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ABSTRACT: 
Use of Trademarks in keyword advertising has been one of the most 
debatable issues in trademark law for several years. This entirely new way of 
using Trademarks over the Internet has provoked a discussion concerning 
the core concepts of Trademark law. Harmonized EU trademark law proved 
to be ambiguous on whether it amounted to trademark infringement or not. 
This ambivalence was also exhibited by the case law of EU Member States. 
European keyword advertisers simply could not tell which use of a 
competitor‘s trademark was lawful. In recent years CJEU has continuously 
expanded the scope and reach of trademark protection in the EU .It is 
notable that Inconsistencies in the court’s system of infringement criteria 
clearly come to the fore and this approach has been criticized by analysts 
who believe that the Court should have adopt a more traditional approach to 
the analysis of trademark infringement, which was suggested by its 
Advocate General, in order to arrive at the same conclusion. The premise on 
which the Court rested its ruling, it is believed, missed salient parts of the 
evidence, circumvented its preexisting jurisprudence, and most of all, 
threatened to open the floodgates of abusive trademark use in the future. 
With reference to above , this thesis will address issue of keyword 
advertising under EU legislations and will evaluate ECJ case law together 
with national members case law.  
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 CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 
1. BACKGROUD OF STUDY  
 
The Internet provides a new and vast platform for millions of users 
worldwide to communicate with each other. It is arguably today‘s most 
important tool for communication. It also provides an importantly huge 
market for businesspeople, and innovative means of transacting business, as 
traditional marketing methods become outmoded. An increasing number of 
companies now try to maintain online presence through the creation of 
individual web pages. This enables them to reach out, and present their 
products to consumers, who equally rely on Internet search engines to locate 
goods and services that meet their needs.  
 Furthermore, growth of the internet has caused more than grand 
opening  for new channels of commerce and communication. It has also 
opened up grand opportunities for competition causing nothing but a stir 
among the legal court system. Commercial use of the internet has generated 
a myriad of lawsuits over intellectual property (IP) issues and specially 
trademark issues.  
During the early 1990’s , trademark disputes pertained more to the use of 
meta tags which is programming code used in the creation of a website. 1 
Meta tags are still powerful tools because they have a direct effect on the 																																																								
1Warner, Elizabeth, "Running Head: Trademark Law and Keyword Advertising" (2004). 
Rochester Institute of Technology paper work , P. 7 .  
frequency with which search engines will find a website. Even though an 
Internet user never sees this code, meta tags have been the subject of 
trademark lawsuits because companies have used them to divert or confuse 
consumers. The deceptive use of another company’s trademark in these or 
similar ways can result in a successful trademark infringement lawsuit, 
leading to an award of financial damages . So , after meta tagging generation 
is outmoded , more recently during another round of trademark issues, 
keyword advertising has become a controversial issue.  
 In respect to above and epidemic issues of keyword advertising , 
companies consider it desirable to maintain a top spot in search engine lists, 
and to develop other strategies for luring users to visit their websites. 
Generally, users do not pay any fees for search engine services whose 
providers rely instead on fees collected from advertisers. Internet users 
typically get two types of results when they enter keywords on search 
engines: the natural results, and the sponsored links. The natural results are 
the normal results of an Internet user‘s search, which are generated without 
the payment of a fee to the service provider, such as Google. 
 The sponsored links, on the other hand, are results that are related to 
the user’s keyword which are displayed at the top of the search engine list  in 
return for fees paid by the sponsors of those links (advertisers). 2  For 
example, a user who searches for the keyword “CAR”  may get results 
showing advertisements by competitors, such as “FIAT” or BMW. 
 When the word which is typed in search engines is general words like 
CAR or CARPET , normally nothing will happened because these words are 																																																								
2 Candice barrett, state regulation of keyword advertising: a lesson from the Utah legislature 
s,(2008 )15 j. intell. prop. p. 281. 
not any person’s exclusive or intellectual property rights and literarily they 
are in public domain and anybody can use them. The problem will arise 
when the keyword used by an advertiser may be a trademark which is 
considered as exclusive right of its owner.  
Indeed, there is an increasing trend in the use of trademarks in 
keyword advertising, both by the proprietors of marks, and their 
competitors3. Search engine owners like Google (through its Adwords 
program) and Yahoo! (through its Sponsored Search program), offer 
services to advertisers, which allow them to use trademarks owned by other 
parties as keywords, in return for a fee. For example, BMW may purchase 
FIAT as a keyword through Google‘s Adwords program. When users 
making an enquiry enter that keyword on the Google search engine, they are 
automatically presented with sponsored links that are related to BMW, 
which appear on top, or the left side of the natural results. The use of 
trademarks as keywords by companies advertising their goods and services 
on the internet give rise to legal problems, particularly in the intellectual 
property right field.  
The issues that have arisen before the court have not been over whether a 
company should be allowed the right to purchase keyword, rather question is 
raised over whether these third parties should be allowed to sell keywords 
that are trademarks, such as the name of a company’s leading competitor.  
 Within the EU, that question has been at the centre of sharp 
disagreements among national courts, which have had to grapple with 
numerous lawsuits brought by trademark proprietors against Google for 																																																								
3Hyeon sookroh , contemplating the legal issues on keyword advertising the asian business lawyer, 
2009 ,  p.107 
perceived trademark infringement. Amid such confusion, national courts 
have relied on the CJEU for interpretive guidance, and  the latter, in its 
rulings, has tried to adapt pre-existing trademark law to new technologies. 
2. STATEMENTS OF PROBLEM  
 
Prima face, keyword advertising strikes the mind as a lawful and beneficial 
advertising program, offering consumers a wide range of options as they 
browse the Internet for goods, or services. The problem with keyword 
advertising, however, lies in the fact that search engine owners permit 
advertisers to make unfair use of protected trademarks as keywords, and link 
the search results to websites owned by those advertisers, which have no 
relationship with the proprietors of the marks. Although advertisers very 
much fancy this practice, it is not so for trademark proprietors who complain 
of trademark infringement and unfair competition. Nevertheless, search 
engine owners are adamant in dismissing claims of trademark infringement, 
understandably, given the enormous profits that they earn from keyword 
advertising. 
 Although keyword advertising achieve popularity between advertisers 
who are looking for more profit and the advertising is one important tool for 
that , so the function of search engines caused to complain of the trademark 
holders and raises the legal issues in relate to trademark infringement and 
unfair competition. However, in contrary because of the large profits and 
income which keyword advertising bring for search engine companies, they 
insist strongly on the spot that keyword advertising does not infringe 
trademark owners’ rights and it is happening totally legally. For trademark 
holders it is not acceptable. in an era that companies have extended their 
trademarks protection to jingles, smells , and shapes they do not expect 
someone freely use their own trademarks for misleading consumers or 
misusing at any intention.  
 They care to their trademark because it has value in several ways. The 
most direct and obvious is the sale of products and services to consumers. 
The combination of the price paid for a product plus the quantity and 
frequently of purchase creates the sales revenues for a business. This is 
converted into profits and ultimately shareholders value. The share price of a 
company is driven by investor’s expectations about the future ability f the 
business to attract customer revenue and extract profit from these.  With 
respect to all mentioned above for all companies it is very important to 
attract consumers and keyword advertising is playing revers for them.4 Most 
of the infringement claims so far brought by trademark proprietors, as well 
as much of the emerging case law relate to Google, which is recognized as 
the world‘s most patronized search engine.5 
 As noted, Google, like other search engines, allows advertisers to use 
protected trademarks as keywords. As a result, many companies have 
brought suits for the infringement of their trademark. This study identifies 
the legal issues implicated in keyword advertising, and analyzes the related 
case law addressing them. 
Another important issue about the problem which is present is passage of 
time. In the traditional market , advertising of products and services entails 
on the one side , the dissemination of information through different 
traditional media - TV advertising, magazine or other advertising media. In 																																																								
4 The Economy of Brand , Jan Lindemann , 2010 , Palgrave Macmillan Publication , UK , P. 6.  
5Mark bartholomew , making a mark in the internet economy: a trademark analysis of search 
engine advertisingǁ (2005), Oklahoma law review , P.364 .  
comprising with traditional advertising, internet advertising is different. 
Consumers exercise their choice of product and services almost instantly , 
spend less time making their buying decisions and expect efficient customer 
services. But , this market should be fair and if some business would make 
use misleading commercial advertising in order to gain profit or retain 
market share, the impact of misleading advertising would have important 
adverse economic consequences on both consumers and businesses. 6 
 So due to above, answer of this question will be so important whether 
keyword advertising is kind of misleading advertising which effects 
consumers or not. Due to non existence of standard definition of online 
advertising and also due to existence of different case law and different 
scholar opinions, answering to this question will be a partial part of my 
thesis. Furthermore at least in Europe national law will soon be modified to 
permit consumer representative organizations to bring representative actions 
on behalf of consumers against distance, and particularly on-line traders 
which involve concept of keyword advertising also. 7 
 So with addressing all presented above , the main problem is that does 
the keyword Ad-Words activities involve any infringement due to European 
laws and directive. Because of growing search engine based advertising 
therefor the trademark holders have started to challenge infringement in 
court .They seek liability and damages for trademark infringement in the 
courts normally. Thesis is going to identify and interplay the function and 
legal issues beyond of keywords advertising and present analysis of related 
European courts case laws to resolve the problem. 
 																																																								
6 Cristina Coteanu, Cyber consumer law and unfair trading practices , Ashgste publication , 2005 , 
p 137.  
7 Internet law ; text and materials , 2nd Ed , Chris Reed , Cambridge University press , p.303. 
3. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
1. What is legal and technical framework of keyword advertising under 
European law?  
I. Is it considered Trademark infringement, if the search engines allow 
advertises to buy competitors trademarks as keyword? 
II. Are search engines like Google or advertisers liable for trademark 
infringement and if how ? 
III. Can we consider keyword advertising as consumer misleading due to 
consumer laws ? 
IV. Due to principle of unfair competitions in Europe , can keyword 
advertising be considered as unfair competition? 
V.  Is keyword advertising infringing any principe of E-commerce 
Directive of Euro? 
VI. Should European legislation provide special protection for trademark 
holder against keyword advertising? 
IV. How do jurisdictional problems arise in respect to the keyword 
advertising ? 
V. To what extent is a search engine operator, that enables an advertiser 
to reserve a keyword that triggers a sponsored search result, liable 
under EU and US law when the reserved keyword corresponds to a 
trademark of the advertiser’s competitors. 
4. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
 
I. Express the definition and the nature of the keyword advertising. 
II. Examination of present legislations to evaluate is it related to keyword 
advertising in any matter to clarify whether is it infringing trademark 
or not ? 
III. Evolution of relation of keyword advertising with consumer confusion 
and consumer misleading and unfair competition.  
IV. Addressing keyword advertising in context of E-commerce Directive 
of EU.  
V. Examination of Euro National courts case law such as Italy and 
France and also important cases of ECJ jurisdictions 
 
5. SIGNIFICANCE OF STUDY 
According to the research study on September 2013, 91 percent of Internet 
users enter to the Internet environment via search engine web pages and uses 
search engines. For instance, 80 percent of people, who want to buy car, 
search for a car by using search engines. 89 According to the website of com 
score search engine usage is important for several reasons, but one of the 
most important reasons is simply understanding where you need to spend 
your time. While Google is the most popular search engine it is also the most 
competitive. On the other hand Bing and Yahoo have a significant share of 
usage compared to ASK and AOL, but Google leads the way with a 
considerable distance from others. Graph below shows share of different 
search engines.10 																																																								
8 Veronica Maria Jarski , How People Search Online [Infographic] , marketing profs website , Sep 
2013. (Visited june 2014) 
9  Nursel Yalçn, “what is search engine optimization: seo?” ,(2010), Procedia Social and 
Behavioral Sciences , No.  9 (2010) 487–493, 
10 Global Search Market Draws More Than 100 Billion Searches per Month,” press release, 
comScore,August 31, 2009, (accessed December 2017) 
  
 
 
 
 
Furthermore due to an industry survey conducted by PwC and sponsored by 
the Interactive Advertising Bureau (IAB) Internet advertising revenues 
(“revenues”) in the United States totaled $72.5 billion for the full year of 
2016 and these revenues for the full year of 2016 increased 22% over 
2015.11 
																																																																																																																																																																					
http://www.comscore.com/Press_Events/Press_Releases/2009/8/Global_Search_Market_Draws_More_tha
n_100_ Billion_Searches_per_Month  
11IAB Internet Advertising Revenue Report conducted by Price water house Coopers (PWC) ,. 
Available at :http://www.iab.net/  
  
 
 
 
 
 
In order to find out how online advertising has grown from pas times it is 
better to have a look how it shaped and changed during a period of Ten 
years. The below graph show value of online advertising from 2007-2016. 
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Importantly, due to the European Commission Eurostat finding in the EU 
Six in ten Internet users shopped online in 2013, which strictly show 
importance of advertising of products on the Internet. Buying over the 
internet has become very popular in the EU, with 61 % of internet users in 
2013 using it to buy or order goods or services for private purposes, an 
increase of eleven percentage points compared with 2008. The share of e-
shoppers among internet users varied considerably between Member States: 
the highest proportions were registered in the United Kingdom (85 %), 
Denmark (81 %) and Germany (80 %), and the lowest in Romania (15 %), 
Bulgaria (22 %), Estonia (28 %) and Italy (32 %).12 
Therefore, this statistic shows the value of online advertising and at 
the same time it reflects that the keyword advertising is so effective for the 
advertisers and the users of the Internet because most of internet users are 																																																								
12 Eurostat European Commission , Internet use statistics - individuals findings , Available at: 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php/Internet_use_statistics_-_individuals#E-
shopping_trends 
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looking for products and services. This new trademark issue in scope of 
intellectual property rights can bear problems for society even for the courts 
and it has proved it is one of the hottest issues among intellectual property 
matters. Internet has provided new area for infringement of trademark and 
consumer confusion by trademark and disordering E-Commerce, which had 
lots of difference with traditional trademark infringement provisions and 
principals , so it can caused to misuse and misunderstood. The new word of 
internet brings  with its huge profits, also serious problems for the society. 
As the Challenges are new to the lawyers, scholars ,  business companies 
and the courts, they should try to adapt themselves and it is going to affect 
litigation issues and legal theories with emerge of new challenges. 
  The significance of this study is explaining the new issue of 
intellectual property over the internet, relating to trademarks, explains the 
factors for infringement, and tries to find the liabilities and responsibilities 
on it. With regard to case laws, which was brought in this area and the 
legislation on different countries on it. This research tries to resolve and 
clearance of ambiguity in the issue of trademarks law and particularly on 
keyword advertising. 
 With regard to the nature of the keyword advertising, which is new 
international issue and because of that, my research could not be limited to 
specific country such as Italy , so all countries and specially European 
countries can use and benefited. In addition will be useful for lawyers 
,courts, scholars students, companies  , and internet users which are daily 
using internet as the source to finding clear data’s which may misused by 
search engine confusion of customer.  
This study will discuss the significant issue relating to keyword 
advertising and will propose the solution for it. In addition, the study 
introduces keyword advertising and then clears the legal issues about 
trademark infringement , consumer confusion and unfair competition and E-
commerce issues and alongside will address theories related to keyword 
advertising, then discuss the litigation of some European county and ECJ. 
  Also , the research will enhance knowledge of the economic rationale 
for trademark protection, as well as the impact of protection on free 
competition. It will examine whether trademark rights may be qualified so as 
to reconcile trademark law with competition law. In this sense, the research 
offers scope for trademark law to evolve with contemporary social and 
economic developments. Here, the research will draw on seminal theoretical 
contributions that have persistently grappled, albeit without consistency, 
with trademark valuation for the purposes of rights conferment, and the ideal 
role that the use of trademarks should serve.13 
 
6. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND APPROACH 
 
The key objective of this research is to critically analyse the development of 
trademark protection law as a means through which owners can distinguish 
their products from those of rivals and the aim is to provide a legal analysis 																																																								
13 F. Schechter, 'The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection', Harvard Law Review, 40 (6) (Apr 1927), 
813-33; Landes and Posner, 'The Economics of Trademark Law', (; H. Rosler, 'The Rationale for European 
Trade Mark Protection', European Intellectual Property Review, 29(3) (2007), 100-07; N. Economides, 
'The Economics of Trademarks', Trademark Reporter, 78 (1988), 523-39; J. Phillips, Trade Mark Law: A 
Practical Anatomy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003); Cornish and Llewelyn, Intellectual 
Property: Patents, Copyright, Trademarks and Allied Rights; L. Bently and B. Sherman, Intellectual 
Property Law (3rd edn.; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) 
by applying a legal dogmatic method combining a descriptive and analytical 
study of the EU legislation, case law and doctrine on the issue of keyword-
triggered advertising. Therefore, research will examine the liability of 
keyword vendors, as well as the defences available to third party purchasers 
and users of their products and particular attention will be given to the 
impact of keywords on the conventional role of trademarks, including how 
the ECJ has attempted to grapple with this problem.  
  In the above regard, reference will be had to the evolution of 
trademark protection under ECJ jurisprudence to provide deeper insights 
into potentially ideal modes of protection for trademark rights in light of the 
functions they perform, or are expected to perform. The analysis will foster 
better understanding of what is currently perceived as the rational premise 
for trademark protection under substantive law generally, and case law 
especially, as well as the constraints such protection may bring upon on free 
competition. The case law, in particular, reflects considerable dissonance in 
judicial opinions on how to integrate the desirability of trademark protection 
with free trade and consumer interest in the context of the unprecedented 
wealth of information made available by the Internet..  
Also , the analysis will be extended to other economic functions that may 
impact the degree of protection under Article 5 Trade Mark Directive 
(TMD), specifically, Articles 5(1)(a), and 5(2). Simultaneously, 
contradictions observable in the criteria for the determination of trademark 
infringement will be highlighted, thereby furthering appreciation of the 
challenges associated with trademark protection under the TMD, especially 
with regard to online keyword advertising.  
  In performing the tasks outlined above, a qualitative library-based 
approach is adopted involving the content analysis of materials obtained 
from primary and secondary sources. The primary sources include relevant 
regulations, directives, and statutes originating from the EU as well as the 
case law of the CJEU. The secondary sources consulted are a variety of law 
and non-law textbooks, reports, studies, journal articles.  
  Since keyword advertising is a relatively new subject in EU law, most 
of the materials that have addressed it, consist in review articles. Those 
articles are examined in order to unveil the thoughts of legal writers within 
the EU on the legal position regarding keyword advertising. The websites of 
inter- governmental bodies, government agencies, and civil society 
organizations have also provided valuable inputs. In addition, this candidate 
attended and will attend national, regional, and international seminars on 
issues relating to trademarks, and keyword advertising. Participation in such 
fieldwork will make it possible to access useful materials that are not 
normally available in libraries. 
 
7. LITERATURE REVIEW 	
Through the use of Google’s search engine, users are able to access virtually 
everything on the Internet. When they enter a search term on the engine, two 
types of results are generated, natural, and sponsored results.14 The natural 
results cover all material on the Internet as catalogued by Google at the time 																																																								
14 PJ Greene, ‘Keyword advertising, and other invisible uses of third party trade marks in online 
advertising – a New Zealand/Australasian perspective’ (2009) 40 Victoria University of Wellington Law 
Review , p. 106.  
the search is conducted, which are related to the term entered on the search 
engine. These results are arranged with the aid of Google’s search algorithm 
based on their relation to the search term, such that those that are most 
related to it appear at the top of the list.  
The sponsored results, on the other hand, are results related to 
Google’s AdWords. The Google’s AdWords program allows third party 
advertisers to buy their preferred keywords and to link advertisements that 
are related to those keywords. 15 Advertisements related to a keyword are 
generated as sponsored results whenever an Internet user enters a search 
term that coincides with that keyword. The ranking of these advertisements 
on the results list depends largely, though not exclusively, on the price an 
advertiser has paid to Google to purchase a keyword. This, in effect, means 
that it is Google, which specifically determines the ranking of sponsored 
advertisements, while that of the natural results depends on the state of the 
Internet at the material time.  
In those situations, Google’s AdWords may clash with the rights of 
trademark owners, in the sense that, keywords purchased by advertisers, are 
identical or similar to protected trademarks, and those advertisers are neither 
the owners of those trademarks, nor parties authorised by their owners to use 
them.16  
																																																								
15 A Tan, ‘Google AdWords: Trademark Infringer or Trademark Liberalizer?’ (2010) 16 Michigan 
Telecommunications and Technology Law Review 273, p. 476. 
16 G Psaroudakis, ‘In search of the trade mark functions: keyword advertising in European law, European 
Intellectual Property Review, 2012, p. 33.  
Among competitors, as well as trademark proprietors, the use of 
trademarks in keyword advertising has increased. In this connection, the 
doctrine of trade mark use helps in enabling trademark law to serve the 
important function of promoting the buying and selling of products, as well 
as reducing costs for consumers in terms of the time spent in searching for 
desired products.17 
 Without question, Internet users derive benefits from search engines. 
they are offered alternatives that are related to the products searched for, in 
addition to information on a wide variety of other new products. To many 
trademark proprietors, however, search engines are a source of concern. 
They are considered to violate trademark law in that they permit competitors 
to ride freely on the hard won goodwill of trademark proprietors.18 
These novel trademark issues arising from the internet present legal 
and policy challenges to courts. While the emergent technologies may 
infringe the reputation and goodwill of trademark proprietors, they 
simultaneously enhance competition, increase consumer choices, improve 
quality, and reduce prices. More complexity is added to these problems by 
the fact that trademark infringement arising from the Internet is different in 
nature from the traditional trademark infringement cases. Courts are, 
therefore, compelled to adapt existing approaches for dealing with 
traditional trademark infringement disputes to those arising from the 
Internet. 
																																																								
17Isaiah A. Fishman,―why are competitor's advertising links displayed when i google my 
product? an analysis of internet search engine liability for trademark infringementǁ,(2006), 5J The John 
Marshall review of intellectual property L. 431 , p. 433.  
18stacey l. dogant & mark lemley , trademark use requirement in dilution casesǁ ,(2008), santa 
clara computer & high technology Vol. 24 , Issue 3 , 2007 , p. 544.  
 For little known brands, the use of famous trademarks can help to 
boost access to Internet users. This is because when users enter those marks 
on a search engine, the generated results are linked to advertisements 
belonging to the less famous brands,thereby bringing them to the attention of 
users.19 
 The main policy goal underlying trademark protection is the 
prevention of consumer confusion. The proprietors of trademarks may 
prevent third parties from using their marks on the premise that doing so is 
necessary to prevent consumer confusion. Thus, the philosophical basis of 
trademark law is not the protection of marks per se, but the protection of 
consumers from confusion. In effect, the chief aim of trademark law is the 
protection of the consuming public, and not trademark proprietors. But given 
all that, it is equally believed that the use of trademarks in keyword 
advertising helps, rather than harms consumers. 
 Nevertheless, some national courts in the EU chose a broad 
interpretation of use, leading to a finding of liability for trademark 
infringement. By contrast, others favored a more traditional interpretation of 
trademark use, which generally exonerated search engine owners, 
particularly Google, from liability. Therefore, a persistent question has been 
whether Google can lawfully sell trademarks as keywords, or whether it may 
be held liable for trademark infringement when users enter trademarked 
keywords on its search engine.20 
																																																								
19Gregory shea, Trademarks and keyword banner advertisingǁ,(2002), southern California law 
review, Vol. 75:529 , p. 535. 
20Stephanie Yu Lim, Can Google be Liable for Trademark Infringement? A Look at the 
"Trademark Use" Requirement as Applied to Google AdWordsǁ(2007), ucla entertainment law review,14: 
265 , p. 431.  
About state of the art in case of keyword advertising in European 
legislations within the European Union, the Trademark Directive and the 
Community Trademark Regulation govern the European Union trademark 
law. Article 5 of the Trademark Directive and Article 9 of the Community 
Trademark Regulation sets out circumstances where a trademark owner has 
the right to prohibit a third party’s use of the trademark owner’s trademark. 
Many Member States’ national courts have struggled with the question of 
whether or not an unauthorized use of someone else’s trademark as a 
keyword in an advertisement on the Internet constitutes trademark 
infringement. Given that the Member States’ courts have reached different 
conclusions on the issue, national courts have referred questions to the Court 
of Justice of the European Union for the Court to interpret the Trademark 
Directive and the Community Trademark Regulation. 
In reference to history of keyword advertising , in 2003 Louis Vuitton 
which is a very famous French Brand of luxury fashion manufacture found 
that Google is displaying advertisements of websites that are mostly 
imitation products when internet users were searching for Louis Vuitton 
products in search engine specially Google. The company legal team 
brought law suit against for trademark infringement in a French regional 
court in order to condemn Google for infringement of company’s exclusive 
rights on Louis Vuitton trademark. The court found that actually Google was 
offering the word “Louis Vuitton” to its Internet users in keyword 
suggestion tool. So, on the basis of obvious act of Google the court 
announced that Google is liable for trademark infringement and then another 
court which was intermediate court affirmed the ruling on this case. This 
decision was like a bomb explosion among IP scholars. Then, Google 
appealed to de court de causation , in order to ask for clarification on several 
issues of the EU law, specially they asked for interpretation of Trademark 
Directive 1989. Cour de cassation referred Three question of the Google to 
the ECJ for ruling and questions summary was about weather Google is 
liable for trademark infringement or not. 21 In an advisory opinion which 
brought lots of crisis advocate general Poiares Maduro recommend that ECJ 
should not find Google liable for infringement due to the 1989 Trademark 
Infringement. Advocate general mentioned that there should be a Four prong 
test in order to tell Google is infringing.  
First, a defendant’s use of a trademark must lack the proprietor’s 
consent. Second, the use must happen in the “course of trade.” Third, the use 
must relate to goods or services “identical or similar” to ones covered by the 
trademark. Fourth, use must affect or be liable to affect the functions of the 
trademark. Particularly important among these functions is the “essential” 
one of guaranteeing the origin of goods or services. Uses that raise a 
likelihood of confusion undermine this “essential function.22 
 Due to this Four prong test Advocate General analyzed AdWords as 
two separate uses; one when Google allowed advertisers to select keywords 
initially and a second when Google displayed advertisers to select keywords 
initially and a second when Google displayed advertisements in response to 
keywords entered by internet users. Louis Vuitton consented to neither use 
and both uses occurred in the course of trade in the manner of that Google is 
profiting from advertising in course of trade.  
 However, it was found by the advocate general that such display of 
advertisings by Google just fulfilled the third prong of the infringement test 
because only at that stage was a link established between the trademarked 																																																								
21 Google France, 2010 ECJ EUR-Lex LEXIS  
22 Opinion of Advocate General Poiares Maduro,  
keywords and goods that were “identical or similar” to Louis Vuitton’s 
products. In contrast, at the earlier selection stage no such link was 
established because the marketed service, inclusion in Ad-Words, was 
neither similar nor identical to Louis Vuitton’s goods.23 
Hence, the Advocate General reached the fourth prong of the 
infringement test only with respect the display of advertisements. He found 
that such display was not sufficient to under- mine the essential function of 
trademarks — to guarantee the origin of goods — because it did not lead to 
confusion. Although the Advocate General acknowledged that advertisers 
paid for the benefit of the “expectation of being relevant to the search,” he 
emphasized that search results often disappointed the particular expectations 
of individual users. For such reasons, internet users assessed the origin of 
goods or services only on the basis of the content of the advertisement and, 
ultimately, the advertised websites. 24 
Court of Justice of the European Union began to rule on the issue in 2010, 
when it reached decisions in three different cases it was faced with. These 
three judgments mark the formulation of the Community case law regarding 
keyword-triggered advertising within the EU and later this issue continued 
also until now.  
 This approach has been criticized by analysts who believe that the 
Court should have adopted a more traditional approach to the analysis of 
trademark infringement, which was suggested by its Advocate General, in 
																																																								
23 TRADEMARK LAW INFRINGEMENT LIABILITY ; EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE 
HOLDS THAT SEARCH ENGINES DO NOT INFRINGE TRADEMARKS , Harvard Law Review ,  Vol. 
124 , p. 650 .  
24 Ibid 
order to arrive at the same conclusion25. The premise on which the Court 
rested its ruling, it is believed, missed salient parts of the evidence, 
circumvented its pre-existing jurisprudence, and most of all, threatened to 
open the floodgates of abusive trademark use in the future. 
 With the emergence of keyword advertising, disagreements have 
arisen over the normal functions of a trademark protected under Article 5(1) 
TMD. There are also questions about how to address the conflicting interests 
of search engine owners, trademark proprietors, advertisers, and the 
consuming public. At the initial stages of the ongoing disagreements, 
attention focused on whether the use of a trademarked keyword in 
generating advertisements constituted use‘ of the relevant mark by the 
search engine owner, the advertiser, or both of them, and therefore, whether 
the matter fell under harmonized EU trademark law; or was better tackled 
under national tort, or unfair competition laws.26 
 Furthermore many scholars evaluated the keyword advertising under 
concept completion law and unfair competition acts. The argued Trademark 
owners advance several arguments against the legality of search engine 
companies allowing third-party trademarks to be bought for keyword 
advertising. The basic claim trademark owners make is that search engines 
are being unjustly enriched by exploiting trademarks without permission in 
order to earn substantial profits. Such specific claims include also unfair 
competition . 
																																																								
25 Joined cases c-236/08, c-237/08 & c- 238/08, google france sarl v. louis vuitton malletier sa, 
2010 ecj eur-lex lexis 119 
26 Alexander von Mühlendahl,The Max-Planck study on the overall functioning of the European 
trade mark system ǁ,(2011), ECTA(Europian Communities Trade Mark Association) , p. 122. 
The trademark owners argue that because the search engines are using 
the marks in commerce in connection with the selling or advertising of 
goods and services in such a way that is likely to cause confusion, all 
elements needed to constitute unfair competition are met. 27 
 The owners argue that keyword advertising can result in confusion for 
the consumers because most of the advertisements are placed on the search 
results page as "sponsored links," and it is not clear who sponsors the 
advertisement.  In opposite search engine argued before that  Additionally, 
the search engines argue that, because advertisers use their own names in the 
advertisements when referring to the identity of the source of their goods or 
services, the likelihood of confusion argument fails. 28 
 Due to all what mentioned above keyword advertising it is observed 
that more and more companies advertise on the web, the legality of keyword 
advertising practices has become the newest battle in a series of conflicts 
over how much protection trademarks should be given in cyberspace and 
this is still questionable.  
 
 
 
 
 																																																								
27 SheldonH.Klein&HenryHuffnagle, IV,SpktDecisions: The Issue of "Use" in the Context of 
Search Engine Kqword-Tggered Advertisng, No. 12 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. 1, 1 (2007). P. 19.  
28J. Anderwood ,  State regulation of keyword advertising : A lesson from Utah legislative ,  15 J. 
Intell. Property , 2008 , p. 282. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER TWO: LEGAL AND TECHNICAL ASPECTS OF 
KEYWORD ADVERTISING 
 
 
1. THE INTERNET AND ITS IMPORTANCE 
 
The Internet is a network of computers that can intercommunicate packets of 
data via telephonic connection through the transmission control 
protocol/internet protocol (TCP/IP) standards. The Internet prototype was 
designed and developed in 1969 by Bolt, Beranek, and Newman Inc., under 
contract with the Advance Research Project Agency (ARPA) of the U.S. 
Department of Defense. In 1996, ARPA was renamed the Defense 
Advanced Research Projects Agency. The resulting network became known 
as the “ARPANET.” U.S. universities joined ARPANET in the 1970s, and 
connections to some European universities were made at the end of that 
decade. The defense application was segregated in 1983 and then 
ARPANET ceased to exist in 1990. The Internet began to be upended to 
commercial internet service providers after 1992 and, through them, to 
private individuals.29 
 The Internet has positively changed human life. It has made life easier 
and has promoted the people’s welfare. The Internet, or the "World Wide 
Web" (WWW), is a worldwide network that makes connections among 
millions of computers that facilitate communication and exchange of 
information.30 
The Internet has become a major part of human life and has provided 
a great venue to learn, search, communicate, perform online transactions, 
and shop, among others. It has become the main source of information in 
any area.31 The WWW is now the primary source of information for a large 
number of consumers. Moreover, the Internet has become a new channel for 
many products and services over the last few years.32 
 Accordingly, the Internet provides new ways of conducting business 
in the modern world. It has a larger bigger market than that of traditional 																																																								
29 R. Rahman, Computer Science Handbook, UKM Publication , 2014 , p. 16.  
30Yelena Dunaevsky ―Don‘t Confuse Metatags with Initial Interest Confusionǁ, (2001), 29(3), 
Fordham Urban Law Journal , p. 618.  
31Gholam R. Amin, Ali Emrouznejad , Optimizing search engines results using linear 
programmingǁ, Journal of expert system with applications ,  (2011), 38(9) ,p. 1537 
32Purushottam Papatla, Feng (Oliver) Liu―Google or BizRate? How search engines and 
comparison sites affect unplanned choices of online retailersǁ, (2009), 62(11), Elsevier, p. 1042. 
channels for sales. Consequently, companies need Internet-based marketing 
activities to attract customers in faster and more effective ways. This 
worldwide network of computers brings together buyers and sellers and 
provides a new competitive environment where companies can conduct 
business. Furthermore, it has become a wide market place for consumers to 
find and obtain products, as individual buyers and sellers are matched 
according to product offerings and needs.33 
 The Internet has made a fundamental change in the manner by which 
consumers obtain information by facilitating consumer search and purchase 
patterns.34 Consumers generally have several ways to access information on 
products that aid them in making purchase decisions in the traditional 
manner, such as regular mass media (e.g., television, radio, newspapers, and 
magazine), people (e.g., inquiry to friends, family, or experts), information 
provided by the producers or manufacturers (advertisements, catalogues, or 
companies’ marketing representatives), and personal observation and 
experience.35  
On the one hand, customers can bring together all traditional channels 
of information in this manner. They can also find reliable information and 
product catalogues from the official web sites of companies, watch or read 
web advertising, and use the web sites that provide experts’ critical reviews 
on products. On the other hand, producers or manufacturers can ask users to 
share their experiences or opinions on their products or services. Moreover, 																																																								
33Lisa R. Klein, John A. Quelch, (1997), 14(5), "Business-to-business market making on the 
Internet," International Marketing Review, p. 352. 
34Ghose and Yang ―An Empirical Analysis of Search Engine Advertising: Sponsored Search in 
Electronic Marketsǁ, (2009), 29(3), Management Science, Articles in Advance, p. 7. 
35Christopher Skinner, (2010), 11(6), "Innovation in the internet age", Business Strategy Series, p. 
409. 
they provide a discussion area in their web sites where users can place their 
queries. For example, many web sites in the tourism industry, such as 
Agoda36 and Trip advisor37, provide in-depth details on destinations, hotels, 
and services that help users gather information before making decisions. 
 In this regard, the Internet is a huge source of information and a 
communication tool, with over 2.6 billion search queries per day on Google 
alone. Clearly, a great opportunity for business beyond e-commerce exists.38 
 Business organizations need to represent themselves on the Internet to 
attract more customers and to increase public awareness of their 
organizations and products to increase sales. Internet popularity and the low 
cost of publishing information on the WWW have caused the increase in 
utilization of cyberspace for businesses. Millions of users globally can view 
the web pages of different companies as the Internet is easily accessible at an 
affordable price. Consumers can search for the products of a company and 
ask questions directly to the company without going to the store, which is 
important to save money and time. The traditional ways of advertising will 
no longer influence consumer perception and behavior in this new and 
amazing market.  
Therefore, companies have to come up with new advertising channels 
to attract customers and connect with them. Technically, dealing with 
customers in cyberspace is useful in eliminating communication cost. The 
information provided on the web site enables customers to find the answers 
																																																								
36WWW.GEDODA.COM 
37WWW.TRIPADVISOR,COM  
38Christopher Skinner, (2010), 11(6), "Innovation in the Internet Age", Business Strategy Series, p. 
409.  
to their inquiries themselves.39 Initially, obtaining specific information from 
the abundant information on the Internet was not easy. Today, search 
engines have become the main tool for surfing the Internet.40 This practical 
tool plays an important role in connecting sellers and buyers. The next 
section discusses the history and function of search engines.  
2. SEARCH ENGINES 
2.1.Search Engine Definition 		
The growth of the Internet as a massive and dynamic repository of the 
world’s information continues at an unprecedented rate. The depth of 
expanding information that resides in billions of servers around the world is 
logically impossible to grasp. Internet users rely on search engines to find 
information. 41  According to some scholars, “when the search engine 
software finds pages that match the search request, it presents the user with 
brief descriptions and clickable links to the web page.”42 
Generally, “searching” is a major activity on the Web and it uses keys. 
Search engines are frequently used for accessing information. The amount of 
queries and search results is in thousands or even millions because of the 
large and widespread information on the Web.43 
																																																								
39Karen A. Forcht, (1996), 4(4), "Doing business on the Internet: marketing and security aspects", 
Information Management & Computer Security, p. 4. 
40Nadia Abou Nabout, Bernd Skiera―Return on Quality Improvements in Search Engine 
Marketingǁ, (2012), 26(3), Journal of Interactive Marketing , p. 141.  
41Tasneem Fidali ,An evaluation on how keyword advertising affects Google search results , 
Master thesis ,San Jose State University , 2006 , p. 14. 
42 Poremsky , Diane , Visual quickstart guide: Google and other search engines , Berkeley, CA: 
Preachpit press , p. 18.  
43J. Bar-Ilan et al.―Methods for comparing rankings of search engine resultsǁ, (2006), 50(10), 
Computer Networks, p. 1448. 
 Search engines are defined as powerful tools that assist consumers in 
their activities in the online environment. These tools help users find better 
information in an efficient manner.44 They function as mediators between 
consumers and online information. The most frequently used search engines 
to locate information on the Web are Google and Yahoo.45 
Recent surveys show that about 120 million American adults (84% of 
the adult Internet population in the United States) used search engines in the 
past and that about 59 million American adults use search engines on a 
typical day. A shopper may use Web search tools to look up pre-purchase 
product information (prices, designs, styles, reviews, etc.), even if the 
transaction is ultimately executed offline.46 
 With regard to Internet World Stats (2010) between 2000 and 2010, 
the number of Internet users worldwide more than quadrupled from fewer 
than half a billion to 1.9 billion. Approximately 85% of Internet users 
bought at least one product online, and search engines supported 37% of 
their purchase decisions. 
2.2.Emergence of Search Engines  
 
The WWW Worm, which was one of the first search engines, had an index 
of 110,000 web pages and accessible documents. By the late 1997, some 
search engines claimed to index up to 100 million web pages. Similarly, the 
number of searches conducted grew rapidly. The WWW Worm received an 																																																								
44C. Flavián-Blanco et al.―Analyzing the emotional outcomes of the online search behavior 
with search enginesǁ, (2011), 27(1), Computers in Human Behavior, p. 540. 
45Gholam R. Amin, Ali Emrouznejad―Optimizing search engines results using linear 
programmingǁ, (2011), 38(9). 
46N. Kumar, K.R. Lang―Do search terms matter for online consumers? The interplay between 
search engine query specification and topical organizationǁ, (2007), 44(1) 
average of about 1,500 queries per day in March and April of 1994. Alta 
Vista, a then popular search engine, claimed it handled roughly around 20 
million queries per day by November 1997. The demand for more relevant 
and faster search results increased because of the competition among search 
engines and required search engines to improve their search technology to 
meet user demands.47  
2.3. Search Engines Technology and its Financial Importance 
Search engines gather data by deploying robot programs that are fully 
automated and index pages on the Internet. Search engines generally respond 
to queries by finding and indexing large numbers of web sites, which they 
display according to their relevance to the user’s search. Each result is 
ranked by its relevance to the query. 
 Search engines use special software called spider or bot to collect data 
from web sites. The collected data include the web site URL, keywords that 
define the content of the web site, the code structure that forms the web 
page, and links provided on the web site. This program moves by using the 
hyperlink structure of the Web. It navigates through web pages periodically 
and captures changes that have been made since its last navigation. Then, the 
search engine indexes and stores them in a database. This database is 
referred to as the index of the search engine, and the performed operation is 
called indexing. Therefore, when a user searches the Web to collect data or 
information, the query is transferred to the search engine index and the 
results are shown to users (query). An essential competition factor among 
search engines is the sorting process and display of relevant results. Pages 
relevant to a performed query are determined and shown to users in a sorted 																																																								
47 Amir Mortazavi , Master thesis in computer sciences , USM University , 2012 , p. 16 
list structure. At this point, search engine algorithms take on the important 
role of determining and showing the most relevant results to users.48 
In brief, search engines collect data using robots from each Web URL and 
store them in a database for when users perform queries through them. They 
also use the database as reference to show the results. 
 Technically, search engines gather data by deploying robot programs 
that are fully automated to index pages on the Internet. These robot 
programs, as mentioned above, are spiders or crawlers. These robots in 
Google create lists of findings automatically. The robot programs 
periodically visit pages on the Internet to check whether any information on 
the page has been updated. The programs automatically add new information 
to the index if they find updated information on the pages.49 Important 
elements for updates, such as page titles, text on the page, and other 
elements, play a role in how Web pages are categorized and presented in 
searches. Users are able to access these indexes when they search for 
information through a search engine. 
Search technology has improved with the developments in 
information technology, and the ability of search programs to get faster and 
more relevant search results has been enhanced along with it. Many search 
engines have started to incorporate reading meta tags as part of their 
indexing formula and use tags to position, rank, and categorize web sites in 
results. Commercial sites started to scramble to attract visitors as the number 
of web pages increased exponentially on the Internet. Webmasters added 																																																								
48Jin Zhang, Search engines‘ responses to several search feature selections, (2010), 42(3), The 
International Information & Library Review, p. 212. 
49Tasneem Fidali ,An evaluation on how keyword advertising affects Google search results , 
Master thesis ,San Jose State University , 2006 , p. 16. 
popular search keywords to meta tags not related to the content on the page. 
Rogue web pages could then be accessed frequently and receive high 
ranking. Search engines took action against Webmasters who manipulate 
search results by excluding the pages altogether from their search results to 
provide relevant results. 50  Companies realized that they had to use 
innovative ways to advertise to get the attention of search engines users 
because of the way search engines are tied to keyword advertising, which is 
caused by the sophistication of the search software that weeds out irrelevant 
sites. Advertisers have started to buy the most frequently searched keywords 
related to their products from search engines so that their sites would appear 
frequently in the search results.  
The major reason for the popularity of search engine marketing lies in 
its unique ability to customize an ad for the keyword in the customer’s 
search. This customization attracts qualified visitors with potential intention 
to buy from the advertisers’ web sites. 51  This highly popular online 
advertising format is also known as search engine marketing, keyword 
advertising, and paid or sponsored search. Statistics shows that 47% of the 
total worldwide online advertising expenditure in 2009 in the United States 
alone reached $10.7 billion.52 This type of advertising has become the 
largest source of revenue for search engines.53 
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search engine marketingǁ, (2012), 29(1), Intern. J. of Research in, p. 68. 
52Nadia Abou Nabout, Bernd Skiera―Return on Quality Improvements in Search Engine 
Marketingǁ, (2012), 26(3), Journal of Interactive Marketing, p. 141. 
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 In short, the mechanism of keyword adverting works in such a way 
that users receive two types of results when they type keywords into search 
engine bars, namely, unsponsored and sponsored search results. 
Unsponsored or natural search results depend on result relevancy. The 
display of natural results is free of charge in contrast to the sponsored search 
results (located on the top right-hand side), which advertisers pay for each 
click on their ad. The price and ranking paid per click depends on the 
keyword auction. Yahoo and Google are two market leaders that use similar 
auction designs. Generally, advertisers offer a bid for each keyword for each 
click, and the search engine provider values the offered bid according to the 
ad’s quality, which is measured by the proprietary quality score. Currently, 
the sale of advertisements placed on search result pages is a major source of 
income for many of popular search engines. Google also earn the largest part 
of its revenues through Ad-Words. 
The graph in below shows how much is Google revenue from Google 
advertising from 2001-2016.54 
																																																								
54 Available at: https://www.statista.com/statistics/266249/advertising-revenue-of-google/ 
	
Advertising is any paid form of non-personal communication about an 
organization, product, service, or idea by an identified sponsor. Advertising 
was originally established in print media, such as newspapers and 
magazines, and then it was applied to the television and radio broadcast 
scenes. However, advertising has started to shift away from the traditional 
print and broadcast media toward the growing online advertising industry 
because of the popularity of online services.55 
 In the last 20 years, a number of different approaches to online 
advertising have been devised. The current incarnation is that a business 
purchases either an ad space from an online publisher or search keywords, 
usually through an advertising agency as an intermediary. Search keywords 
are bought on the basis of a particular piece of text (e.g., eBay may buy the 																																																								
55Hamed Sadegh Neshat , Effective Online Advertising , Master thesis ,  Simon Frasor University 
Thesis 2011 , P. 19 .  
keyword “used DVD”), and the search engines display an ad if the keyword 
bid is high enough and the ad content is deemed relevant enough. The 
advertiser pays the search engine a certain amount of money, called the cost-
per-click, if the ad is clicked on. Non-search advertising is typically called 
“display advertising,” and its business model is more varied and different 
from search advertising. Typically, an advertiser or agency purchases an ad 
space through an online publisher such as Google.56 
 Generally, online advertising is a form of promotion that uses the 
Internet and the WWW for delivering marketing messages to attract 
customers. Examples of online advertising are contextual ads on search 
engine results pages, banner ads, rich media ads, social network advertising, 
interstitial ads (placing commercial messages between the current and 
destination page), online classified advertising, advertising networks, and 
email marketing (including email spam).  
Differences exist among the types of advertising. For instance, paid 
search differs from traditional advertising in that companies do not pay to 
have their ads displayed. Companies only pay when their ad is clicked on by 
a user. This pay-for-performance format substantially reduces the wastage 
incurred by advertisers compared with traditional pay-per-exposure 
advertising formats.57 The tool being a high target is another reason why 
paid search leads to limited wastage compared with other media. A 
company’s ad is only triggered by a specific keyword, which enables the 
company to reach a more targeted audience. Furthermore, the ads are 																																																								
56John Chandler-Pepelnjak  , Modeling Conversions In Online Advertising , PhD thesis , 
University of Montana , 2010 , p. 17. 
57Animesh, A., Viswanathan, S., Agarwal, R., 2011, “Competing “Creatively” in Sponsored 
Search Markets: The Effect of Rank, Differentiation Strategy, and Competition on Performance”, 
Information Systems Research, Vol. 22, No. 1, pp. 153–169. 
considered far less intrusive than online banner or pop-up ads because they 
are based on the consumers’ own queries.58 
 With respect to paid search advertising, some inter-government 
agencies reported Google as a global leader as it holds 86% of the market 
share. BingHoo (representing the integration of Bing and Yahoo’s platform 
in 2010) and Baidu have a market share of 7% and 6%, respectively, in the 
global paid search market.59 
3. GOOGLE  
3.1.Historical Overview of Google Website  	
Google is the world’s most preferred search engine, as it is used by 80% of 
Internet users worldwide. Google is one of the most profitable advertising 
tools, with a large number of people using its search results. The name 
"Google" originated from the word "googol," which is a term used by 
mathematician Milton Sirotta to refer to the number represented by the 
numeral 1 followed by 100 zeros. The chosen name represents Google's 
mission “to organize the immense, seemingly infinite amount of information 
available on the web.”60 
Larry Page and Sergey Brin, two Stanford students from California, 
USA, founded Google in 1998. Through word of worth, Google developed 
quickly into a large company in only 10 years. It has become so well-known 
that "Google someone or something" is now a common phase used when 
searching the Internet for someone or something. According to Google, Page 																																																								
58Ghose and Yang, 2009a, “An Empirical Analysis of Search Engine Advertising: Sponsored 
Search in Electronic Markets”, Management Science, Vol. 55, No. 10, pp. 1605–1622. 
59Covario, 2012, “Paid Search Grows 17% in Second Quarter”, accessed August 6, 2014: 
< http://www.covario.com/phocadownload/design/q2- 12_gpssa_FNL.pdf>. 
60Google’s official website , Company overview http://www.google.com/about/company/ 
and Brin wanted to collect the world's information and make it available for 
everyone. Google's services are free, easy to use, and deliver relevant results 
in less than a second. The founders want their users to know when someone 
has paid to be shown on their site, which is why they chose to differentiate 
the search results from paid ads. 
3.2.Google Ad-Words  	
After the invention of search engines, advertisers found that customers hit on 
search engine web sites more than any other web sites. Search engine web 
sites that receive millions of hits daily present great opportunities for 
advertisers. Pay-per click advertising began with Bill Gross who developed 
the idea for the first pay-per-click (PPC) search engine called Goto.com, 
which was later bought by Yahoo in 2003. At the beginning, people were not 
interested in PPC search engines because of the advertisement on them. PPC 
search engines did not become popular until the late 2000s when Google 
introduced its AdWords. Paid search as an industry grew from a base in the 
low millions to $4 billion in revenue in the late 1990s to 2004. Google’s 
total advertising revenues in 2010 was $28 billion and that for the third 
quarter of 2012 was around $10 billion.61 
The widespread use of Internet searching and online shopping has 
created a huge effect on commerce and consumer purchasing habits. The 
world has over 2.4 billion Internet users as of February 2013. North America 
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has recorded over 273 million Internet users alone; this fact means that 
search engines are more than willing to promote their advertisements.62 
 AdWords is Google's keyword-triggered advertising program. In other 
words, it is Google’s online advertising that helps advertisers drive 
interested people to their web sites. AdWords enables advertisers to take 
advantage of the millions of searches conducted on Google each day. 
Business owners create ads for their business and choose whether to have 
them appear on Google above or next to the search results. They choose a 
word that is relevant to their product or service, and then Adwords shows 
their ad on Google when someone searches for that or for related words.63 
AdWords enables advertisers to purchase keywords for their web site's meta 
tags and their Google advertisements. These keywords are recognized by 
Google's algorithm when a searcher types the relevant keyword. This 
process is like buying the right to have the advertiser’s ad to appear with the 
search results for a certain keyword.64 Disgruntled trademark owners filed 
more than 100 lawsuits in the United States and Europe when search engines 
began offering ads using trademarks as keywords.65 
 Google goes through millions of web pages to find the most relevant 
when users perform search through the Google toolbar. Thousands of search 
results will appear, but not all businesses will be on top of the results. 
Nevertheless, AdWords gets business visibility even if the web site is not in 
																																																								
62Miniwatts Mktg. Group, Internet World Stats: Usage and Population Statistics, 
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64aleasha j. boling, confusion, or mere diversion? rosetta stone v. google's impact on expanding 
initial interest confusion to trademark use in search engine sponsored ads , indiana law review , vol 47 , no 
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something?, Harvard Journal of Law and Technology, Volume 26, No.  , Spring 2013, p. 484. 
the top results. AdWords can help users' ads appear on Google in front of 
many of potential customers. These users could become the web sites' 
customers.66 
 In simple terms, Google AdWords artificially manipulates search 
results to prioritize an advertiser's web site over other search results. 
Advertisers purchase the keywords they want their web site and AdWords 
advertisements to be associated with.67 Google sells advertisements based on 
the keywords searched by users. An advertiser purchases a keyword from 
Google and pays for each time the ad is clicked by a search engine user who 
searched for that keyword. Practically, AdWords gives the opportunity to 
advertisers to purchase keywords, which are words related to their 
businesses and will show under "sponsored links" on Google when users 
inquire about those words. Sponsored links are usually located on the right 
side or above of the organic or natural search results.68 
For instance, Nokia advertisement will be displayed in the sponsored 
link area of the search result page if a user performs a search for mobile 
phones.69 Initially, an AdWords account is necessary to purchase ad words. 
In particular, an account holder has to pay a non-refundable activation fee to 
create an account before the account holder can create ads and select 
keywords for free. On Google, an ad can be paid in two ways: 
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• Cost-per-click: the account holder will be charged each time someone 
clicks on the ad. 
• Cost-per-thousand-impressions: the account holder will be charged 
each time someone views the ad. 
The account holder has to determine a maximum amount for billing rate, 
which Google uses to weigh the ad’s ranking. Google determines where on 
the search result the ad will be located on the basis of its ranking. In fact, 
advertisers compete for the use of a keyword by bidding on it. Therefore, the 
account holder’s financial power implies the degree of the ad’s visibility. 
The display location of non-sponsored links is generally sorted by Google 
according to their relevance to the search query. The Google search 
algorithm uses non-commercial factors to determine the relevance of web 
pages.70 
 By contrast, although ads are also ranked among themselves, 
sponsored links do not follow the algorithm of natural results. Therefore, the 
value of AdWords for advertisers lies on the fact that Google allows its 
keyword-linked ads to override Google’s normal page ranking system for 
non-sponsored links. Sponsored links obtain priority over non-sponsored 
links in Google’s search results display as they appear beside or above the 
non-sponsored ones. Google search users may be misled to assume that the 
ads are the most relevant results as no explicit indication exists to set apart 
sponsored links from non-sponsored links. 
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Some scholars consider that, under the current trademark law, “a 
trademark owner's job of protecting his [or her] rights merely begins when 
the trademarks are registered. It is up to the owner to actively police the 
market, or the world for that matter, for violations. Once discovered, it is up 
to the trademark owner or licensee to take action against those 
infringements. The Internet has added a new dimension to the job of policing 
for trademark infringements, but the law is still the same.”71 However, this 
practice has raised a significant trademark concern that businesses are free to 
purchase not only generic search terms but also their competitor's 
trademarks. 
 
This question has been the subject of a great debate among scholars because 
businesses, such as Apple and Samsung, have turned to Google AdWords, 
which enables them to bid on keywords and create corresponding 
advertisements.72 To date, no uniform method is used to analyze whether 
trademark infringement exists in these cases. Although both U.S. and foreign 
courts have applied versions of likelihood of confusion tests in this context, 
all of the decisions fall short of actually protecting what is at stake when 
trademarks are sold as keywords on the Internet. The damage to trademarks 
in this context is not necessarily that consumers will confuse one product 
with another but that the goodwill and value associated with a trademark that 
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another advertiser purchases to garner recognition for the advertiser's own 
mark will be damaged.73 
The Internet’s inherently intangible nature, coupled with the 
intangibility of intellectual property right 74  including trademark rights, 
render the issue of trademark infringement on the internet an abstruse and 
complex legal problem. Often, the requirements that one needs to fulfill in 
bringing a successful trademark infringement action remain unsatisfied 
when the action concerns third party trademark infringement, and in 
particular where OSPs are sought to be held accountable for the actions of 
their infringing users.  
In simple terms, Google Adwords artificially manipulates search 
results to prioritize an advertiser's web site over other search results. 
Advertisers purchase the keywords they want their web site and Adwords 
advertisements to be associated with. 75  Practically, AdWords gives the 
opportunity to advertisers to purchase keywords, which are words related to 
their businesses and will show under "sponsored links" on Google when 
users inquire about those words. Sponsored links are usually located on the 
right side or above  organic or natural search results. 76 
Keyword advertising appears to be a lawful and beneficial advertising 
program that offers consumers a wide range of options when they search the 
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Web for goods or services. However, this approach to advertising is 
problematic in that search engine owners allow advertisers the unfair 
practice of using protected trademarks as keywords and connecting the 
search results to websites owned by those advertisers despite the absence of 
a relationship between the goods or services to these marks.77 Advertisers 
find this practice beneficial and thus make the most of it, but trademark 
proprietors complain of unfair competition and infringement. Nevertheless, 
search engine owners dismiss claims of trademark infringement given the 
large profits that keyword advertising brings in.78  
The popularity of keyword advertising among advertisers lies in its 
ability to increase profits. The fact that search engines can be tapped to 
advertise products and services without having to pay for actual advertising 
costs prompted trademark holders to complain and raise legal issues on 
unfair competition and trademark infringement. Search engine companies 
strongly insist that keyword advertising is legal and does not infringe on 
trademark owners’ rights. However, trade- mark holders find this argument 
and the practice unacceptable.79  In an era when companies extend their 
trademark protection to jingles, scents, and shapes, nobody can freely us or 
unintentionally misuse any trademark to mislead consumers.80 
Google used to disallow advertisers to link their ads to other 
trademarks 81 but this advertising policy was amended in the United States 																																																								
77 Aitken Benjamin , 'Keyword-Linked Advertising Trademark Infringement and Google’s 
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and Canada in 2004 to allow buying their competitors’ trademarks as 
keywords.82 This policy was subsequently adopted in the United Kingdom 
and Ireland in 2008 and the rest of Europe in 2010.83 In early 2013, this 
policy was applied in Australia, Hong Kong, and China. According to 
Google, it “will no longer prevent advertisers from selecting a third party’s 
trademark as a keyword in ads targeting these regions.84 
In simple terms, Google Ad-Words artificially manipulates search 
results to prioritize an advertiser's web site over other search results. 
Advertisers purchase the keywords they want their web site and Ad-Words 
advertisements to be associated with 85  Practically, Ad-Words gives the 
opportunity to advertisers to purchase keywords, which are words related to 
their businesses and will show under "sponsored links" on Google when 
users inquire about those words. Sponsored links are usually located on the 
right side or above  organic or natural search results. 86 Keyword advertising 
appears to be a lawful and beneficial advertising program that offers 
consumers a wide range of options when they search the Web for goods or 
services. However, this approach to advertising is problematic in that search 
engine owners allow advertisers the unfair practice of using protected 
trademarks as keywords and connecting the search results to websites owned 
by those advertisers despite the absence of a relationship between the goods 																																																								
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or services to these marks.87 Advertisers find this practice beneficial and thus 
make the most of it, but trademark proprietors complain of unfair 
competition and infringement. Nevertheless, search engine owners dismiss 
claims of trademark infringement given the large profits that keyword 
advertising brings in.88  
The popularity of keyword advertising among advertisers lies in its 
ability to increase profits. The fact that search engines can be tapped to 
advertise products and services without having to pay for actual advertising 
costs prompted trademark holders to complain and raise legal issues on 
unfair competition and trademark infringement. Search engine companies 
strongly insist that keyword advertising is legal and does not infringe on 
trademark owners’ rights. However, trade- mark holders find this argument 
and the practice unacceptable.89  In an era when companies extend their 
trademark protection to jingles, scents, and shapes, nobody can freely us or 
unintentionally misuse any trademark to mislead consumers.90 
Google used to disallow advertisers to link their ads to other 
trademarks 91 but this advertising policy was amended in the United States 
and Canada in 2004 to allow buying their competitors’ trademarks as 
keywords.92 This policy was subsequently adopted in the United Kingdom 
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and Ireland in 2008 and the rest of Europe in 2010.93 In early 2013, this 
policy was applied in Australia, Hong Kong, and China. According to 
Google, it “will no longer prevent advertisers from selecting a third party’s 
trademark as a keyword in ads targeting these regions.94 
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1. TRADEMARKS; FROM DEFINITION TO DEVELOPMENT 
1.1. Introduction  	
As a starting point for the analysis of the justifications for trademark 
protection and overview of its function , the definition of ‘trademark’ itself 
should be considered. Before doing so, however, it bears mentioning that 
trademark law is not the instantaneous emanation of a singular secular 
occurrence or philosophical proposition. Rather, it is the culmination of 
progressive developments in the requirements for the proper consummation 
of economic activities among economic actors. Such activities, as in most 
aspects of human life, have often involved competing interests, leading to 
disputes.  
Trademark law is the outcome of judicial interventions in such 
disputes in attempt to validate and uphold rights between competing parties. 
It is, thus, the result of the felt need to secure signs of ownership against 
parties who seek to exploit their beneficial use, without permission from 
their owners. But even for all its perceived importance, there remains 
lacking a rational and systematic strategy for its optimal governance. 95 
Although it is unclear when exactly trademarks were first employed as a 
means for determining the origin of products, it was not until the 18th and 
19th centuries that they started to enjoy recognition as important rights 
worthy of protection in the advancement of local and foreign commerce.96  
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1.2. Definition of Trademarks  
Diverse definitions have been proffered for trademark. Legally speaking, 
however, and for the present purposes, the definition provided in TMD, 
itself open to broad interpretations, would be adopted. 97According to Article 
2 thereof:  
A trade mark may consist of any sign capable of being 
represented graphically, particularly words, including 
personal names, designs, letters, numerals, the shape 
of goods or of their packaging, provided that such 
signs are capable of distinguishing the goods or 
services of one undertaking from those of other 
undertakings.  
From the above definition, it can be gleaned that two conditions need to be 
met for a mark to qualify for protectable registration. It must be a sign as 
defined above, and which sign is capable of differentiating between the 
goods or services of competitors. It should, nevertheless, be clarified that the 
above definition is presently undergoing reconsideration. As part of the 
pending reform of the TMD, it has been suggested that the necessity for a 
sign to be graphically represented should be discarded, meaning that it 
would be enough for a mark to be represented in such a manner as to be 
capable of being identified.98Those two conditions are elaborated below. 
1.2.1. It Must be a Sign  																																																									
97 First Directive 2008/95/Ec of the Council, of 21 December 1988, to Approximate the Laws of 
the Member States Relating to Trade Marks (Codified Version) '  
98 Trademark law and practice, The elements , Oxford Universuty Press , p. 41.  
The term, ‘sign’, as an element of a protectable trademark, is normally 
construed widely, taking into account continuous changes in global 
commerce.99   The provision in Article 2 should, therefore, be seen only as an 
indicative, rather than a closed list of signs that may be worthy of protection. 
On the whole though, a sign should be capable of visual perception. At the 
same time, as the ECJ has clarified in Philips Electronics, this does not 
always have to be the case. In fact, a sign may still be deserving of 
protection as a trademark, even if not capable of visual perception, including 
sounds and smell.100  
Despite the apparent flexibility in the interpretation of ‘sign’, it does 
not follow that any means of identification can qualify as a protectable 
trademark.101 For example, one may not apply to register the shape of a 
product as a trademark and seek to exclude others from the use of that shape. 
The shape is, at best, only a feature of the relevant product and cannot 
amount to a sign. More importantly, to allow such a practice would unleash 
intolerable restriction on free competition by preventing others from offering 
products having an identical shape. 102 It would also undermine the very 
essence of trademark law as it would amount to granting owners more than 
what is necessary to avoid consumer confusion.103 It would leave owners of 																																																								
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rival products almost defenceless in infringement claims, where any alleged 
confusion hinges on similarities.  
 
1.2.2. Capable of Distinguishing between the Goods or Services of Different 
Undertakings  
This requirement is the primary purpose of trademark protection; the need to 
distinguish the products or services of one competitor from those of another 
to avoid consumer confusion. In determining how trademarks perform this 
distinguishing function and how they help in affirming the source of goods 
or services, it is desirable to examine their key attributes. As the ECJ has 
posited, “[t]he essential function of the trade mark is to guarantee the 
identity of the origin of the marked product to the consumer or end user by 
enabling him, without any possibility of confusion, to distinguish the 
product or service from others which have another origin.’’104 
It means that for a trademark to effectively perform the function of 
differentiating products or services, it has to serve as a ‘badge of origin’. 
Thus, in Elvis Presley, it was held that the name of the music icon, “Elvis”, 
which was marked on products, did not serve as an indication of origin 
because it was not distinctive and capable of differentiating the marked 
products from those of other competitors. As a result, it did not, by itself, 
qualify for protection.105 The ECJ clarified that consumers who patronised 
the marked products, did so because of the popularity enjoyed by that name, 
and not because it helped them to identify the origin of the products. Put 
differently, popularity does not, eo ipso, prove distinctiveness, and the name 																																																								
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at issue was not, in the circumstances, a ‘keyword’.   
The requirement of ‘distinctiveness’ is meant to clearly indicate or 
allude to the origin of products or services, an observation that reechos the 
opinion of the ECJ on the significance of the origin of trade.106 According to 
the ECJ in Hoffman-la-Roche, the affirmation of origin is the very attribute 
that enables a trademark to serve the purpose of winning consumer 
patronage, thereby securing for the mark owner an advantage over other 
competitors.  
“[The] guarantee of origin means that the consumer or 
ultimate user can be certain that a trade-marked product 
which is sold to him has not been subject at a previous stage 
of marketing to interference by a third person, without the 
authorisation of the proprietor of the trade mark, such as to 
affect the original condition of the product”.107  
In light of the ECJ jurisprudence, trademarks provide their owners a way of 
guaranteeing to consumers that the marked products or services have 
actually originated from them and, in that sense also, serve as a way of 
assuring free and unfettered competition with rivals. It is the ability to 
identify the origin of particular products or services that confers a 
competitive advantage on trademark owners. Apparently, on the ECJ’s view, 
this advantage would be eroded, if the law fails to protect the products or 
services of trademark owners to enable them maximise the associated 																																																								
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benefits.108The Court recognizes, indeed, that trademarks are indispensable to 
the growth of free competition under EU law by affording a way to 
“guarantee that all the products conveyed have originated under the control 
of a single undertaking which is responsible for their quality”.109 In the spirit 
of free trade, it also entitles trademark owners to ratify, as their own, 
products or services having other origins, provided those other products or 
services fulfill their standards.110 
1.3. Development of Trademarks 	
It is useful to provide a brief historical account of trademarks, both to unveil 
their sociological basis, and illuminate the development of the legal regimes 
for their regulation in terms of the features, ambit and order of importance of 
the functions they perform. 111 
It is difficult to tell when the use of trademarks first began, as the 
practice seems to have existed alongside the beginning of trade.112 There are 
indications that, even as far back as five millennia ago, marks were used as a 
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means of identifying pottery and the ownership of livestock.113 
As trade increased across borders, the use of trademarks grew in 
importance among manufacturers, who affixed them to their products as 
indications of origin, although during this time, they enjoyed no legal 
recognition. 114 
With the emergence of the guilds of craftsmen during the Middle 
Ages, trademarks took on added importance. A key impetus for this 
development was the requirement by local law for guild members to mark 
their products so as to ease the identification of the makers of defective 
products. An additional reason was to help secure domestic monopoly by 
protecting the commercial interests of guild members against competition 
from foreign products, which, at that time, were amenable to confiscation.115 
Despite these requirements that were implemented at both local and national 
levels, trademarks did not provide any protection for individual product 
makers, but only served the purpose of assuring quality for privileged 
classes.116  
With the advent of the Industrial Revolution early in the 19th century 
and the rise of the entrepreneurial class, along with the inventive and 
manufacturing activities that flourished, global trade boomed, necessitating 																																																								
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the broadening of trade distribution channels.117 
Those developments, in turn, created the need for competitors to 
secure as much share as possible of the market, as well as competitive 
advantage, through the advertisement of their products. In this way, 
trademarks started to gain the increased importance they enjoy today as 
indicators of the origin of particular products and their makers. 118 Along 
with this, the desirability for trademark protection intensified.119 Given their 
importance and derivable financial benefits, trademark infringement disputes 
expectedly increased, warranting judicial interventions, which themselves, 
enhanced the role played by the courts today in trademark law 
enforcement.120 
During the latter part of the 19th century, which, could be seen as 
marking the modern phase of trademark law, it became necessary to 
streamline trademark rules to bring greater uniformity and dependability into 
the trademark regime. 121 
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2. EVALUATION OF KEYWORD ADVERTISING WITH 
REFERENCE TO TRADEMARK LAW  
 
The importance of the Internet and e-commerce cannot be overemphasized, 
as reflected by the large numbers of economic entities that have extended 
their presence to the virtual world through the establishment of websites 
meant to maximise sales opportunities. 
Morcom et al. have rightly observed that, “the Internet is now a vital 
part of commercial life. Many traders use an Internet web page as a sole, or 
at least main, ‘shop front’ for their goods or services. We bank online, shop 
online, book holidays and buy houses online, even our unwanted second 
hand goods are disposed of online”.122 
 
An important emanation from those developments is online keyword 
advertising. It is, therefore, pertinent to examine the technical dimensions of 
AdWords services, their essential attributes and the ways in which they may 
impact trademark rights. This task necessarily entails an interrogation of the 
nature and extent of the protection trademark holders should be allowed to 
enjoy in circumstances involving keyword advertising.  
It is difficult to resist the urge to exploit the recent economic 
opportunities, especially in a largely laissez faire world that relentlessly 
takes advantage of perceived opportunities. Through the Internet, e-
businesses can access a wide range of consumers spread across vast 																																																								
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distances, providing them huge opportunities to market their products with 
greater rapidity and at reduced costs.123 Businesses are able to deal with 
consumers directly and sidetrack middlemen, as well as the extra costs they 
usually thrust on buyers and sellers. This makes for lower costs and greater 
sales.  
Thus, the Internet facilitates simultaneous trading in identical products 
and services on both the virtual and real-world markets. 124 Those benefits, 
however, come with dilemmas. While the free flow of information is good, 
too much of it can confront consumers with the challenge of separating the 
relevant from the irrelevant. To overcome this problem, Internet users 
patronise ISPs, especially Google, to help them retrieve what is relevant, and 
as quickly as possible.  
Hence, “Google” has today become a nearly universal language for 
searching a relevant piece of information on the Internet. Search engines like 
Google “generate and maintain extensive databases of Internet content in an 
easily searchable format”, which are itemised, using intricate algorithms.125 
As a result of this benefit, consumers employ the Internet as a tool to search 
for products and services they may end up patronising, thus highlighting the 
valuable role that ISPs play in promoting e-commerce. 126 They make it 																																																								
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easier to retrieve useful information from the Internet. 127 
In fact, ISPs “vastly improve our ability to research, manage and 
process knowledge for social, cultural and economic good.’’128 Consumers in 
particular benefit from reduced search time and effort, access to up-to-date 
information, opportunity to compare prices and “better matching” with 
producers.129 
Ironically, notwithstanding the large numbers of users, sites, and 
growing sums of money generated, the economic advantages of the Internet 
is yet to be fully exploited due to a number of factors, one of which is the 
ability of businesses to protect their trademarks.130 
In the contemporary world of commerce, many business entities have 
huge portfolios of intellectual property that require protection and 
enforcement.131 Similarly, major commercial undertakings like Google have 
significant roles to play in meeting the needs of consumers. These entities 
assert considerable influence over the presentation of information from the 
Internet by means of highly variable mathematical algorithms that consider 																																																								
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various criteria including relatedness, distinctiveness of webpage contents, 
keywords and other needs of the search engine user. 132 When a search is 
conducted, the businesses more likely to benefit are the ones that are able to 
channel appropriate levels of consumer traffic to their webpage. 133 
Consumers spend less time and effort in their search by simply entering a 
search term, which Google then tries to match, using sophisticated 
algorithms that search and arrange information on the Internet in order of 
their relation to that term.134 
A consumer may search the term, ‘iphone’, representing Apple’s 
popular product. Apart from generating hits relating to Apple, the search 
engine may also generate hits relating to rival products, usually because the 
competitors have bought the keyword, ‘iphone’. The consent or licence of 
trademark owners is not normally necessary to be able to buy mark-related 
keywords, neither is a commercial link to them necessary. What ISPs do is 
to generate all those advertisements that are most related to the search term, 
and which in most cases, consumers will find to be just as useful as the 
original results generated in response to the search term.135  
Another reason why trademarks may be used as keywords is that the 
third party purchasers may be engaged in the provision of services related to 																																																								
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those marks, for example, a trader engaged in the sale of accessories or 
provision of maintenance for Apple products. These traders would usually 
like to have advertisements of their services displayed whenever “Apple” is 
entered on the search engine. Likewise, other economic actors engaged in 
the supply or resale of original products, including used ones, could be 
interested in buying and using trademarked keywords. These keywords are 
specially collated and reserved by websites providing information about 
products and services, some examples of which are sites dedicated to 
products review and price comparison. 136 
By Google’s reckoning, its keyword services can provide access to 
about 80% of Internet users, enhancing the ease and effectiveness of trade. 137 
Keyword advertisements offer traders significant freedom and power to 
manage their businesses.138There is also considerable transparency as one 
could even see which advertisements have enjoyed the most views and 
potentially the highest levels of consumer traffic.139 
Despite those advantages, it is equally clear that by allowing traders to 
buy trademarks as keywords, providers of keyword services could 
undermine the rights of trademark owners. A trademark, especially one 
popular among consumers, may well be the most important asset on which a 
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particular business depends, so much so that it would naturally frown at any 
unauthorised use of same by third parties, even if for a lawful cause.140 
Arguably, when advertisements belonging to other parties are shown 
in response to the use of a trademark as a keyword, the commercial goodwill 
of the trademark owner is impinged because he is thereby deprived of the 
right to exclusively benefit from the popularity of that mark as a campaign 
tool, or to restrain ISPs from profiting from its use, a situation that would 
cause the trademark owner to lose patronage and suffer economic loss, even 
without any adverse impact on the mark per se.141 
That situation could be avoided by forbidding ISPs from selling 
trademark-related keywords. In that way, consumers would be directed right 
away to the website offering the product intended by the search term 
originally entered on the search engine, and which would also curb 
consumer confusion. Unfortunately, while this would be favourable to 
trademark owners, assuming it were possible, it could cut down on the range 
of product options available to consumers.  
By serving as affirmation of origin and quality, trademarks ensure 
symmetry of information about products. Trademark owners can exercise 
supervision over the manufacturing of their products and be reassured that 
the products on the market actually originated from them, while consumers 
are provided certainty that products bearing the mark will always be the 
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same and will be of the expected quality.142 
According to Landes and Posner, economically speaking, trademarks 
ensure “economic efficiency” by minimising the “search costs” faced by 
consumers; they recognise the mark, are confident that the product is from 
the known source and of the known quality.143 
In other words, in a free market, an easily recognisable mark is a kind 
of abstract information that enhances consumer awareness, and provides a 
means for them to communicate with manufacturers, and to be certain about 
product quality. 144 Thus, when trademarked keywords are used as 
advertisements, they invariably create a source of confusion for consumers 
as to origin, and altogether increase search time and effort. In this way, the 
trademark is robbed of the ability to perform the function intended, and 
rendered undependable as a means of communication between consumers 
and manufacturers. 
It is also worth noting that the origin and quality functions aside, 
trademarks can also perform an advertising function, that requires 
considerable time, effort and expenses from trademark owners for the 
purposes of developing and projecting distinctiveness for both the mark and 
the associated products or services.145 
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Through the advertising function, trademark owners are able to secure 
distinctiveness for their marks and to create a connection between those 
marks and their products in the minds of consumers.146 
Nevertheless, as already pointed out, trademarks have equally 
received adversarial comments for conferring potentially perpetual rights of 
exclusivity on their owners, leading to unjust monopolies that entitle them to 
exclude third parties from using their marks.147  While that is a potent 
criticism, it should also be recognised that, in the absence of such 
monopolies, trademarks would largely be incapable of performing their 
functions.148  The term, ‘monopoly’, is an unsavory one because of the 
unjustifiable power it is thought to vest, making it useful to pause a while to 
examine its true connotation and consequences.149 
Furthermore , industrial property rights150  do not, after all, confer 
monopolies on holders, but only exclusive rights to use their marks. That is 
to say, holders enjoy exclusive control over their marks’ ability to guarantee 
quality, thereby winning customers. 151 Therefore, in the context of the 																																																																																																																																																																					
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discussion that follows, the crucial task is to equilibrate the lawful protection 
of the owners of trademarks with free trade.152 
As the ECJ acknowledged in Hag (II), the main policy goal 
underlying the TMD is the advancement of “undistorted competition”. 153 
Such realisation has undergirded ECJ’s interpretation of European trademark 
law, always taking care to grant protection in such a manner as would be 
consistent with that policy goal; integrating the need for trademark 
protection with the need to ensure that trademarks are used in a way that 
does not undermine free competition.154 
That balancing act must be conducted in a way that protects the origin 
function of trademarks and the associated products, while also permitting the 
unfettered flow of marks and products in the wider societal interest; this has 
been the main inspiration behind ECJ’s interpretive approach to the TMD.155  
As always, the cardinal tenet on which the EU is founded, is the 
development of a single market among the Member States, with the least 
possible barriers to free competition and flow of products and services, 
including distortions by private actors.156 
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Consumers benefit from free competition, and this, in a way, provides 
justification for advertisements that help them to compare and choose 
between rival products, provided effort is also made to ensure that they are 
not misled.157 Yet, it cannot be denied that by comparing rival products, such 
advertisements make it possible for less famous competitors to free-ride on 
the established fame of trademark owners simply by presenting their own 
products beside the marked ones, thus marketing them based on the fame of 
mark owners. This also undermines the substantial investments that 
trademark owners make to develop and maintain the distinctiveness and 
fame of their marks.158 Notwithstanding, that could also be construed as 
freedom of expression and trade.159 
Indeed, the need to progress competition in the virtual world argues 
for freedom of information and trade to trump trademark rights, given the 
usefulness of the strategies employed to access consumers during their 
search for products and services on the Internet.  
Whatever the case, the use of trademark-related keywords in online 
advertising brings free competition principles into conflict with trademark 
rights, and how best to reconcile these conflicting interests, calls for further 
enquiry. 
Typically, ISPs are only concerned with the provision of their services 
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and the enabling technical platforms that facilitate the use of marks; they do 
not concern themselves with the protection of marks. 160  And, it would 
certainly not augur well for the continued availability of those services, if 
trademark rights were always enforced in every case where a mark is used as 
a keyword by other advertisers. It would even not be possible to track every 
keyword that may be used, and an ISP like Google, disclaims liability by 
providing that “advertisers are responsible for the keywords that they choose 
to trigger ads and the text that they choose to use in those ads”.161 
 The choice of keywords, for instance, is not reviewed to determine 
whether it is trademark infringing or not.162 In fact, Google may only conduct 
an investigation, if it receives an infringement petition from a trademark 
owner. Whenever an investigation is conducted and an infringement is 
found, Google would withdraw the mark from the offending advertisement 
or the keyword that generated it. Unfortunately, Google's algorithms may 
continue to capture and represent the infringed mark so that ultimately, 
responsibility would fall back on the mark’s owner to contact the advertiser 
directly to stop and desist from using the mark on its website; thus, the 
protection of marks from being used in keyword advertising becomes the 
final responsibility of their owners.163 
There is no doubt about the immense benefit that businesses enjoy 
from online keyword advertising services; they could actually estimate their 																																																								
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performance from the level of consumer traffic, the number of visitors who 
have viewed their advertisements, and even the number of those that 
proceeded to make purchases, very much unlike real-world advertising, 
where businesses could not readily assess their performance in terms of the 
number of customers won.164 
This gives businesses flexibility in designing their keywords, by 
exploiting information provided by ISPs based on the online activities of 
customers, to create truly potent advertisements that can win great numbers 
of customers and generate high sales levels.  
In that way, new entrants to the market with little known marks are 
able to capture customers for their own products and even steal customers 
that would otherwise have patronised popular trademark owners.165 
Although trademark owners have reason to be concerned, keyword 
advertising benefits consumers as they are able to access businesses in more 
precise ways, including a wider range of products and services, information 
about alternative and complementary ones, as well as price differences, thus 
facilitating comparisons and more informed choices166, in addition to the 
results generated by their original search.  
Therefore, consumers enjoy lower prices and higher standards of 
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quality as a result of keyword advertising.167 Since trademarks may be the 
greatest assets that a business has, however, particularly when they are 
famous among consumers, their owners are bound to oppose their use by 
unauthorised third parties.168 Considering that trademarks are an important 
marketing tool, the commercial goodwill of their owners is affected when 
advertisements from competitors are shown as a result of their use in 
keyword search, which also generates profits for ISPs.169 
Trademarks usually serve to attract consumers, but this impact is 
weakened when their use in keyword searches leads to marked products 
being compared with those of competitors, which are also displayed along 
with them. Consumers are motivated to look beyond the marked products to 
other competing ones, thereby obliterating the distinctiveness of the brand, 
potentially resulting in the loss of consumer allegiance.  Competitors thus 
enjoy an unjust advantage by basically free-riding on the fame of trademark 
owners.170 This practice has been described as “ambush marketing”,171 or as 
Duthrie defines it, ‘the unauthorised trading off the goodwill or exposure of 
another...It is a form of "free-riding" where an advertiser seeks to associate 
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itself ...without paying for the right to do so.’172  
 
3. TRADEMARK FUNCTIONS AND THEIR PROTECTION 
JUSTIFICATION IN ONLINE ENVIRONMENT 
3.1. Introduction  
 
Answering the question of why we need to protect trademarks in online 
environment is an important question due to economical importance of 
brands over the Internet. Any mark that is enough distinctive to address a 
product or service can be a trademark in general and single product in this 
market may be associated with more than one trademark. 173 And generally 
trademark infringement occurs when a Trademark is used as exact replicas 
in the same market and product circle. 174 
Generally by contemporary scholars it is argued that trademarks are 
granted too readily, that trademark holder are too strong by the rights which 
are conferred to their marks, that the situation that trademark rights have 
potentials of being invalidated and revoked are too narrow, and the 
defendants has limitations to escape from liability because trademark laws 
are too narrowly formulated and restrictively interpreted. 175 In my opinion 
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this argument is not valid anymore. Internet age has brought a lot of 
challenges for intellectual property rights and one of  them is trademark 
disputes. For instance the majority of decisions in ECJ are in favor of 
defendants but not trademark holders which contradict this argue.  
The purpose of trademark legislation is to increase market 
transparency as it enables consumers to distinguish services and products 
according to the source they are coming from and it indirectly creates 
incentives for trademark holder to guarantee product quality or service in 
order to raise the value of trademark and consecutively the goodwill, which 
is connected to it.176  
From economic perspective academic discussions of the justifications 
for trade mark protection have focused on the arguments that trade marks 
reduce consumer search costs From classic economic perspective of 
defensing trademark legislation trademark is valuable as it decrees costs for 
consumer search and thus it promote overall efficiency in the 
economy.177Furthermore, it is based on protecting against misappropriation 
of other traders’ labor and investment.178There is another justification for 
trademark protection and its based on consumers comfort as well. Having 
trademark legislation can make it cheaper and easier for consumers to locate 
products with qualities they are looking for and consecutively making 
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related markets more competitive. 179 Therefore , as there are different 
justification and different functions regarding Trademarks we will address 
them separately .  
3.2. Legal and Economic Function of Trademarks 	
As seen already, diverse theories exist explicating different functions for 
trademarks, and proposing corresponding justifications for protecting them 
from infringement, particularly in the marketplace. Some of these theories 
have an ethical bent that support protection so at to prevent third parties 
from reaping where they have not sowed; unjustly enriching themselves by 
taking an unfair advantage of trademarks owned and developed by others. 180 
Perhaps, the most practical justification for protection is offered by 
the ‘cost and benefit’ theory that considers trademark rights as means that 
enable their holders to communicate with consumers.181 
According to trite principles of economics, all economic decisions 
inhere value that ensures the maximisation of benefits for the greatest 
number of people, whether with regard to protection or its integration with 
free competition, and it is this objective that provides a basis for the 
protection of the economic functions performed by trademarks.182 
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Viewed from the angle of holders, the protection of trademarks 
increases the ‘dynamic benefit’ derivable from them by encouraging mark 
owners to aspire to higher levels of quality.183That of course, involves 
substantial commitment of time, effort and financial resources since “the 
value of a trademark in facilitating purchasing decisions depends on the 
information or reputation that mark conveys about the producer of particular 
branded product”.184 
When consumers acknowledge a product’s reputation for quality or 
identify with “lifestyle messages”, purchases increase and so do profits for 
mark holders, given consumers’ readiness to pay higher prices for the 
marked product than for rival ones. Protection, therefore, affords trademarks 
their “modern commercial value” and enhances their “marketing power.’’185 
On the other hand, trademark protection comes with costs in that it 
confers exclusive rights on holders and invariably constitutes them into 
monopolists, understood here as individuals vested with the right to prevent 
other parties from using a sign as a trademark; a cost that may be viewed 
with significant cynicism.186 
The extension of legal protection to the advertising and 
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communication functions of trademarks has been mired in controversy, often 
facing opposition in the context of free competition. 187 Beier, for example, 
has complained that when trademarks are used as advertisement and 
assertion of quality, they perform not legal, but economic functions, 
although his remarks date back to 1970, and predate the advent of modern 
worldwide communications.188 
Two and a half decades on, Beier recognises that there have been 
profound changes in trademark law since that time.189 Further, it is clear that 
as a trademark enjoys increasing fame in the marketplace, it is more likely to 
provide the owner an effective means of advertisement. 
It should also be mentioned that while Recital 11 of TMD’s Preamble 
avers that trademark protection is primarily intended to identify the origin of 
products and services, there is scope for trademarks to perform other 
functions equally deserving of protection. 
As a whole, it is reasonable to say that a well propagated trademark 
may ultimately become valuable, and worthy of protection because of the 
functions it performs as an instrument of advertisement and identification of 
source and quality, which might tempt competitors to seek to take advantage 
of it. These functions help trademarks to acquire brand personality giving 
them an upper-hand position over other assets, both tangible and intellectual, 
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and making them the most priced assets of most economic entities that 
guarantee future business.190 That is why it is important to protect trademark 
owners against infringement by third parties intent on diluting their marks 
and robbing them of consumer allegiance, without the investments that have 
made such marks valuable.191 
 
3.3. Origin and Quality Function 	
It is said that distinct charastriction of trademark function is identifies as its 
origin advertising and quality function192 and we can see that regarding 
Keyword advertising all this three elements are there and actually they are 
problematic issues as well. Some authors suggests that trademarks are 
historically actual indicator of ownership of goods, owing to ramification of 
electronic and international commerce and consecutively distribute of goods 
nationally and internationally from the manufacturer through the jobber or 
importer to the consumer. Therefore, source or origin of the goods bearing a 
well known trademark is seldom known to consumers.193  
Furthermore, Some scholars believed that the only function of 
trademarks which is entitled to enjoy from legal protection is origin function 
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of trademark.194 This Idea does not fit with realities that is about trademark 
law and in general among IP scholars the preferred view is that origin 
function may look more important therefore it is only primary function while 
particular function which are considered secondary have to enjoy from 
protection which come from legislation.195 
Regarding the secondary functions it is believed that the function 
which is called quality function take prominence as it is supposed to 
guarantee the quality and it is connected to consumers 196 and why we can 
not confront protection to only one function of trademarks is because of 
primary function which distinguish commercial origin of goods which is 
sold under trademark has a lot to do with the quality of trademark 197 and 
this is reasonable that some consumers would like to make sure that the 
goods which is bought by them is coming with same kind and quality under 
trademark even the product might not originate from a single factory or set 
of factories 198  and even the quality and origin should be guaranteed by 
trademark even other entities other than trademark holder might be involved 
is some part of delivery circle like small part of manufacturing , packaging 
and the distribution of products through licensing contract. 199 
Due to link between quality function and origin function, consumers 																																																								
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become legally eligible to be protected against low quality counterfeits or 
competing products which is not desired by them as they search and look for 
a trademark which is supposed to guarantee the origin and quality200 and 
similarly trademark owners become incentivized to maintain the standards 
and the quality of their products in order to maintain their clients regarding 
the quality and origin of goods they are buying.  Regarding this the 
investment which trademark owner put into quality of trademark is the 
reason that trademark owner should be protected against unauthorized use of 
his mark in relation to third party or competitor products. 201 
So, with mentioned to above it is notable to say that ironically, 
trademark is not symbolizing or guarantying actual origin of the goods and 
even not its quality but the origin of the quality which is reason for having 
authorities or organizations for maintaining a consistent standard of quality 
control. 202This feature of trademark justifies and rationalizes trademark 
protection that entices invidious traders to utilize well-known marks, 
renowned for their quality and high standards, to pass off products that are 
unable to achieve those same standards of quality. 
Even above statement may apply classically to market but it will apply 
with greater force in online challenges of trademark infringement even 
keyword advertising. Due to importance of internet and large number of 
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buying over the internet 203 business enterprises would know it’s a vehicle 
for promoting their selling nationally and internationally and therefore they 
utilize internet for advertising and selling their product. In this process 
trademark holders normally rely on distinctiveness of their trademark 
together with the quality it has which makes it different with what 
competitors and third parties are offering in the same market. 
In physical market consumers mostly look for both origin and quality 
by even checking product and packaging but in Internet environment there is 
only one role player and it is distinctiveness of a trademark. Consumers who 
are familiar with origin and quality of a trademark expect that the goods or 
services they receive are as same as physical market. Due to Internet abstract 
nature consumers heavily rely on trademarks, as they are indicator of quality 
and origin to locate and purchase the products they would like to buy. 
This is why some famous scholars believed that the most rational and 
convincing argument for trademark protection is that it provide and supply 
information to consumers and therefore satisfy consumers.204 So, as we can 
see in this phenomenon we easily see the communication function of 
Trademark, which takes messages to consumers and relates new products to 
existing products that consumers recognize from shelves of the stores and it 
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facilitates comparison and undermines loyalty to other brands. 205 
So, in this manner trademark is playing an advertising role and this 
communicative feature of trademarks makes it strong effective advertising 
tool.206 And when trademark can take such strong message and are symbols 
around which a business’s investment in the promotion of its goods are built 
even where there is no misuse of trademark regarding origin and quality it 
deserve protection by law. 207 
3.4. Overview of Advertisement and Investment Function  	
Although economic justification is advanced for the protection of the origin 
and quality functions of trademarks, such justification does not quite hold 
for the protection of the advertising function. Clearly, when protection is 
extended to the origin or quality functions of trademarks, this favours 
consumers and society at large, whereas the main beneficiaries of the 
protection of the advertising function are the holders of trademarks. Since 
trademarks now tend to enjoy a life of their own, independent of the 
products on which they are affixed, the protection of the advertising function 
will certainly have a bearing not just on the interests of holders by assuring 
their goodwill, but also those of consumers. 208 Such a scenario is at odds 
with traditional trademark law, and exposes the protection of the advertising 
function and goodwill to controversy,209 and, indeed, renders the economic 																																																								
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justification for the protection of the advertising function untenable. 
Further, as one commentary puts it, “a more subtle effect occurring in 
international trade is that because of the asymmetrical distribution of 
trademarks in favor of richer nations, the effects of brand loyalty on 
consumers can to a certain extent be leveraged to transfer market power 
acquired elsewhere, thereby distorting the development of local industry 
sectors”.210 
Therefore, given the roles they play in affirming the origin and quality 
of products, trademarks could justifiably be seen as a variant of 
advertisement by which consumers are enticed to patronise the products or 
services bearing them.211 Trademark owners invest substantial amounts of 
money and effort to create a sense of distinctiveness for their marks and the 
products on which they are affixed.212  By conjuring their products and 
services in the minds of consumers through unique association with their 
distinctive marks, they try to secure consumer allegiance.213 
Acknowledgement of the function performed by trademarks as 
advertising tools, provides an additional rationale for their protection; it 																																																																																																																																																																					
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equally enables them to serve as the best means of independently attaining 
and sustaining goodwill, separate from that enjoyed by the marked products 
and services, as well as their owners.214 
Recent advances in information and communications technologies 
have provided more sophisticated means through which manufacturers are 
able propagate their products and services to a wider range of consumers 
across vast distances. In this respect, trademarks play the very prominent 
role of a communications channel through which their owners persuade 
consumers as to the uniqueness and quality of their products and services. 
215In effect, they serve as a “commercial magnet” 216 both for capturing and 
retaining consumer patronage. 217 Thus, trademarks have metamorphosed in 
character from “mere existence on the rational and physical plane to that of 
the emotional and psychological”.218  
Another point worth noting is that, in a way, advertising amounts to a 
comparison between rival products and services, elevating that which is 
advertised over and above competitors, and by the same token, diverting 
allegiance from the latter to the former.  																																																								
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In the age of the Internet and e-commerce, online advertising serves as 
a veritable medium through which vendors of products and services attempt 
to communicate with as wide a range of consumers as possible through the 
use of keywords associated with trademarks. 219 
A key objective of such communications is what has been described 
as the ‘lifestyle statement’ that involves substantial investments in the 
sponsorship of sporting events and teams, as well as endorsements by 
celebrities.220 As Meenaghan observes, for example, “Pepsi as a brand is 
regarded as having achieved associations of entertainment, freshness and 
youth through its sponsorship, endorsement, youth lifestyle and 
entertainment marketing approach”.221 
 
Through those advertising measures, marked products and services are made 
more appealing to consumers, who not only end up identifying with them, 
but also, as users, become advertisers of those products and services to other 
consumers.222 
In that sense, trademarks transcend the usual function of indicating 
source or quality to also persuade consumers to patronise products and 
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services that pitch for themselves as if to say “this is the sort of person I 
am’’.223  
When consumers patronise marked products and services, they are 
also presenting themselves to others as users of those products and services 
such that the trademarks become a means of communication, amounting to 
an ‘expressive use’ of trademarks; 224  a function that warrants legal 
protection. This makes advertising to be a formidable tool for sales 
promotion, giving trademarks the ability, like humans, to arouse passions, 
instead of just being mere devices.225  
Trademark owners indulge in sustained advertising that requires 
substantial commitments in terms of money and time not just to create an 
association between their marks and products, but to project themselves as 
the origin of such products about which consumers have become so 
passionate. 226 
All in all, two components of advertising can be identified namely, 
communication and investment. As Gotting quite usefully elaborates, “as 
well-known trade mark embodies the goodwill, meaning the appreciation 
that the company with its performance in the market place has gained among 
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the consumers. It is an image carrier and as such not only represents the 
products or services but the company as a whole”.227 
In other words, a particular impression is left in the perception of 
consumers pulling them to the relevant products through the creation of what 
might be termed as “brand equity”; a sense of distinctiveness, quality and 
marketability. 228 A trademark that falls short of this result would as, Picton 
and Broderick maintain, be but just a name devoid of “brand equity”.229 
So, with reference to above and to sum up it is worthy to note that  
trademarks contribute to the efficient functioning of the market,230 given the 
origin, quality, information and advertising functions that they perform.231 
From a historical perspective, trademarks were originally meant to indicate 
the ownership of products bearing them. 232 As time went by, trademarks 
started to serve as affirmations of origin for goods or services, 233 although 
with recent expansion in global trade, consumers are not readily able to 																																																								
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determine the origin of products even when they have trademarks affixed to 
them.234 Despite that, trademarks generally give consumers the assurance that 
the products to which they are attached originate from a particular 
undertaking that controls product quality235, even though those products may 
actually be produced at different production facilities 236  and other 
undertakings separate from the trademark owner may also partake in their 
production, packaging and distribution under diverse licensing agreements.237 
Thus, given their attribute as tools for communication between producers 
and consumers, trademarks could be seen as powerful advertising 
instruments.238  
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CHAPTER FOUR:  TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT AND 
KEYWORD ADVERTISING UNDER EU LEGISLATIONS; 
PERSPECTIVE ON ECJ AND NATIONAL MEMBERS CASE 
LAW 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Internet which has been described as Third industrial revolution239 has 
enabled web search engines to greatly expand their field of services which 
one of them is keyword advertising which was mentioned detailed in last 
two chapters from legal and technical perspective. Notwithstanding the 
benefits that keyword advertising provide to facilitate trade liberalization240 
and electronic consumer transactions, trademark owners have often sought 
to hold search engines accountable for third party and competitor 
infringement that is resulting both from act of search engines users and 
services which are provided to them by search engines themselves. 241 
With the advent of technology and the widespread availability of internet 
access to many people , trademark owners face unprecedented rates of 
trademark infringement regarding keywords as more individuals residing in 
remote regions of planet in a day by day basis on dramatic scale and they 
can distribute their product internationally within a second and in order to 																																																								
239 B.L. Smith , The Third Industrial Revolution : Law and Policy for the Internet ,in Recueil des 
Cours, 2000 , P. 282. 
240 Ashley Tan, Google AdWords: Trademark Infringer or Trade Liberalizer? , 16 Michigan 
Telecommunication and Technology Law Review , 473 , 2010 , P.501.   
241 Jason Kessler,Correcting the Standard for Contributory Trademark Liability over the Internet, 
Columbia Journal of Law and Social Problems , 2006 , P. 376 
achieve this goal it could be said Google Ad-Words is role player as it 
facilitate trade liberalization. 242 
A company brand’s most valuable asset is often its trademark, which 
signifies the status, quality, and price of the brand’s goods243 and it is 
identifier of source of goods244, which help the efficiency of the market.245 
Therefore the risk of infringement of such important assets to any company 
poses a serious and tremendous threat to a company’s business and 
reputation.246 Therefore, each trademark holder would like to enjoy and 
benefit from legal protection which is provided by trademark legislation in 
Europe jurisdiction and also consecutively seek for remedies by principles of 
liability.  
So, with mention to above this Chapter examines the existing legal 
framework for the resolution of trademark infringement disputes arising 
from keyword advertising in the EU. It focuses on relevant pieces of 
legislation, especially the Trade Mark Directive (TDM), the Community 
Trademark Regulation (CTMR), as well as the E-Commerce Directive, and 
considers how both the national courts and the CJEU have attempted to 
grapple under these provisions with the challenges presented by keyword 
advertising. In this respect, attention is also given to the preliminary 
reference procedure provided under Article 234 EC, which allows the 																																																								
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national courts of Member States to refer questions to the CJEU for 
clarification where there is uncertainty over the interpretation, or validity of 
EU law. Furthermore this Chapter will evaluate application of direct and 
secondary liability principles to keyword advertising.  
 
2. TEADEMARK LEGISLATION IN EU  	
 
Generally there are two sets of legislations within EU that are governing 
trademarks issues. The first one is the Trade Marks Directive (TMD) 
89/104/EEC which was introduced to EU in order to approximate laws of 
the members states.  
The reason for enacting TMD was rooted in substantial disparities which 
were a threat to the free movement of goods and freedom to provide services 
within the EU, and consecutively effect and undermines competition in 
market within Europe.247 
Second (codified version), was adopted on October 22nd,  2008. This 
codified version was created to clarify the content of the repealed Council 
Directive 89/104/EEC. 248 This new Directive does not offer new substantive 
provision regarding trademarks and just amended the repealed Directive 
89/104/EEC provisions. 249 Therefore it could be concluded that all case law 
based on former Directive applies under current Directive.  
Council Regulation 40/94 was firstly enacted in 20th December 1993 																																																								
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and codified updated legislation was adopted on 26th February of 2009 to 
make clarification to the content of the repealed provisions of Council 
regulation 40/94250 and it has only emended the repealed version and 
reference to the repealed legislation shall be construed as reference to 
codified version. 251 
Then, Article 6 together with Article 7 of Trademark Directive sets 
situations where trademark right holder is not legally eligible to prevent third 
party from using trademarks as his/her exclusive rights is not infringed by 
third party. Article 6 provides that:  
“Art. 6: (1). The trademark shall not entitle the proprietor 
to prohibit a third party from using, in the course of trade:  
(a) His own name or address; 
(b) Indications concerning the kind, quality, quantity, 
intended purpose, value, geographical origin, the time of 
production of goods or of rendering of the service, or other 
characteristics of goods or services; 
 (c) The trademark where it is necessary to indicate the 
intended purpose of a product or service, in particular as 
accessories or spare parts; pro- vided he uses them in 
accordance with honest practices in industrial or 
commercial matters.  
(2). The trade mark shall not entitle the proprietor to 																																																								
250 Regulation 207/2009, Preamble 1.  
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prohibit a third party from using, in the course of trade, an 
earlier right which only applies in a particular locality if 
that right is recognized by the laws of the Member State in 
question and within the limits of the territory in which it is 
recognized.”252 
Following that Article 7 states:  
“Art. 7: (1). The trademark shall not entitle 
the proprietor to prohibit its use in relation to goods, 
which have been put on the market in the Community 
under that trademark by the proprietor or with his consent. 
 (2). Paragraph 1 shall not apply where there 
exist legitimate reasons for the proprietor to oppose 
further commercialization of the goods, especially where 
the condition of the goods is changed or impaired after 
they have been put on the market.”253 
Regarding keyword advertising related legislation, E-Commerce Directive 
of European Union is present as well.254 In respect to E-Commerce directive, 
it is notable to say that there is no direct trademark related provision in it but 
it address online service providers and liability exemption for certain 
activities. Therefore, it is relevant to search engines as service providers and 
advertisement services they offer within European Union.255 
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The most important and relevant provision in E-Commerce Directive, 
which sets regulations that are related to trademark keyword advertising, is 
Article 14, which states the following:  
“ Article 14) 1. Where an information society service is 
provided that consists of the storage of information provided 
by a recipient of the service, Member States shall ensure 
that the service provider is not liable for the information 
stored at the request of a recipient of the service, on 
condition that:  
(a) The provider does not have actual knowledge of illegal 
activity or information and, as regards claims for damages, 
is not aware of facts or circumstances from which the illegal 
activity or information is apparent; or   
(b) The provider, upon obtaining such knowledge or 
awareness, acts expeditiously to remove or to disable access 
to the information. 
 2. Paragraph 1 shall not apply when the recipient of the 
service is acting under the authority or the control of the 
provider.  
3. This Article shall not affect the possibility for a court or 
administrative authority, in accordance with Member States' 
legal systems, of requiring the service provider to terminate 
or prevent an infringement, nor does it affect the possibility 
for Member States of establishing procedures governing the 
removal or disabling of access to information.” 256 
This legislative framework provides a background of how keyword 
issues are handled both with respect to trademarks registered under national 
laws of a Member State as well as community trademarks. It is notable to 
say that even Google France case as first case in ECJ regarding keyword 
advertising was influenced by E-Commerce Directive alongside with 
Trademark Directive as it was mentioned “Commercial communications are 
essential for the financing of information society services and for developing 
a wide variety of new, charge-free services.”257  
The ECJ has followed a consistent pattern as it strives to strike a 
balance between (i) the promotion of competition in the online environment 
by allowing fair use of trade marks (ii) the protection of consumers from 
deceptive practices and (iii) the investment businesses make in promoting 
their brands.258 
3. TRADEMARK JURISPRUDENCE IN THE EU 
  
The national courts of member-states and the community’s highest court, the 
Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) sitting in Luxembourg, share 
judicial functions in the EU. Courts in the member-states are similar to 
courts of first instance, and they are primarily responsible for enforcing EU 
law. However, Article 234 EC of the preliminary reference system states that 
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a national court may refer questions to the CJEU for clarification during 
instances of uncertainty on the interpretation or validity of any EU 
legislation. 259 The national court decides on the issue pending before it on 
the basis of clarification by the CJEU. The CJEU neither decides on any 
case referred to it in accordance with the preliminary reference procedure 
nor presides over it as an appellate court; it only rules on questions of law 
that are referred to it. The widening scope of EU law and the tendency of 
national courts to refer questions for ruling after hearing the substance of a 
case show that the CJEU ruling is equal to a decision.  
Advocates general assist the judges of the CJEU. Advocates general 
are legal experts who qualify as judges and whose role is to prepare and 
present independent, well-considered opinions on pending cases. Their 
opinions are not binding on member-states, and the court is not bound to 
adopt them either. The ultimate ruling of the court in any case may not be 
similar to the opinion rendered by the advocate general assigned to the case. 
The CJEU clarification binds not only the national court that makes the 
reference but also all other national courts, including those of other member-
states. The preliminary reference procedure may help foster the uniform 
application of EU law across member-states. Nevertheless, the judicial 
powers exercised by national courts in cases of trademark disputes usually 
result in contradictory interpretations of the EU trademark law. This problem 
intensifies when national courts are burdened with disputes on modern 
technologies, such as Google Adwords. For example, whereas the French 
courts ruled that a violation of EU trademark law was committed when 																																																								
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Google Ad-Words used trademarks as keywords, the national courts in 
England took the opposite position.  
Courts in other member-states, such as Austria, Germany, and the 
Netherlands, also struggled with the problem posed by keyword advertising 
and had to go to the CJEU for clarification, under the preliminary ruling 
system, on how to apply the TMD to the Google Ad-Words case. The CJEU 
is tasked to provide interpretive guidance on the TMD and CTMR and on 
whether keyword advertising is equal to trademark infringement. In cases of 
infringement, the CJEU faces the additional challenge of determining 
whether to hold liable the referencing service provider, such as Google, or 
the advertiser that purchased and used the trademark as a keyword. The 
CJEU also clarifies whether advertisers and service providers are entitled to 
a counsel.  
Under the EU trademark law, determining trademark infringement 
depends on two legislative provisions, also known as double-identity 
provisions, namely, Articles 5(1)(a) TMD and 9(1)(a) CTMR.  
Article 5(1) TMD states the following:  
1. The registered trademark shall confer on the proprietor exclusive rights 
therein. The proprietor shall be entitled to prevent all third parties not 
having his consent from using in the course of trade:  
(a) any sign that is identical to the trade mark in relation to goods or 
services, which are identical to those for which the trademark is registered. 
Article 9(1)(a) CTMR similarly states that a registered trademark 
gives the proprietor exclusive rights to the mark. In addition, the proprietor 
may prevent third parties from using it without his/ her consent all signs 
related to the goods or services that are identical to those for which the mark 
was registered.  
On the basis of CJEU jurisprudence, a proprietor who claims 
trademark infringement under Article 5(1) TMD or Article 9(1) CTMR does 
not need to show proof that the alleged infringer’s use of his/her mark is 
likely to cause confusion. Rather, the proprietor can successfully prevent a 
third party from using the same mark under the existing provisions based on 
the possible effects of infringement on the mark. Under Article 5(1)(b) TMD 
and the parallel likelihood of the confusion provision in Article 9(1)(b) 
CTMR, a trademark proprietor can prevent a third party’s unauthorized use 
(in the course of trade) of a sign for goods or services that is identical or 
similar to those covered by the registered mark because doing so can 
confuse the public. Thus, the likelihood of confusion covers the tendency of 
consumers to mistake the two signs or marks to be related.  
Another provision relevant to determining keyword advertising 
disputes is the E-Commerce Directive 2000/31 of the EU. Although this 
directive is not concerned with trademarks, it is pertinent to trademark 
infringement in keyword advertising because it contains exceptions useful to 
information service providers when escaping liability for their hosting 
activities. This directive can be useful to search engine owners who offer 
keywords to advertisers in the EU. These provisions form the backbone of 
the legal framework necessary to resolve disputes on keyword search related 
to CTMs and those registered under the trademark systems of the member-
states.260 
3.1. Legal Structure of Article 5 TMD 
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If an advertiser who buys a trademark as a keyword uses that mark in the 
course of trade and in relation to goods or services according to TDM, the 
key issue is whether the proprietor of the mark can prevent the advertiser 
from using the same mark. In examining this issue, the advertiser who uses a 
mark identical to that of the proprietor is the focus of attention. According to 
the CJEU, in cases such as Arsenal vs. Reed 261 and L’Oreal vs. Bellure 262 
the exclusive right granted to a trademark proprietor under Article 5(1)(a) 
TMD ensures that the mark fulfills its functions; therefore, only the 
proprietor can exercise that right, and a third party’s use of the mark affects 
(or may possibly affect) its functions. Aside from having the important task 
of indicating the origin of particular goods or services, a mark also indicates 
quality assurance, advertising, communication, and investment.  
The court’s interpretation of Article 5(1)(a) TDM indicates that this 
provision gives a broader scope of protection than Article 5(1)(b) because 
the latter only protects against the confusing use of a mark or a similar sign. 
Therefore, to that extent, it only protects a mark’s function in indicating the 
origin of the goods and services. 263 Whether Article 5(1)(a) TDM was 
actually intended to provide an extended form of protection indicated by the 
court is unclear.  
TRIPS Article 16(1) suggests that the only protected function of a 
mark, as in Article 5(1)(b) TDM, is that of indicating the origin of the goods 
and services. The TRIPS Article 16(1) states that the likelihood of confusion 
shall be presumed where an identical sign is used for identical goods and 
services.  In the case of Google, the CJEU considered all the different 
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functions of a mark. However, it focused only on a mark’s indication of 
origin and advertising functions, without providing any particular basis, in 
the cases of Arsenal vs. Reed and L’Oreal vs. Bellure. 264  
Therefore, a mark’s investment function is also relevant despite the 
omission, as in the latter two cases. The court acknowledges that a proprietor 
may decide to register his/her mark as a keyword with a referencing service 
provider for advertising purposes, that is, having an advertisement appear as 
a sponsored link. In cases in which third parties may have already selected 
the said mark as a keyword, the proprietor is forced to pay a price higher 
than that paid by third parties if he/she wants his/her advertisement to appear 
in a priority position. However, the payment of a higher fee cannot 
guarantee the appearance of a proprietor’s advertisement in a priority 
position because a combination of factors determines which advertisement 
appears in what position. Nevertheless, a proprietor should pay to use his/her 
own mark as a keyword and to pay even more if he/she wants his/her 
advertisement to appear at a better position in the search results in 
comparison with the third parties who purchased the mark earlier as a 
keyword. Therefore, the investment function of a mark is a problem in these 
cases.  
Article 5(2) TMD is the second policy that concerns trademark 
infringement. According to this provision, a member-state may allow a 
proprietor to prevent unauthorized third parties from using, in the course of 
trade, any sign that is identical or similar to his/her mark if this mark is 
known and reputable in that member-state. In such a case, infringement 
takes unfair advantage or is harmful to the uniqueness or reputation of the 																																																								
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mark. This ruling applies even when the goods or services in relation to 
which that sign is used are different from those for which the proprietor 
registered his/her mark.  
 
3.2. Legal Analyze of Article 5 TMD  
 
TMD is the outcome of the mutual concessions among the EU member-
states and explains the convoluted nature of Article 5 of that directive. It 
harmonized the trademark laws of the member- states, but it did so only 
partially. Although full harmonization was not intended, the harmonization 
was meant to eliminate the aspects of national trademark laws that serve as 
obstacles to the effective functioning of the internal market. Therefore, the 
harmonization should allow for the free movement of goods and services and 
enhanced competition among member- states. As a result, the aspects of 
national trademark laws remain unaffected by the harmonization, as shown 
in Article 5(5) TMD, which states that protecting against other uses, apart 
from the use of marks for differentiating goods or services, is not precluded. 
For example, Article 5(1) TMD concerns the use of marks in relation to 
identical goods or services, and it applies uniformly and is binding to all 
member-states. By contrast, Article 5(2) TMD indicates that member-states 
are tasked to provide extra protection to reputable marks, even in instances 
in which the same are used for different goods or services.  
Clearly, Article 5(1) TMD rests on two legs, namely, (a) and (b). 
Under (a), the sign or mark in question should be shown to be identical to 
the registered mark of the proprietor. The goods or services for which that 
sign is used should also be identical to those for which the mark was 
registered. Under this leg of Article 5(1), a proprietor is not required to 
demonstrate the likelihood of confusion. This provision means that the 
offered protection is absolute, typical of the EU trademark law.  
 
The double-identity provision is useful in cases of imitation and 
parallel trade, but difficulties emerge when this provision is applied to cases 
of using trademarks as keywords. A third party implicated in the keyword 
advertising of identical or similar goods and involving the use of another 
person‘s trademark, as well as the search engine that facilitates this 
advertising, could be prosecuted under Article 5(1)(a) TMD even without 
the confusion on the part of search engine users. Article 5(1)(a) TMD does 
not provide for an alleged infringing party to escape liability by showing due 
cause nor does it require proof of any particular injury, such as taking an 
unfair advantage of or damaging a mark‘s reputation or distinctiveness. 265 
Under Article 5(1)(a), the CJEU still demands a trademark proprietor to also 
show that one of the functions of his/her mark has suffered an adverse effect, 
which is rigidly interpreted by the court on one of the mark‘s functions (not 
only the one guaranteeing origin), to ensure free competition. 266 
Articles 6 and 7 TMD summarize certain situations in which a 
trademark proprietor may not prosecute a third party and prevent the use of 
his/her mark because that use does not infringe on the exclusive rights to that 
mark as provided by the law. According to Article 6(1), the ownership of a 																																																								
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trademark shall not entitle a proprietor to prevent a third party from using in 
the course of trade:  
(a) his own name or address; (b) indications concerning the 
kind, quality, quantity, intended purpose, value, geographical 
origin, the time of production of goods or of rendering of the 
service, or other characteristics of goods or services; (c) the 
trade mark where it is necessary to indicate the intended 
purpose of a product or service, in particular as accessories 
or spare parts; provided he uses them in accordance with 
honest practices in industrial or commercial matters.  
Article 6(2) then states that a trademark does not entitle a proprietor to 
prevent third parties from using, in the course of trade, a pre-existing right 
recognized under the law of a member-state, and applying only within the 
defined boundary for which it was granted.  
Paragraph 1 of Article 7 TMD states that a trademark proprietor 
cannot prevent the use of his/her mark in relation to goods once those goods 
are in the market in the community under the same mark or used with his/her 
consent. However, Paragraph 2 of Article 7 states that the proprietor may be 
entitled to prevent the use of the same mark given legitimate grounds for 
doing so, such as when the condition of the goods with the mark has 
subsequently been changed or degraded.  
Although not part of the trademark law, the EU’s E-Commerce 
Directive is significant to resolving keyword advertising disputes because it 
contains provisions that exempt certain hosting activities of information 
service providers. To this extent, the directive may be useful to owners of 
the search engines used in keyword advertising within the EU. Paragraph 1, 
Article 14 of that directive states that where information service is provided 
(including storage of information supplied by users of that service), member-
states should exempt the service provider from liability if it claims no actual 
knowledge of the illegality of information stored at a user’s request or of any 
activity and when damages are claimed. Under this article, member-states 
are also required to exempt the service provider from liability if, upon 
becoming aware of the illegality of the information or any activity, it takes 
immediate and concrete steps to discard the information or make it 
inaccessible.  
Nevertheless, under Paragraph 2 of that Article, this exemption cannot 
be applied if a user is acting under the authority or control of that service 
provider. Lastly, Paragraph 3 indicates that the article does not prevent 
national courts or other administrative bodies that act in accordance with 
their national laws from asking the service provider to terminate or prevent 
the infringement. Moreover, paragraph 3 states that the Article does not 
prevent member-states from creating procedures to guide the removal of 
information or the disablement of access to them.  
As we have established the legal framework for dealing with 
keyword-related disputes in CTMs and those registered under the laws of 
member-states, the next section examines the related case law.  
 
4. GOOGLE LEGAL RULES REGARDING KEYWORD 
ADVERTISING 
4.1. Google Policy  	
Google’s policy regarding using of trademarks in keyword advertising was 
not always consistent and it has evolved over time. 267At starts, bidding of 
trademarks in advertisements, which was belonged to competitors or third 
parties, was not allowed. It could be said that this issue was mostly in favor 
of trademark owners and was suitable for protection of intellectual property 
over Internet but unfortunately this policy has changed in 2004. 
From 2004 it became possible for advertisers to use trademarks 
belonging to competitors and third parties as keyword in their 
advertisements. Under this new policy, Google simply viewed marks as no 
more than the usual keywords that any interested party may bid for.  
Consecutively, Google was not considering complaints that were 
claimed by proprietors of trademarks against competitors or third parties 
regarding their used trademarks which was basically used without notice and 
their consent. It looks very weird from intellectual property protection 
perspective when Google provided special device for its customers to choose 
their keyword from a trademark list, which was like a trademark menu, and 
then customers were able to bid their targeted trademark and use it as their 
advertisements keyword.   
Nevertheless, at the insistence of trademark proprietors, then Google 
did not change its position on issue but not allowed marks to be featured in 
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the real text of advertisements. But surely, Google general policy of making 
trademarks available to be used as keyword without paying attention to 
complaints made by proprietors of those mark made considerable income for 
Google.  
As Google reported right after this decision keywords derived from 
trademarks contributed about 7% to its total earnings.268 A new milestone 
was recorded in June 2009, when Google began to allow marks to feature in 
the actual text of advertisements.  
4.2. Third-Party Trademark In Google AdWords Under  2009 
Policy Change  	
After policy change in 2004, Google was using that policy for near Five 
years which brought more financial contribution to the Google and later it 
was initial reason for another policy changing in 2009.  
After Google changed its policy in 2009, most important change 
which happened was enabling advertisers to choose competitor or third party 
trademark as keyword and appearing this selection and therefore keywords 
in actual text of their advertisements, regardless of objections and 
complaints of the trademark proprietors and it is subjected to four conditions 
in new policy. 269 
First condition is where a mark is used in the text of an advertisement 
in a generic or descriptive manner, rather than to refer to its proprietor, or 
the goods, or services on which he uses the mark. Another condition in 																																																								
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ADWORDS, Available at: http://support.google.com/adwordspolicy/bin/answer.py?hl=en&ans 
which a mark may be permitted to appear in the text of an advertisement is 
where the advertiser is selling, or clearly aiding the sale of goods, or 
services, which correspond with the mark. Furthermore, a mark will be 
allowed to appear in the text of an advertisement where the relevant 
advertiser is selling, or clearly aiding the sale of spare parts, components, or 
other compatible products related to the marked goods, or services. The last 
covered condition is where the primary objective of the landing page270 of 
the relevant advertisement is to furnish informational material concerning 
the marked goods, or services, provided that the advertiser is not also selling 
or aiding the sale of goods, or services belonging to a competitor of the 
proprietor of the relevant mark.271 
4.3. Google’s Regional Policy  	
Apart from general policy that Google introduced, it has generally two 
policy regimes than one affects North America (United States of America 
and Canada) and another policy is designed for rest of the world.272 
The difference of the policy which applies to Europe is that it is 
generally more slanted towards the proprietors of trademarks.273Regarding 
this policy , while a trademark right holder submit a complaint to Google 
regarding the keyword which is corresponding his trademark , Google will 
ensure that impugned advertisement is not utilizing corresponding term to 																																																								
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disputed trademark in its text, or as a keyword for generating 
advertisements.  
In such cases if Google finds trademark proprietors’ claim relevant 
then Google will ask the advertiser to remove the mark from his 
advertisement and will prevent using this mark in future regarding 
wrongdoer advertisements.274 
This policy change happened due to suits and legal actions against 
Google by trademark holders and resulting court rulings mostly in Europe. 
In one way it is obvious that Google together with other search engines are 
earning considerable amount of profit by exploiting legal loopholes. 
Therefor, as the law narrow down such loopholes and limit act of selling 
trademark as keyword coupled with court rulings that have been issued, 
Google is modifying its policy in order to not be liable. So, it is obvious that 
this policy changing was outcome of efforts by trademark holders and 
rulings emanating from the court was role player in this issue as well. 
Furthermore, it is notable to say that such policy changing has not 
solved the problem yet and instead, it only transfer potential liability for 
trademark infringement to advertisers instead of search engines. Furthermore 
it is notable that it remains to be seen what effect the changes in policy and 
disclaimers will have in protecting search engine owners from liability that 
will be addressed in next chapters.  
In 2010, after having lots of lawsuits and receiving many negative 																																																								
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feedback, Google decided to change its policy regarding who is entitled and 
allowed to use their advertising system and purchasing a keyword which is 
trademarked across European countries which was basically different with 
Google policy in North America. In respect to policy changing Google 
Company announced that:  
“We defended our position in a series of court cases that eventually made 
their way up to the European Court of Justice, which earlier this year 
largely upheld our position. The ECJ ruled that Google has not infringed 
trademark law by allowing advertisers to bid for keywords corresponding to 
third party trade marks. Additionally, the court ruled that advertisers can 
legitimately use a third party trademark as a keyword to trigger their ads. 
Today, we are announcing an important change to our advertising 
trademark policy. A company advertising on Google in Europe will now be 
able to select trademarked terms as keywords. If, for example, a user types 
in a trademark of a television manufacturer, he could now find relevant and 
helpful ads from resellers, review sites and second hand dealers as well as 
ads from other manufacturers. This new policy goes into effect on September 
14. It brings our policy in Europe into line with our policies in most 
countries across the world.”275 
After policy changed, Google still made it available for trademarks’ 
right holders to complain regarding trademarked keyword, which belongs to 
them. 276 But it is notable to say that under new policy, such complaint right 																																																								
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5. EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE AND KEYWORD 
ADVERTISING RULING  
5.1. Introduction 		
It has been observed that, way back in the 1970s, during the early years of 
the ECJ, the Court had no knowledge of even the most basic function of 
trademark, the origin function.278 
At that time, the Court was reluctant to recognise and confer legal 
protection on national trademarks, while showing a different attitude 
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examples include, but are not limited to, the following:  
- ads using a trademarked term in a descriptive or generic way, such as not in reference to the term as a 
trademark   
-ads for competing products or services   
-ads for informational sites about a product or service corresponding to the  trademark   
-ads for resale of the trademarked goods or services   
-ads for the sale of components, replacement parts, or compatible products corresponding to a trademark.   
277 Stefan Bechtold and Catherine Tucker , Trademarks , Trigers and Online Search , journal of 
Empirical Legal Studies, Vol. 11, Issue 4, 2014, p. 718. 
278 H. Jehoram, 'The Ideal-Standard Judgment: An Unheeded Warning', Intellectual Property 
Quarterly, 1 (1999), p. 114. 
towards other classes of intellectual property rights.279 There was greater 
disposition towards the protection of inventions and works of art, which 
were considered to promote innovation, and therefore needed to be protected 
against unauthorised uses by third parties, whereas trademarks were viewed 
as lowly forms of intellectual property rights, which deserved no protection. 
280
 
Now ,  European Trademark law after more than Two decade is facing 
new challenges due to new emerging technologies and Internet is major role 
player in making new challenges. According to a research which was carried 
by European Commission, half of European are using Internet as source of 
information regarding their buying over Internet on- or offline.281 
Searching for or against a trademark makes Internet users able to look 
for goods or services’ sources and allow them compare prices for same or 
similar products and review their alternative or complementary offerings. 282 
While this options will lead to comfort for internet users by providing them 
different choices, it undermines trademark owner’ efforts to protect their 
trademark.  
Generally case law on keyword advertising evaluated online service 
providers liability for allowing their users to reserve registered trademark  as 
their keyword for online search results without trademark right holder’s 																																																								
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consent.283 
There was inconsistent court’ decisions within different member states 
jurisdiction and it varied considerable. Therefore, there was an urgent need 
for clarity as keyword advertising was most important tool for search 
engines business model’ revenues. 284 
ECJ played an active role in case of keyword advertising as there were 
difficulties for applying TMF and CTMR to this new form of dispute due to 
Art. 267 of the TFEU which defined a duty for court of Justice to interpret 
TMD and CTMR. Some scholars saw this phenomenon as a concern as such 
judgments in effects are “invention in the guise of interpretations”. 285 
The most famous case which bears in minds issue of keyword 
advertising is Louis Vuitton. In an advisory opinion, which attracted 
numerous criticisms, Advocate General Poiares Madera argued that ECJ 
should not have found Google liable for infringement on account of the 1989 
Trademark Infringement. A four-prong test must be used to determine if 
Google did in- fringe. First, a defendant’s use of a trademark must not have 
the proprietor’s consent. Second, the use must occur in the “course of trade.” 
Third, the use must relate to goods or services “identical or similar” to the 
ones covered by the trademark. Fourth, use must affect or be liable to affect 
the functions of the trademark.   
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On the basis of the four-prong test, the advocate general analyzed Ad-
Words. When Google allowed advertisers to select their Keyword, no such 
link was established because the marketed service, that is, the inclusion in 
Ad-Words, was neither similar nor identical to Louis Vuitton’s goods.286 The 
advocate general reached the fourth prong of the infringement test only in 
terms of the display of advertisements. He found that such a display was 
insufficient to undermine the essential function of trademarks, that is, to 
guarantee the origin of goods, because it did not lead to confusion. Although 
the advocate general admitted that advertisers pay for the benefit of the 
“expectation of being relevant to the search,” he stressed that search results 
usually disappoint the particular expectations of individual users. Therefore, 
Internet users assess the origin of goods or services only on the basis of 
advertisement content of the advertisement and, ultimately, the advertised 
websites. 287 
The CJEU ruled in 2010 on three different infringement cases. These 
three judgments marked the creation of the Community Case Law on 
keyword-generated advertising within the EU. This is- sue remains relevant 
until now and has been criticized by analysts who believe that the court 
should have used a traditional approach in analyzing trademark 
infringement, as suggested by its advocate general, to obtain the same 
conclusion. Analysts believe that the premise on which the court rested its 
ruling missed important parts of the evidence, bypassed its pre-existing 
jurisprudence, and threatened to open the floodgates of abusive trademark 
use in the future.  																																																								
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In Google France, a triplex of French cases (c-236/08, c-237/08 and 
c-238/08), were involved. They all raised related issues, which the French 
highest court, the Cour de Cassarion, submitted to the CJEU for clarification 
under the preliminary reference procedure. All three trademarks proprietors 
were aggrieved at Google‘s permission of their marks to be used in keyword 
advertising. Consequently, they brought this action against Google in the 
French courts. Having lost in the lower courts, which found Google liable 
for trademark infringement in all three cases, Google embarked on a 
prolonged appeal. At the Court de Cassation, the Court decided to halt 
proceedings in the three cases to abide clarifications from the CJEU on some 
recondite questions of law referred to it under the preliminary reference 
system.  
5.2. Case Google France Google Inc. V. Louis Vuitton Malletier 
C-236/08  
 
The most celebrated of the three cases, is case C-236/08 involving Google, 
and Louis Vuitton, the proprietor of the CTMs, "Vuitton", "Louis Vuitton", 
and "LV", which were both registered under French national trademark law. 
The three marks were recognised as reputable. The ―Louis Vuitton ǁ 
trademark was used as a keyword. Apart from enabling advertisers to pick 
that mark as a keyword, Google made it possible for them to combine it with 
words suggesting imitation, such as Louis Vuitton imitations or replica and 
copy.  Thus, when Internet users entered Louis Vuittonǁ, or Louis Vuitton 
imitationsǁ on the Google search engine, advertisements were generated, 
which led them to sites (headed sponsored links) offering products that were 
imitations of the Louis Vuitton luxury brand. Although not confusing as 
such, the advertisements explicitly displayed ambiguous messages such as -
Louis Vuitton copies-  Louis Vuitton was aggrieved at this use of its mark in 
keyword advertising. Consequently, it brought this action against Google in 
the French courts. It won at the lower courts, which found Google liable for 
trademark infringement. Google then appealed to the Cour de Cassation, 
which decided to seek clarifications from the CJEU on three questions.  
The first question was whether a paid referencing service provider that 
supplied registered trademarks as keywords to advertisers, and agreed to 
create and display, through those keywords, links to sites offering imitation 
products, was using the said trademarks in a way that the proprietors of the 
marks could oppose on the basis of Article 5(1)(a) and (b) TMD, as well as 
Article 9(1)(a) and (b) CTMR Secondly, if the relevant trademarks were 
found to be reputable, whether their proprietors could oppose such use 
pursuant to Article 5(2) TMD, and Article 9(1)(c) CTMR. Thirdly, if such 
use was not one that the proprietors of the marks were entitled to oppose 
under both TMD and the CTMR, whether the provider of the paid 
referencing service could be considered to be an information society service 
provider that stored information supplied by the users of the service within 
the context of Article 14 of the E-Ecommerce Directive, and consequently, 
not liable, unless it had been notified by the proprietors of the marks of the 
advertisers‘ illegal use of the sign.  
5.3. Google France V. Viaticum Luteciel 	
In the second case, like the first, Viaticum SA (Viaticum) and Luteciel 
SARL (Luteciel), proprietors of the French trademarks, -bourse des vols- , -
bourse des voyages- and –BDV- ,  were aggrieved That Google permitted 
advertisers to use Their marks as keywords. When Internet users Entered 
Those marks on the Google search engine, advertisements for sites offering 
products identical with, or similar to the marked products were generated. 
But, unlike the first case, the products offered for sale on the generated 
advertising sites were not infringing imitations, but products of competitors 
to the proprietors of the marks.102 Google was held Liable for trademark 
infringement, and further Top on appeal, for aiding trademark infringement. 
Dissatisfied, it appealed to the Cour de Cassation, Which Referred two 
questions to the CJEU for clarification. Those questions corresponded with 
the first and third questions that it had Referred to the CJEU in Case C-
236/08 discussed above. 
5.4. Google France V. Cnrrh (C-238/08) 
5.4.1. Back To Ground And Facts 
 
The parties in the third houses were Google, Mr. Raboin, and Tiger SARL 
(Tiger), on the one hand, and Mr Thonet, and Centre national de recherche 
en relations humaines SARL (CNRRH), on the other. CNRRH was a 
licensee of the French trademark –Eurochallenges-, the license having Been 
Obtained from Mr. Thonet, the proprietor of the mark. As in the other cases, 
Google permitted advertisers to use the Eurochallenges mark as a keyword. 
When Internet users - entered Eurochallenges on the Google search engine, 
advertisements Appeared leading them to sites offering products identical 
with, or similar to those of the proprietor of the mark. As in the second case 
above, the products sold on the advertised sites were not imitations, but 
belonging products to competitors, who, in fact, owned the sites. After 
hearing and determination, Google, Tiger, and Mr. Raboin were held Liable 
for trademark infringement.  
This decision was affirmed on appeal, leading to further Top appeals 
brought` separately by Google, and Tiger before the Cour de Cassation. 
Again, the Court Referred three questions to the CJEU for a preliminary 
ruling. The first was Whether, an economic operator, who agreed on the 
basis of a paid internet referencing service, to reserve, without permission, 
trademarks owned by third parties as keywords, Which When used in 
searches displayed links to the site operated by operators in That order to 
offer for sale goods, services or That were identical with, or similar to Those 
For which the marks were registered could be said to infringe the exclusive 
rights granted to the proprietors of the marks under Article 5 TDM. The 
second and third questions were rispettivamente a repetition of the first and 
the third questions Referred to the CJEU in Case C-236/08. 
5.4.2. Judgment Detail  
The CJEU eventually responded to the above questions referred to it by the 
Cour de Cassation in the three Google cases. The Court ruled that Google‘s 
Ad-Words program did not amount to trademark infringement, and it was, 
accordingly, not liable. Advocate General Poiares Maduro, in his opinion 
submitted to the CJEU, advised against finding Google liable for 
infringement under TDM. The Advocate General professed his commitment 
to the traditional analysis of European trademark law, and drew upon 
existing CJEU case law, to advance a four-part test for analyzing trademark 
infringement. The first part of this test is that the allegedly infringing party 
must have used the relevant mark without the proprietor‘s consent. Second, 
is that the purported use must have been in the course of trade. Third, the use 
must relate to goods, or services identical with, or similar to those for which 
the mark was registered. Fourth, the use must be shown to affect, or be likely 
to affect the functions of that mark, the most essential of which, being the 
guarantee of the origin of the goods, or services for which the mark was 
registered. One way in which a use may affect this essential function of the 
mark, for example, is to create a likelihood of confusion.  
In the instant case, Advocate General Maduro thought that Google‘s 
adwords program constituted two distinct uses. Google‘s permission of 
advertisers to pick keywords constituted one use, and when Google showed 
advertisements upon Internet users entering those keywords on the search 
engine, that constituted yet another use. However, it was clear to the 
Advocate General that Louis Vuitton did not authorize any of these uses. 
Moreover, each of the uses took place in the course of trade. This is because, 
in each case, Google was pursuing an economic activity from which it 
expected to benefit through advertising fees.  
With respect to the third part of the test though, the first use was 
immaterial because the service offered thereby of allowing advertisers to 
pick keywords, was not identical with, or similar to Louis Vuitton‘s 
products. But the second use met that part of the test because the 
advertisements generated from the entry of the trademarked keywords on the 
search machine related to goods that were identical with, or similar to the 
products of Louis Vuitton. Consequently, it was on the basis of the second 
use (the showing of advertisements) that the Advocate General ultimately 
reached a conclusion on the fourth part of the test. According to him, the 
showing of the advertisements was not enough to affect the essential 
function of the registered mark in guaranteeing the origin of the covered 
products because that did not cause confusion among consumers 38. The 
Advocate General maintained that while it is case that advertisers paid for 
the benefit of the ―expectation of being relevant to the search 288, Internet 
users did not always get the results they expected from their search. As a 
result, they often had to determine the origin of particular goods, or services 
based on what is contained in the advertisements, and invariably the sites 
advertised.  
The CJEU adopted the Advocate General‘s opinion that Google was 
not liable for trademark infringement. It, however, followed an interestingly 
different line of reasoning to reach that conclusion. Instead of labouring 
through the Advocate General‘s four-part analysis 289, the Court centered its 
attention on the third part of the test, -use in the course of trade- , ignoring 
all the others. The Court took the view that in storing trademarked 
keywords, and showing advertisements triggered through the use of those 
keywords, Google pursued a commercial activity. Nevertheless, the Court 
thought that the type of use contemplated in TMD required, at the very 
minimum, a showing that the allegedly infringing party, in this case, Google, 
used the mark in its individual commercial communication Ad-Words, the 
Court concluded, did not fit into this requirement. In that sense, Google 
could not be said to have used the trademarked keywords at all. Instead, all it 
did was to make it technically possible for other parties to use them.  
Turning to Article 14 of the E-Commerce Directive 290, in determining 																																																								
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290 Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on 
certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal 
Market ('Directive on electronic commerce') 1. Where an information society service is provided that 
consists of the storage of information provided by a recipient of the service, Member States shall ensure 
that the service provider is not liable for the information stored at the request of a recipient of the service, 
whether the liability of the referencing service provider should be limited, 
the role played by that service provider must be considered in other to 
ascertain whether such a role was a neutral one in the sense of being merely 
technical, automatic, and passive. In this connection, for example, it was 
relevant that Google played a role in writing the commercials that 
accompanied the advertising links, or in establishing, or choosing keywords. 
However, the mere fact that the referencing service was provided for a fee, 
as in this case, was not a relevant factor capable of denying the service 
provider of the exemption provided for under Article 14 of the E-Commerce 
Directive 14. The controlling test of that Article is whether the service 
provider played any active role of a nature that gave it knowledge, or control 
of the information stored. This is an issue for the national courts to decide, 
and a service provider that is found to have played such an active role cannot 
avail itself of the exemption in Article 14. Even in the absence of any active 
role, such a service provider may still not be entitled to the Article 14 
exemption, if it did not act promptly to discard the infringing advertisement, 
or render it inaccessible upon becoming aware of its illegal nature.  
Although the CJEU‘s ruling only addressed the questions referred to it 
by the Court de Cassation, the overall result should be comforting to 
providers of keyword advertising, such as Google, and its counterparts in the 
EU. It is worth adding that aside from the liability of referencing service 
providers, such as Google, the Court took the opportunity to address the 																																																																																																																																																																					
on condition that:  
(a) the provider does not have actual knowledge of illegal activity or information and, as regards claims 
for damages, is not aware of facts or circumstances from which the illegal activity or information is 
apparent; or  
(b) the provider, upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness, acts expeditiously to remove or to 
disable access to the information. 
liability of keyword advertisers, that is, those patronizing the Google Ad-
Words program. The basis for proving liability in both cases is not the same. 
For example, according to the CJEU, there is no ―useǁ under TMD where a 
referencing service provider stores, as keywords, signs that are identical with 
trademarks, and shows advertisements that are prompted through the use of 
those keywords. On the other hand, according to the Court, an advertiser 
who uses, as a keyword on an internet referencing service, a sign that is 
identical with a trademark, uses that sign in relation to goods, or services in 
the context of Article 5(1)(a) TMD. Thus, even though Google was found 
not to be liable for trademark infringement, advertisers patronizing its 
adwords program may be liable for such infringement. In addressing the 
issue of an advertiser‘s liability, the CJEU placed emphasis on the 
advertising function of a trademark. According to the Court, the proprietor 
of a trademark may prevent the use of his mark as a keyword for goods, or 
services that are identical with those for which he registered that mark, if the 
advertisement generated from the use of the keyword makes an average 
Internet user unable to determine, or do so with difficulty, whether the 
goods, or services actually originated from the proprietor, an entity 
economically related to him, or from a third party.  
 
5.5. Portakabin Ltd And Portakabin Bv V. Primakabin Bv Case 
C-558/08 Netherlands  
5.5.1. Background and Facts  
 
Preliminary Reference was from the Hoge Raad der Nederlanden 
(Netherlands), The Supreme Court of the Netherlands and Subsequent to 
Google France referred by the Cour de Cassation, the CJEU also received a 
preliminary reference from the Dutch Supreme Court. There, the CJEU 
expatiated on the implications of using a third party‘s trademark as Google 
Ad-Words.  
In Portakabin case both the plaintiff and the third party produced and 
sold movable houses. The plaintiff operated by way of a business entity that 
used the mark PORTAKABIN. It owned a subsidiary called Portakabin BV, 
which was a licensee of the mark. The defendant, Primakabin, which had no 
connection with Portakabin offered for sale and lease, new and used 
movable houses that included not only its own, but also those produced by 
Portakabin.291 
Both parties advertised their products on their respective websites. But 
in advertising its products, Primakabin used Ad-Words, such as ̳Portakabin,  
Portocabin, ̳Portokabin and ̳portocabin. If any Internet user entered any of 
these words on a search machine, it generated a Primakabin advertisement, 
which was shown as a sponsored link‘ , either to the right side of the search 
results, or above them. Portakabin attempted unsuccessfully to prevent 
Primakabin from using its mark in this manner. Primakabin contended, and 
the trial court agreed that, it only used the Ad-Words to let customers know 
that it also sold Portakabins. According to the trial court, Primakabin‘s use 
of the Portakabin mark was not meant to distinguish goods. Furthermore, the 
use did not take an unfair advantage of that mark. The only purpose for 
which Primakabin used the mark was to direct anybody interested to its own 
website on which it also offered second hand portakabins for sale. 																																																								
291 Case C-558/08 Portakabin Ltd and Portakabin BV V Primakbin BV 2010 See Online:  : 
http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:62008CJ0558:EN:HTML 
Dissatisfied, Portakabin appealed to the Gerechtshof te Amsterdam 
(Amsterdam Appeal Court). The Appeal Court restrained Primakabin from 
making any advertisement generated through the use of the Ad-Word 
Portakabin, which carried ̳used portakabin in it.  
Moreover, if Primakabin chose to use the keywords, Portocabin, 
Portokabin, and the like, it should ensure that users were not linked to pages 
of its websites on which products not made by Portakabin were offered for 
sale. Nonetheless, the Appeal Court maintained that the use of the keywords 
Portakabin, Portocabin and Portokabin and the like, did not amount to use in 
relation to goods, or services. Portakabin was unhappy with this part of the 
Appeal Court‘s judgment, as it felt that the Appeal Court should have 
restrained Primakabin from making any use whatsoever of Portakabin as an 
Ad-Word.  
That prompted Portakabin to take out a further appeal to the Dutch 
Supreme Court, which submitted several questions to the CJEU for a 
preliminary ruling Among the questions raised was whether the proprietor of 
a trademark could prohibit an advertiser from using a sign that is identical 
with, or similar to his mark as a keyword on an Internet referencing service, 
pursuant to Article 5 TMD. The other questions raised, related to the 
applicability of the exemptions granted to resellers of trademarked products 
that have already been lawfully put on the internal market by the owner, or 
with his consent under Articles 6 and 7 TMD, which provide that a 
trademark proprietor may not exercise his right to prevent under Article 5 
TMD in such a situation.  
5.5.2. Analyzing CJEU’s Ruling in Portakabin Case 
 
Reiterating its ruling in LVMH v. Google, the CJEU stressed that an 
advertiser‘s use of a trademark as a keyword constituted use in the course of 
trade. Additionally, the Court agreed, in line with its earlier ruling in Google 
France v. Louis Vuitton , that Portakabin had the right to bring a suit under 
Article 5 TMD to prohibit a third party from using, without its consent, signs 
that were identical with, or similar to its own, and in relation to goods, or 
services that were identical with, or similar to those for which its mark was 
registered. But the Court maintained that it was for the national court to 
decide whether an alleged use of a sign that was identical with, or similar to 
a trademark, as a keyword on an Internet referencing service was one that 
could be considered to be consistent with honest practices in industrial, or 
commercial matters. In other words, with regard to the applicability of the 
exemptions in Article 6 TMD, it was up to the national court to decide 
whether the purported use was the type contemplated in that Article, even 
where it may also fall under Article 5 TMD. The Court noted the objective 
of Article 6(1)(b) and 6(1)(c) TMD in qualifying the rights granted to 
proprietors of trademarks so that they do not obstruct the free movement of 
goods and services within the internal market. In particular, Article 6(1)(c) 
aims to make it possible for parties selling goods, or services that are a 
necessary supplement to trademarked goods, or services to use that mark for 
the purposes of drawing the attention of the public to the practical 
connection between their goods, or services and those of the proprietor of 
the mark. It is up to a national court, using its discretion, to decide the 
existence, or otherwise of such a connection.  
As Article 6(1)(c) provides, if the use of a mark in advertisement is 
necessary to show the purpose of a third party‘s good, or service, for 
example, but not limited to accessories, and spare parts, the proprietor of that 
mark cannot prevent its use in the advertisement. Thus, in keyword 
advertising disputes, a national court must determine whether an allegedly 
infringing third party could argue that the use in question was consistent 
with honest practices in industrial, or commercial matters, entitling it to rely 
on the provisions of Article 6 TMD in its defense. Ultimately, the obligation 
imposed on third parties is to act fairly with regard to the lawful interests of 
the proprietors of trademarks, and the alleged use must be consistent with 
the aim of Article 6(1)(c) TMD.  
 
With regard to Article 6(1)(b) TMD, the CJEU ruled that when a third party 
uses a sign that is identical with, or similar to a trademark belonging to 
another person in keyword advertising on an Internet referencing service, 
that use cannot generally be considered to be meant to indicate a 
characteristic of the goods, or services advertised by that party in the sense 
provided in the Article. This form of use does not fall within the purview of 
that Article. Nevertheless, certain situations may warrant an opposite 
conclusion, and it is for a national court to make the necessary determination 
based on an examination of the case in its entirety. Thus, in the present case, 
the Dutch Supreme Court must determine whether Primakabin‘s use, as a 
keyword, of signs identical with, or similar to the Portakabin trademark was 
meant to be a description of the products that Primakabin offered, consistent 
with Article 6(1)(b) TMD. In this regard, the Dutch Supreme Court should 
also take note of the fact that the use of the Portakabin trademark in the 
advertisement was not in a generic sense.  
Another issue the Court touched upon is the limitation to the rights of 
the proprietors of trademarks imposed by the exhaustion rule in Article 7 
TMD. Pursuant to that Article, once the proprietor of a trademark has 
produced and placed goods on the market within the European Economic 
Area (EEA), or where such goods have been so placed with his consent, he 
cannot subsequently prevent the use of his mark for the resale of those 
goods, unless he has a legitimate reason to do so. In such a case, a reseller of 
those goods is allowed to use the trademark of the producer for the purposes 
of advertising the goods, and alerting the public of their further 
commercialization. The proprietor of that mark cannot prevent this, in the 
absence of a legitimate reason.  
In the present case, since Primakabin’s advertisement was only directed at 
the resale of used mobile houses that Portakabin had produced and put on 
the internal market under its trademark, and further, since Primakabin‘s 
resale of those houses amounted to their further commercialization as 
conceived by Article 7 TMD, the CJEU went further to consider whether 
there was any legitimate reason for Portakabin to challenge Primarkabin‘s 
advertisement. According to the Court, such a legitimate reason may exist if 
an advertiser‘s use of a sign that is identical with, or similar to a trademark is 
seriously detrimental to the prestige of that mark, or if such an advertiser 
gives the misleading impression that both he and the proprietor of the mark 
are economically related.  
Although the CJEU pointed out that it was for a national court to 
determine the existence, or otherwise, of a legitimate reason under Article 
7(2) TMD, the Court, nevertheless, gave some specific indications of what 
would, or would not qualify as a legitimate ground, in order to ensure that 
national courts reached the right decision in cases involving the resale of 
used products. In this regard, the Court reminded national courts to bear in 
mind the interest of buyers and sellers in seeing that the sale of used 
products on the Internet is not inhibited unnecessarily. As it were, the sale of 
used trademarked products is a recognized business practice to which the 
ordinary consumer is well accustomed. Therefore, according to the Court, 
the addition, for example, of words, such as “used”, or “second hand” to a 
trademark is not a legitimate reason for proprietor of that mark to oppose its 
use. This is because the addition of such words to a trademark does not mean 
that the advertiser is giving the impression that he is economically connected 
to the proprietor of the mark. Such an advertisement also does not seriously 
impair the reputation of that mark.  
Similarly, where a trademark is used to advertise the resale of used 
goods, but not all of the goods are dressed in that mark, this may not 
constitute a legitimate reason for the trademark proprietor to oppose its use, 
unless such a use presents a danger of serious damage to the image of the 
mark arising from the quantity, poor quality, or presentation of the other 
goods advertised with the mark, but not dressed in it. In the instant case, the 
CJEU urged national courts to note that, although Primakabin’s 
advertisement referred to used portakabins, it directed Internet users not only 
to products made by Portakabin, but also other producers. Here, the Court 
clarified that a reseller like Primakabin, which specialized on the sale of 
used trademarked products could not be prevented from using that mark to 
advertise its resale efforts, notwithstanding that it also sold used products 
made by other producers.  
But if Primakabin’s use of the portakabin’s trademark to sell products 
made by other producers will expose the image of that mark to the risk of 
serious damage, due, for instance, to the quantity, poor quality, or 
presentation of the other products advertised with the mark, then Portakabin 
will have a legitimate reason to oppose Primakabin’s use of its trademark in 
advertisements. The Court added if the party reselling the products removed 
the trademark, and in its place, affixed his own mark (relabeling), that may 
constitute a legitimate reason for the proprietor of the replaced mark to 
mount an opposition. This last example stresses the most essential function 
of a trademark, and the importance of making it clear to consumers as to the 
origin of the used products.  
If after considering the case before it, a national court were to find that 
Article 6(1)(b), or 6(1)(c) TMD is applicable, it must next consider whether 
the relevant use was consistent with honest practices in industrial, or 
commercial matters. In order to decide whether this requirement has been 
met, the national court should consider whether the third party‘s use of the 
trademark has enabled the public, or at the minimum, a significant majority 
thereof to see a practical connection between his goods, or services and 
those of the proprietor of the mark, or his licensee. Equally important, is 
whether the advertiser was aware of this, as it is not tenable for him to claim 
ignorance of the fact that his advertisement created confusion, given his 
knowledge of the environment in which he does business, coupled with the 
fact that he is using a keyword that he knows to be identical with another 
party‘s mark.  
5.6. Interflora inc. interflora British unit V Marks & Spencer 
plc Flowers Direct Online Limited  	
5.6.1. Background and Facts  
 
This case is the most recent of a string of cases that overwhelmed the CJEU 
under the preliminary reference procedure on keyword advertising disputes 
related to Internet search engines. The plaintiff, Interflora, manages a global 
flower delivery network composed of independent florists. The 
INTERFLORA trademark is reputable in several parts of the EU, including 
the United Kingdom. Marks and Spencer (M&S), a leading UK store, also 
sells flowers but is not involved with the Interflora network. Through 
keywords purchased on Google’s Ad-Words referencing service, 
advertisements of M&S would be generated and shown as sponsored links 
when Internet users entered keywords, such as "interflora flowers," 
"interflora," "interflora delivery", "interflora.co.uk" or "interflora.com" on 
Google. These advertisements did not carry the Interflora trademark but 
offered M&S flower delivery service to Internet users. Consequently, 
Interflora brought this suit for trademark infringement against M&S before 
the High Court of Justice (England and Wales, Chancery Division). 
 
In turn, the High Court referred a set of questions to the  CJEU on the 
use of a mark of an Internet referencing service by a competitor without the 
consent of that mark’s proprietor.292 One of the questions focused on the 
rights derived from trademarks under Article 5(1) TMD and Article 9(1)(a) 
CTMR, which give exclusive rights to the proprietors of marks and entitle 
them to prevent the use, without their consent, of identical or similar signs. 
The other question was on the protection of reputable marks under Articles 
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5(2) TMD and 9(1)(c) CTMR.  
 
5.6.2. Ruling of the CJEU  
 
On the basis of its reasoning in the case of Google France and Google Inc 
vs. Louis Vuitton which was discussed in detail in above CJEU reaffirmed in 
its September 2011 ruling that the use of a sign as a keyword in advertising 
is equal to the use in the course of trade and in relation to the goods or 
services offered by the party making the advertisement. The important issue 
is that keyword should not have been shown on the advertisement generated. 
On the basis of the infringement stated in Article 5(1)(a) TMD, which 
forbids the use of a sign that is identical to a registered trademark and is 
related to goods or services for which the mark was registered, the court 
ruled that this case concerned whether the alleged use had an adverse effect 
on the functions of the mark. As with the court ruling in Google France, the 
proprietor of the mark could only contest such a use if it adversely affects 
the functions of the mark. Here, the court pointed out that aside from the 
essential function of a mark in guaranteeing the origin of products, its 
investment and advertising functions should also be considered. The court 
then presented steps to be followed in determining whether the infringing 
use had adverse effects on those functions.293 
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5.6.3. Functions of Dispute  
5.6.3.1. Function of Indicating Origin 
 
Relying on its ruling in the Google case, the CJEU stated that the use of a 
sign as a keyword that is identical or similar to a trademark is considered to 
adversely affect the function of that mark in indicating origin if the 
advertisement generated through the use of the sign does not make it 
possible or makes it difficult for reasonably well-informed and observant 
Internet users to determine whether the goods or services mentioned in the 
advertisement actually originated from the proprietor of the mark, an entity 
economically related to him, or a third party.  
In the case at hand, the court stated that Internet users who entered 
“Interflora” and the like on the Google search engine would experience 
difficulty differentiating from the advertisement generated between the 
service offered by Interflora and that from M&S, especially in the absence of 
any clarification by the latter. In other words, the resulting advertisement by 
M&S tended to give Internet users the wrong impression that M&S was 
involved in the Interflora flower delivery network. However, the court left 
this matter to be decided by the English national court.  
 
5.6.3.2. Advertising Function  
 
While recognizing that a trademark is useful in promoting the owner’s goods 
or services, the CJEU noted that the mere ownership of a mark does not 
necessarily entitle one to prevent practices that are, by nature, fair to 
competition. Competitors’ use of identical words in keyword advertising 
does not stop the proprietor of the mark from gaining its own customers. 
However, if the proprietor is forced to use extra marketing measures as a 
result of others’ use of his/her mark, then such a use may be considered to 
adversely affect the advertising function of the mark. The more the 
advertisers bid for a particular keyword, the more that keyword is likely to 
cost. In the present case, M&S, by bidding on the Interflora trademark, made 
bidding for the same trademark expensive or costly for the owner. The 
consequence is that Interflora would be forced to scale down on its 
advertising or be prepared to pay more for it.  
 
 
Arguably, this situation is an adverse effect on the advertising function of its 
mar. This argument from the Google France case was not accepted by 
CJEU, which had a similar stand on Interflora. However, the observation in 
Interflora is that keyword advertising did not negatively affect the 
advertising function of a mark in every case. This observation led the court 
to recognize that keyword advertising could have such an effect in several 
cases. Nevertheless, the court attempted to rationalize its refusal to consider 
the aforementioned consequences of the competitive bidding for a mark, 
which led to an adverse effect. The court explained that the purpose of the 
trademark law is not to protect proprietors from practices intrinsic to 
competition. The objective of keyword advertising is to provide Internet 
users with other options apart from the one originally sought when the 
keyword was entered in the search engine. The court suggested that keyword 
advertising is a force for good. Moreover, it maintained that keyword 
advertising does not deprive the mark proprietor of the opportunity to 
communicate effectively with and attract his/her customers. However, this 
court’s reasoning is doubtful because the prospect of a trademark proprietor 
communicating effectively with and attracting his/her customers may be lost 
due to the escalated advertising cost resulting from the competitive bidding 
for his/her mark as a keyword.294  
So, the decision of the CJEU indicates that the use of a competitor of a 
sign the same as or similar to a mark does not automatically and adversely 
affect the advertising function of that mark. As for the advertising function, 
the ECJ has noted both in Google France and Interflora. 
 
Advertising function is defined by the CJEU in Google France as the 
function of acting ‘as a factor in sales promotion or an instrument of 
commercial strategy and the ‘investment function’ in Interflora as the 
function of ‘acquiring or preserving a reputation capable of attracting 
consumers and retaining their loyalty’. 295 Both of these definitions are vague 
and there is no attempt to provide any justification for either, whether from 
the language, scheme or purpose of the TMD or CTMR, case law or 
otherwise. 296 
 
5.6.3.3. Investment Function  
 
In terms of the investment function of a mark, the CJEU noted that such a 
function enabled the proprietor not only to create and maintain a reputation 
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but also to draw in customers and retain their patronage.297 If a third party 
uses a sign identical to the mark and related to the goods or services that are 
identical to those for which that mark was registered, then this function will 
be adversely affected in a manner that significantly interferes with the 
proprietor’s use of the mark in creating and maintaining a reputation, 
drawing in customers, and retaining their patronage. The court observed an 
overlap between the investment and advertising functions of a mark. Similar 
to the case of the advertising function, if a proprietor is forced to use more 
marketing measures be- cause his/her mark is used in keyword advertising, 
then that action does not suggest an adverse effect on the mark’s investment 
function. The court left the national court to decide on whether the use of the 
Interflora trademark by M&S endangered that mark, thus restraining 
Interflora from gaining customers and retaining their loyalty. In resolving 
the trademark infringement disputes from keyword advertising, reconciling 
the protection of reputable marks with the interest of fair competition should 
be considered. In the aforementioned cases, the CJEU attempted to provide 
direction on how pre-existing laws should be applied to the new 
environment of key- word advertising and its related challenges.  
The following points should be considered. In considering that a 
trademark is contributory to the acquisition and preservation of reputation, 
which could help its proprietor acquire customers and retain their loyalty, 
the CJEU suggested that a mark could aid in attaining goodwill. Moreover, 
the court noted that advertising and other commercial means are a way of 
investing in a mark.  
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Any use that considerably interferes with the objective of acquiring 
and preserving the  reputation of the mark causes an adverse effect on the 
investment function of that mark, which entitles its proprietor to lodge an 
opposition. According to the court, in cases in which a mark already has a 
reputation, its investment function will be diminished by any use that affects 
its reputation, consequently endangering its preservation.  
In the latter case, the effect of the use is not required to be substantial. 
Furthermore, one is not certain if the reputation of a mark referred to by the 
court is the type indicated by Article 5(2) TMD. To ensure fair competition, 
CJEU apparently provided the added qualification that it will not be 
sufficient if the only effect of a use is to force the proprietor of a mark to 
adapt to ac- quire or maintain his/her mark’s reputation. However, this 
reasoning is difficult to understand because if a proprietor is forced to adapt, 
then his/her mark’s reputation can face threat or interference. Although the 
court has undoubtedly provided useful insights into the functions that a mark 
may serve, this last point is does not explain much.298 
 
5.6.3.4. Dilution  
 
Dilution is a fairly recent invention in trademark law that radically shifts the 
balance in the law by dispensing with the confusion test 299  and has proven 
to be a dauntingly elusive concept. 300  The CJEU explained that, in 																																																								
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determining dilution cases, the test of the “reasonably well informed and 
reasonably observant Internet user” is relevant. Thus, in the Interflora case, 
if the English High Court determined that reasonably well-informed and 
observant Internet users could tell that the goods and services offered were 
those of M&S rather than those of Interflora from the advertisements 
generated by entering “Interflora” keywords on the search engine, then no 
trademark dilution would have occurred.301  
In terms of free riding, the court indicated that if the advertiser is a 
competitor offering different goods or services, which are alternatives rather 
than imitations of those of the proprietor of the trademark, and then the 
advertiser cannot dilute the distinctive character of the mark. Therefore, an 
advertiser that offers goods or services that are genuine alternatives to those 
of the proprietor of a trademark should be considered as engaging in fair 
competition rather than free riding, even if the advertiser uses keywords that 
are identical to the mark.  
In this case, Interflora was concerned that the action of M&S would 
dilute the distinctiveness of its Interflora mark and turn it into a generic word 
for flower delivery service. However, the CJEU did not consider such 
concerns. If the M&S advertisements did not confuse the reasonably well-
informed and observant Internet users, then the advertisements only assisted 
to present the service offered by M&S as an alternative to that offered by 
Interflora. Thus, it did preserve, rather than dilute, the distinctiveness of the 
Interflora mark. However, the court’s reasoning is not beyond reproach. If 
proof of confusion among Internet users is considered a precedent for 
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making a dilution case in keyword advertising, then the whole notion of 
dilution will become redundant. The reason is that if the proprietor of a 
trademark can prove the confusion, then a basis already exists for him to 
succeed on other grounds for trademark infringement (e.g., Article 5(2) 
TMD). Thus, the proprietor would have no reason to further prove the 
dilution.  
5.6.3.5. Unfair advantage  	
The CJEU admitted that keyword advertisers have the advantage when they 
bid for the reputable marks of their competitors as keywords. The reputation 
of these marks enables them to be featured outstandingly in the keyword 
searches of consumers. As a result, many consumers will encounter the 
advertisements of competitors generated by using the keywords. In the 
L’Oreál case, the court ruled the act of riding on the reputation of a mark, in 
which the competitor taking advantage makes no effort of his/her own or 
does not financially compensate the proprietor of the mark, to be unlawful. 
This ruling, which declared smell-alike, look-alike imitation perfumes 
unlawful and resulted in widespread judicial criticism, also led the court to 
conclude that keyword advertising took unfair advantage of reputable marks 
in the Interflora case. However, the court explained that keyword advertising 
helped to provide consumers with alternatives to the products offered by the 
proprietor of the mark, thus absolving it from being unlawful. As the court 
further explained, taking unfair advantage of a reputable mark under Article 
5(2) TMD or Article 9(1)(c) CTMR would only be unlawful if such act did 
not have due cause.  
In the Interflora case, the advocate general cleverly sidestepped the 
issue by distinguishing both cases rather than rigidly following the L’Ore á l 
ruling, an approach that would have made keyword advertising unlawful. 
According to the advocate general, although the L’Ore á l case involved 
imitation, M&S offered ordinary products in the Interflora case, which 
involved commercial alternatives to the products offered by the latter to 
consumers. Therefore, this action had due cause and was a fair one despite 
the view of the advocate general that M&S clearly tried to take advantage of 
the reputation of Interflora. The reason is that keyword advertising was used 
in the aforementioned approach meant to offer consumers commercial 
alternatives. He stated that this approach intended to promote competition 
and offer consumers more choices. 302 
The opinion of the advocate general was qualified. If the trademark was not 
only used to promote the relevant advertisement or displayed the mark, then 
it would mean taking unfair ad- vantage. In such a case, whether the 
advertisement is a lawfully comparative one (permissible use) or simply one 
that rides on the reputation of the mark (prohibited use as indicated in the 
L’Oreál case) should still be determined. Disputes caused by these forms of 
advertisements have rarely been considered from a comparative advertising 
perspective, whether by the CJEU or the national courts of the member 
states. Therefore, Advocate General Jääskinen raising the point was 
remarkable, although it was not addressed extensively. The clarification 
sought by the English High Court sought in its preliminary reference to 
Article 5(1)(a) TMD comprised issues similar to those addressed in the 
previous CJEU rulings. Some of those issues include whether the form of 
keyword advertising implicated in the instant case involved the use of a 
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mark by the advertiser and whether the use was related to the goods or 
services for which the aforementioned mark was registered. Following the 
previous rulings of CJEU The advocate general answered both questions 
positively.  
 
In the present dispute, another question that the English High Court 
mentioned in its preliminary reference was the relevance of the idea that the 
advertisement was capable of leading several consumers to assume that 
M&S was involved in the Interflora network. Yet again, the advocate 
general repeated the CJEU position in the Google case that using a 
trademarked key- word could affect the origin function of the relevant mark. 
Therefore, such an action is prohibited when the advertisement generated 
does not allow average Internet users, or allows them but with difficulty, to 
determine if the goods or services advertised actually come from the 
proprietor of the used mark, the entity economically connected with it, or a 
third a party.  
However, according to the advocate general, even when a mark is 
mentioned in the generated advertisement, an adverse effect on the origin 
function of that mark may not be assumed if the advertisement makes it 
effectively clear that the advertiser is not linked to the mark, as in the case of 
comparative advertising. The advocate general raised the issue of 
comparative advertising again, although he failed to elaborate on it. 
Moreover, he added that the advertisements generated from trademarked 
keywords sometimes presented alternatives to the marked products, 
explaining that the opportunity, which was offered to consumers to make 
informed decisions among alternative products, is one of the benefits of the 
Internet. Nevertheless, the advocate general presented his position on Article 
5(1)(a) TMD by emphasizing the special nature of Interflora. That is, the 
mark was meant to indicate a network of independent commercial florists 
offering standardized flower delivery service, which is the second meaning 
of the mark, based on the description of the advocate general. He explained 
that the fact that M&S was generated when Inter- flora was entered into a 
search engine was likely to make Internet users assume that M&S was 
involved with the Interflora network. This assumption would be equal to a 
mistake regarding origin and thus would be considered infringement.  
CJEU ruled that M&S took unfair advantage of the Interflora mark, 
without giving any financial compensation for its proprietor. The use 
constituted an infringement (free riding), unless a just cause for it was 
present. With policy considerations in mind, the court concluded that an 
infringement could result if the products advertised were simply imitations 
of those offered by the proprietor of the mark. However, the court further 
explained that no infringement would exist if the products advertised were 
commercial alternatives to those offered by the proprietor of the mark, did 
not erode or tarnish the products of that proprietor, or affected the functions 
of the mark. Such a use would generally be considered fair competition in 
the relevant class of products and thus having just cause. However, on the 
basis of the surrounding facts, the CJEU left it to the English High Court to 
decide on whether the actions of M&S caused dilution or amounted to free 
riding.  
 
5.6.4. High Court Of England And Wales: Victory For The 
Trademark Owner  
 
The extensive ECJ process that involved trademark infringement related to 
keyword advertising between Interflora and M&S concluded on May 21, 
2013, when the High Court of England and Wales issued a 99-page 
significant decision favoring Interflora as the trademark owner. This 
decision was a triumph for the individuals who believe that, in cases in 
which keyword advertising principles of intellectual property rights and 
trademark protection is overlooked, businesses should base their trade on the 
use of keywords already protected as trademarks by their competitors.303 
 
The court concurred with the ECJ point of view that the choice and 
use of M&S of the keyword “Interflora” led to the use of this trademark. 
Moreover, the use of trademarks has harmful effects on the origin function 
of the Interflora trademark. Thus, M&S infringed on the exclusive rights that 
belonged to Interflora in its trademark under Article 5(1)(a) of the 
Trademarks Directive.304 
The High Court of England and Wales considered several major 
elements in promulgating its decision. The high court considered what 
constitutes as the “average consumer” in the disputes and the effects of 
keyword advertising on the origin function of trademarks. The high court 
also scrutinized the effects of keyword advertising on the investment 
function of trademarks, including unfair advantage and due causes.  
On the matter of the average consumer in this legal case, confusion 
and misinformation about trademarks could be mitigated if the average 
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consumer is reasonably well informed, observant, and cautious. In its 
decision, the high court stated that the average consumer is “not particularly 
technically literate, does not know precisely how Ad-Words operates and is 
not aware of the issues.” Furthermore, the high court mentioned that current 
Internet users learn by being proactive and seem to be aware of the 
differences between natural and sponsored search results unlike in the past. 
Nevertheless, the high court eventually found that a significant percentage of 
Internet users in the United Kingdom did not appreciate the appearance of 
the sponsored search results appear because advertisers paid for links to their 
services. This situation was generated by keywords consisting of or related 
to the search term entered by users.  
 
With respect to the origin function of trademarks, the decision of the high 
court mentioned that the ECJ jurisprudence cases, including Google France 
L'Oreal vs. eBay and the current case, considered the effects of keyword 
advertising on the origin function of a trademark. The high court confirmed 
that the aforementioned case had established that the use of the keyword 
“Interflora” by M&S had adversely affected the origin function of the 
Interflora trademark as the advertisements of M&S had not enabled 
reasonably well-informed and observant Internet users to determine whether 
the M&S flower delivery service originated from Interflora, was 
economically connected to Interflora, or came from a third party. The high 
court eventually concluded that the M&S advertisements did not enable 
users to make this distinction. Moreover, the Internet users did not have 
enough general information about the market of the flower delivery system 
to distinguish between the two. The M&S advertisements did not clearly 
indicate that M&S was competing with Interflora. The court determined that 
this situation was probably caused by the nature of the Interflora business as 
a network of traders operating under their own business names. This fact 
became more difficult for users who clicked on the M&S advertisements to 
distinguish the origin. Eventually, the high court decided that, although not 
every individual Internet user searching for a flower delivery system 
believed that the M&S flower delivery service was involved in the Interflora 
network, a significant per- centage of users searching for “Interflora” and 
consequently clicking on a link to the M&S ser- vice was led to believe that 
it was involved in the Interflora network, thus adversely affecting the 
Interflora business. The court decided that M&S had infringed on the 
trademark of Interflora un- der Article 5(1)(a) of the Trademarks Directive 
of the European community.305 
With regard to the investment function, the high court considered 
whether the M&S key- word advertising had adversely affected the 
investment function of the Interflora trademark by harming the trademark’s 
image that was conveyed to the public. The court was not convinced that 
Interflora had presented proof of such issue. Consequently, M&S was not 
held accountable for trademark infringement in this manner.  
In terms of unfair advantage and due cause, the high court considered 
whether M&S had taken unfair advantage of the Interflora trademark and, if 
so, whether such use had been fair and with “due cause.” However, the high 
court was not convinced about the arguments of Interflora that M&S had 
deliberately targeted the former, which had been unable to respond. Thus, 
M&S was not held liable for infringement under Article 5(2).  
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5.6.5. Court of Appeals Sends Interflora Back To High 
Court  
After the high court decision, which was a victory for trademark owners, the 
Court of Appeals of England investigated the high court decision based on a 
request by M&S and rendered a new decision that weakened the victory of 
the trademarks owners.  
On November 5, 2014, the Court of Appeals ruled on the ongoing 
dispute between Inter- flora and M&S. The decision was based on previous 
ECJ rulings in 2011 and those of the high court in 2013. As previously 
discussed, the high court ruled that M&S had infringed on the trademark 
rights of the florist by registering “Interflora” as a Google Adwords 
keyword. However, the Court of Appeals found a number of “legal errors” 
in the high court ruling and ordered a retrial of the case.306 
The Court of Appeals found that, in considering the test, it makes no 
difference whether the question is asked and answered from the perspective 
of the single hypothetical, well-in- formed, and observant Internet user or 
whether that hypothetical person gives the benchmark for identifying a 
population of Internet users with significant views. Furthermore, the Court 
of Appeals determined that the judge was entitled to consider the effects of 
the advertisements on a significant portion of the relevant class of 
consumers. However, the court warned that considering only the views of 
the Internet users who were unobservant could set the bar too low. The 
Court of Appeals emphasized that only the effects of the advertisements on 
Internet users who were reasonably well informed and reasonably observant 
that should have been considered.  																																																								
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In terms of the relevance of the doctrine of initial interest confusion in 
the current case, the Court of Appeals determined that the judge had made a 
mistake in depending on the initial interest confusion. This concept arises 
when the initial confusion of the average consumer may be dispelled before 
the point of sale; however, the consumer may still purchase even without the 
confusion. The Court of Appeals reiterated that the only test to consider if 
the functions were affected was the “reasonable Internet user” test provided 
by CJEU. In addition, the court explained that the doctrine of initial interest 
confusion was a “potentially misleading gloss,” which should not be 
included in the analysis of the trademark infringement, at least in cases 
involving keyword advertising. 307 
Finally, the Court of Appeals decided that the judge was correct in 
determining that a trademark infringement could occur when an 
advertisement appeared as a result of a search for a trademark term when the 
advertiser had not bid on it as an Adword but the advertisement came up as a 
result of the advanced broad matching function of Google. The Court of 
Appeals clarified that in determining whether an advertiser had used the 
trademark in these circumstances, the court would need to consider whether 
the object and effects of the activities of the advertiser were intended to 
generate the appearance of its advertisements as a result of the search for the 
trademark term. 
 
5.6.6. Interflora Case’ Critical Analyzing  
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The ECJ decision on keyword advertising and its issuance of a decision 
unfavorable to trademark owners was expected because of jurisprudence, 
which is based on the Trademark Directive process. Nevertheless, the high 
court decision could still be considered an important victory for trademark 
owners, particularly Interflora.  
This decision has been long overdue and is certainly a significant 
triumph for Interflora. Moreover, this decision can reassure other trademark 
owners. Some extended decisions that favor Interflora were the result of the 
distinct situation of Interflora as a business, which is built in a network of 
independent businesses operating under their own business names. 
Consequently, this situation proves the difficulty of distinguishing the origin 
of the services between Interflora and M&S.  
The high court decision resulted in the necessity for keyword 
advertisers to consider re- viewing their online advertising functions and 
strategies to guarantee that their advertisements and sponsored links that use 
keywords identical to the trademarks of competitors or third parties clearly 
indicate that they are not associated with their competitors.  
According to court’s decision, the average consumer’s awareness has 
increased and continues to increase, as Internet users use search engines 
more and more to browse the Internet. Therefore, a court may not 
automatically favor the trademark owner should a similar case arise in the 
future. As regards the high court decision, the presiding judge in this case 
was surprised that M&S had not attempted to use a defense based on its 
keyword advertising that constitutes comparative advertising pursuant to 
Article 4 of the EU Misleading and Comparative Advertising Directive 
(2006/114/EC) and previous EU legal cases. Although the judge did not 
mention the merits of such a defense, businesses encountering similar 
infringement allegations of using key- words protected by trademarks may 
use this option when drafting their defense.  
Note that the high court decision abided by the ECJ responses, 
proving that the use of third-party trademarks as keywords in Google search 
cannot establish trademark infringement unless it has harmful effects on the 
trademark functions. Thus, the high court’s ruling is relevant to businesses 
because it emphasizes the fact that the use of the competitor trademark as a 
key- word can result in trademark infringement, particularly if confusion can 
arise from determining the origin of the goods or services.  
The high court decision was largely against M&S as it looked at the 
factual grounds of the case from the viewpoint of reasonably well-informed 
and observant users. Note that a considerable percentage of Internet users 
cannot identify between sponsored and organic results de- rived from 
Google. These users are not aware that advertisements are generated by 
keyword search terms. As Internet users become more informed, begin to 
comprehend how keyword searching works, and become more aware of 
sponsored links, pursuing infringement actions on these grounds may 
become more difficult to execute. However, business owners can and should 
reduce their liability and risk exposure by guaranteeing that advertisements 
clearly indicate that the relevant goods and services come from a competitor. 
Keyword advertisers should review their online advertising strategies and 
procedures to confirm that their advertisements and sponsored links that use 
keywords identical to competitor trademarks expressly indicate that they are 
not associated with their competitors.  
After the decision favoring Interflora, the Court of Appeals heavily 
criticized the dependence of the high court judge on the “initial interest 
confusion” doctrine, indicating in strong terms that the “doctrine of initial 
interest confusion is therefore an unnecessary and potentially misleading 
gloss on the tests the Court has articulated.” Furthermore, the Court of 
Appeals held that Justice Arnold, in his original decision, had turned the 
responsibility to the defendant to prove that no trademark infringement 
occurred, when the usual approach is place the onus on the claimant to prove 
that infringement occurred (i.e., the defendant should not have to prove the 
negative). In addition, the Court of Appeals criticized the decision of Justice 
Arnold to admit into the proceedings several forms of evidence from 
Interflora.  
In a highly unusual move, the Court of Appeals did not overturn the 
original high court decision but ordered a retrial. Barristers for Interflora 
claimed that the “errors” of the original judge were so minor that the original 
decision would have been no different even if the high court had abided by 
the reasoning of the Court of Appeals. However, the Court of Appeals can- 
not retry cases on facts unless compelled to do so and can only point out 
errors of law. Thus, it argued that the “errors” were so grave that the original 
case warranted to be reheard by the high court, which would re-examine the 
evidence and re-cross-examine witnesses for both parties. In short, the Court 
of Appeals ordered the high court to conduct a second hearing of the case.  
 A crucial point is understanding the fact that the Court of Appeals did 
not consider the original decision to be wrong. Rather, it determined that the 
high court over-relied on a doctrine of the trademark law in the form of the 
“initial interest confusion” concept. The Court of Appeals also determined 
that the high court incorrectly placed the onus on the defendant to prove that 
no infringement occurred and wrongly admitted or relied on pieces of 
evidence in the proceedings.  
Although the Court of Appeals could have immediately overturned the 
high court decision, the former did not. This author suspects that the Court 
of Appeals was cautious of the fact that this case was a finely balanced one 
and was highly dependent on factual evidence. As a result of the Court of 
Appeals findings and given that it did not and could not re-hear evidence of 
facts beyond exceptional circumstances presented in the original decision, it 
effectively determined that the high court should retry the case. The high 
court would possibly arrive at the same decision as before. Nevertheless, the 
Court of Appeals cited sections of the original decision of the high court 
judge on numerous occasions, such as that bidding on a competitor 
trademark as part of a keyword advertising campaign is not actually 
prohibited. Determining if infringement has occurred will always rely on the 
individual facts of the case and whether consumers were confused or 
perceived an association between the brand owner and the advertisement.  
Although the Interflora case greatly relied on the specific structure of 
the Interflora net- work of florists, that is, a group of independent florists 
using the same Interflora brand, the presumption is that M&S was more 
likely to infringe on the rights of Interflora had Interflora been a 
“traditional” business. The case and its decision are important in creating 
guidelines in the multi- billion-pound keyword and pay-per-click advertising 
sector of the United Kingdom. The triumph of M&S may reinforce the 
relatively liberal use of bidding on the trademarks of a competitor in 
keyword advertising.  
 
5.7. Discussion on ECJ Rulling  
 
After a long period of intractable uncertainty, the curtain has now been 
drawn, at least, for now, on the lawfulness of third parties using, without 
authorization, trademarks as keywords to generate advertisements. Needless 
to reiterate, the CJEU has now given judicial approval to this practice. And 
on this premise, bearing in mind as well, the need to promote competition, 
the Court has found no need to grant reputable marks any extra protection 
that would otherwise enable their proprietors to challenge the practice.  
The CJEU performed much of the task of shedding light on the 
uncertainty arising from keyword advertising in a series of rulings that 
predated Interflora. Notable among those were the rulings in Google France 
joined cases, and Portakabin, all of which were examined earlier on. 
Nevertheless, with the Interflora ruling, the Court eventually addressed most 
of the issues potentially posed for trademark law by keyword advertising. 
The cumulative result is that the Court has apparently signaled its approval, 
at least, of keyword advertising that does not involve the use of marks 
belonging to brand owners. Advertisers need no longer be wary of using the 
trademarks of other parties in order to offer consumers’ , goods, or services 
that are commercial alternatives to those offered by the proprietors of those 
marks.  
Based on the clarifications provided by the CJEU, it was predictable 
that English High Court will ultimately find in favour of M&S. This is 
because M&S could persuasively contend, in the context of Article 5(2) 
TMD, and Article 9(1)(c) CTMR, that it took advantage of Interflora‘s 
trademark with a due cause: that is, in order to provide consumers with an 
alternative to what Interflora offered. 308 
Despite the CJEU jurisprudence that has emerged so far, however, 
some areas of doubts still exist. One such area is how precisely to apply 
some of the nascent functions of a trademark that the CJEU articulated in the 
above cases, and what their implications might be. For example, although 
the Court dwelt on the investment function of a mark, it ended up shedding 
more fire, rather than light on the issue. This lack of clarity is a potent source 
of future disputes, both in the context of keyword advertising, and beyond. 
The situation is compounded by the rapidity of technological advances and 
breakthroughs, with the likely result that much of the emerging CJEU 
jurisprudence is made obsolete, taking us back to the drawing board.  
Furthermore, although it is remarkable that the CJEU observed a likelihood 
of confusion in that case, that observation is limited to the particular facts of 
the case, and will hardly apply to most keyword advertising disputes, which 
normally involve economic entities that are not brand names, or organized 
like the Interflora network. 
Another problematic issue that the CJEU may still need to contend 
with, stems from the fact that, although it is unpopular third parties that are 
usually implicated in the use of reputable marks in keyword advertising, the 
proprietors of reputable marks are also often desirous of using the reputable 
marks of their competitors in keyword advertising. Therefore, unless the 
Court attempts, in some way, to distinguish its all- be-it controversial ruling 
in the Google cases, it may, in certain situations, be positioned awkwardly to 
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rule unlawful, a practice that it has already endorsed in those cases. And, if 
the Court continues to maintain a liberal stance on the taking of unfair 
advantage, that will have implications for EU trademark law as a whole, not 
only keyword advertising. One particular provision that is likely to be a 
trouble spot is Article 5(2) TMD. Given that the law governing comparative 
advertising also forbids the taking of unfair advantage, this aspect of the law 
could be affected, as well.  
The Max Planck Institute for Intellectual Property and Competition 
Law which is one of most accredited institutes in the field of IP law in 
Germany conducted a study on keyword advertising, EU trademark law, the 
rulings of the CJEU, and the emerging jurisprudence of the national courts 
of Member States. The study examined the nature of Ad-Word programs, 
and the parties implicated in the use of trademarks as keywords.309  
Beginning with the last issue mentioned above, the study concluded 
that the protection of trademarks is meant to provide choices to consumers, 
ensure the diversification of products, and guarantee their quality. If these 
objectives are to be achieved, then it is important for the law to guide against 
consumer confusion as to the origin of marked products. The study, 
therefore, agreed that the CJEU was right in considering the origin function 
as the essentialǁ function of a trademark. But the study also pointed out that 
the freedom of information, as well as the Community‘s desire to promote 
competition should be borne in mind in determining the degree of protection 
granted to trademarks, especially where this goes beyond the protection of 
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the origin function.  
On the application of established trademark infringement criteria to 
the use of trademarks as keywords, the study noted that the CJEU has ruled 
that an advertiser‘s use of a trademark as a keyword is a use in relation to 
goods, or servicesǁ, and, therefore, comes within the ambit of Article 5(1) 
and (2) TMD. The study observed though that, in this respect, the Court has 
not been willing to attach liability to the owner of the relevant search 
machine.  
Quite importantly, the study referred to the CJEU‘s test for 
determining a likelihood of confusion, or detriment to the origin function of 
a mark, and cautioned against an unduly rigid adherence to that test. It 
pointed out that the decisions of some national courts surveyed, 
demonstrated the difficulty of meeting, in the short text of an advertisement, 
the requirement of full transparency with regard to the identity of a relevant 
advertiser. The study further suggested that courts should be slow to infer a 
likelihood of confusion, where an advertisement is recognizable, the 
advertiser‘s name is disclosed, and the trademark used as the triggering 
keyword is not shown in the advertisement. Here, the study raised the point 
that a negligible degree of confusion on the part of inexperienced Internet 
users could be accommodated in return for the benefits derivable from 
keyword advertising in terms of information supply and the promotion of 
competition.  
Noting that, in addition to the origin function, the CJEU has endorsed 
the protection of the other functions of a trademark under Article 5(1)(a) 
TMD, the study examined the CJEU‘s interpretation of those functions in 
relation to keyword advertising. It observed that, with regard to the 
investment and the advertising functions of a mark, the Court demands a 
substantial adverse effect. Thus, the mere taking of advantage by an 
advertiser, or the fact that the trademark proprietor is exposed to increased 
costs, the loss of customers, or forced to adopt additional measures, will not 
be enough to warrant a finding of an adverse effect on those functions. 
According to the study, the CJEU tends to integrate competing interests in 
its application of Article 5(1)(a) TMD to the use of trademarks as keywords.  
The study further noted that the CJEU‘s position on the use of 
trademarks in keyword advertising is equally applicable to Article 5(2) 
TMD. Unless an advertisement causes confusion, no finding of free riding, 
or dilution will be made. Here, according to the study, the Court apparently 
attaches importance to the fact that consumers are being provided with 
alternatives to the marked products. The freedom of information, and the 
promotion of competition, therefore, feature in the Court‘s consideration.  
Turning to the limitations contained in Article 6 TMD, and the 
exhaustion principle in Article 7 TMD, the study observed that the CJEU has 
interpreted them rather narrowly as they concern the use of trademarks as 
keywords. For example, the Court has generally maintained the position that 
a use opposable under Article 5(1) TMD because of the ambiguity of the 
ensuing advertisement, cannot be considered to be in accordance with honest 
practicesǁ, and the proprietor of the affected trademark has a legitimate 
reason to oppose the continuation of that use. The study did not accept this 
reasoning of the Court. Instead, it argued that the lawful uses permitted 
under Articles 6 and 7 TMD help advertisers to inform consumers, and 
therefore, to facilitate transparency and competition. Consequently, the use 
of trademarked keywords in such situations ought to be permitted to the 
extent that they do not create a likelihood of confusion. But unfortunately, 
the study noted, the CJEU‘s transparency requirement for the use of 
trademarks as keywords carries the risk that national courts might interpret it 
so strictly as to deny the uses otherwise allowed under Article 6 and 7 TMD.  
According to the study, the two most common factors that feature in 
the determination of whether or not to allow the use of a trademark as a 
keyword, are confusion and unfairness. But the study thought that the CJEU 
had unduly expanded the likelihood of confusion criterion in trademark law 
in applying it to keyword advertising. As the jurisprudence of the national 
courts since the CJEU‘s rulings has already shown, the drafting of a 
sufficiently transparent advertisement within a short text entails considerable 
difficulty. Consequently, the use of trademarks as keywords is prevented 
even where consumers are not led to believe that particular advertisers are 
economically connected to the proprietors of the used marks. The study 
suggested that simply because the possibility of consumers assuming an 
economic connection cannot be ruled out completely should not be taken to 
constitute a likelihood of confusion. 310 
As the study noted, restraints on the use of trademarks as keywords do 
not affect the advertising of counterfeits alone, but also genuine competitive 
products, supplementary products, spare parts, and second hand products. 
They may also hinder product commentaries, and comparative pricing. In 
the end, the balance is tilted overwhelmingly in favor of the proprietors of 
trademarks at the expense of competition, advertisers‘ desire to supply 
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information, and consumers‘ interest in using such information. All this 
makes it particularly important that the national courts of Member States 
appropriately interpret the CJEU‘s test for the likelihood of confusion, the 
study added. 311 
Finally, however, that the CJEU has apparently refused to endorse the 
notion that a third party‘s use of a trademark in keyword advertising 
amounts to an unfair exploitation of that mark‘s goodwill, particularly where 
the advertisement concerns products that are in competition with those for 
which the mark is registered. The study identified with the Court‘s view in 
this regard. As a whole, it called for trademark law to be interpreted and 
applied to keyword advertising in a manner most conducive to the goals of 
information flow and competition, with a main focus on the need to prevent 
consumer confusion. Thus, if the use of a trademark in keyword advertising 
does not cause real confusion, it should also not be considered unfair. 
5.8.  The Problematic Issue of ‘Use’ in the Internet Environment  
 
As a basic principle of intellectual property law, trademark rights are 
territorially limited.312 The implication of this principle is that a trademark 
owner who desires to enjoy the protection of its mark under the law of a 
foreign country must have it registered in that jurisdiction, particularly 
where such registration is a requirement for statutory protection. Even 
though popular marks are usually exempted from this principle, 313  in 
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  313 Paris Convention, Art.6bis and TRIPS, Art.16:2 that prohibits  the registration and use of a 
jurisdictions such as the UK, and Member States of the EU, such marks must 
still be registered, if they are to enjoy protection under domestic trademark 
laws.314  
Impliedly, given the borderless nature of the Internet, determining 
what constitutes “use” entails considerable difficulty. In situations where 
trademarks are used on websites, an important enquiry would be whether 
products or services are being offered from those websites to consumers 
within the jurisdiction where trademark enforcement is being claimed. 
Should the answer be in the affirmative, such conduct would qualify as use 
in that jurisdiction.315  Although it is unnecessary to show that products or 
services are being sold through such websites, the mere accessibility of a 
website in a jurisdiction is not enough to constitute use.316 In Euromarket v. 
Peter, for example, where a website was accessible to UK consumers, it was 
held that the website was not directed at those consumers, but only intended 
to advertise a shop located in Ireland. Several factors may be used to 
determine whether a website or an online material is targeted at consumers 
in a specific jurisdiction. These include the language in which the website or 
online material is presented, (2) currency in which prices are quoted and (3) 
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the provision of manuals through that website in a specific language.317 
These yardsticks are, however, not exhaustive. 
Furthermore, The role of the ‘commercial communication’ 
requirement in the determination of trademark infringement is highlighted 
by an examination of the relationship between Articles 5 and 6 TMD. 
According to the ECJ, under Article 5, “...the proprietor of the mark is 
entitled to prohibit that use if it is liable to have an adverse effect on one of 
the functions of the mark...”318 The Court proceeded to clarify, however, that 
“...the proprietor of the trademark is not entitled to prohibit such use in the 
situations listed as exceptions in Arts.6 and 7 of [the TMD]...”319  The 
exceptions contained in Article 6 TMD include the use of a person’s own 
name as a trademark, notwithstanding that the name is identical or similar to 
a registered trademark.320 Use of that name is permitted “even if there is 
some actual confusion with a registered trade mark.”321 
It is clear, therefore, that the ‘own name’ provision in Article 6 affords 
exemption from liability, even when that name is used as a 
trademark.322Moreover, it goes without saying that the use of a trademark as 
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a trademark must be as a commercial communication by the party using it. 
Thus, the availability of the ‘own name’ defence, even where confusion is 
conceivable, means that a defendant can escape liability, despite its 
unauthorised use of what is otherwise a registered trademark, in its 
commercial communication. This equally shows that where a trademark is 
not used in a person’s commercial communication, it cannot be said to affect 
the functions of that mark as to ground an infringement claim. This further 
illustrates the nature of the hurdle that must be crossed under the 
‘commercial communication’ requirement to establish a basis for trademark 
infringement.  
Noteworthy, is that, in addressing the scope of Articles 5 and 6 TMD, 
the ECJ, as well as national courts of EU Member States making reference 
to the Court, have tended to shy away from the ‘use as a trademark’ or 
‘trademark use’ terminology, which is more a feature of UK trademark 
law.323 In particular, the ECJ324 and its Advocates-General325  have clearly 
refrained from the notion of ‘trademark use’. The question is normally 
framed as whether ‘use’ of a sign by a defendant is covered by the type of 
use contemplated by Article 5 TMD, and hence, capable of affecting a 
mark’s functions.  
For example , In Hölterhoff v. Freiesleben, the ECJ was of the view 
																																																								
323 B Trimmer, ‘An increasingly uneasy relationship - the English courts and the European Court 
of Justice in trade mark disputes’ , 30 European Intellectual Property Review, 2009,p. 87.  
324 C-100/02, Gerolsteiner Brunnen GmbH & Co v. Putsch GmbH [2004] RPC 39, [15].  
325 Case C-206/01, Arsenal Football Club Plc v. Matthew Reed [2002] ETMR 82, [A41] 
(Advocate-General Colomer).  
that, where third parties make strictly descriptive uses of trademarks, such 
uses cannot be said to undermine the rights protected under Article 5 
TMD.326 By implication, the use of a trademark strictly for the purposes 
permitted under Article 6(1)(b) and (c) TMD would not constitute use that 
undermines the functions of that mark. Put differently, such use would not 
amount to ‘use as trademark’, and would, consequently, fall outside the 
ambit of Article 5 TMD. However, while the ECJ has distanced itself from 
the ‘trademark use’ concept, the concept is still seen to have lived on. 327 
With regard to the ‘own name’ defence under Article 6(1)(a) TMD,  it 
is permissible to use a trademark both as a trademark, and in a party’s own 
commercial communications. But in respect of Article .6(1)(b) and (c), a 
third party’s use of a trademark to describe the characteristics of a product, 
or to describe the purposes for which a product is intended, will not amount 
to use ‘as a trademark’ in the sense of indicating product origin, even though 
the third party, in this case, is clearly using that trademark in its own 
commercial communication.  
The point made above is exemplified by Adam Opel v. Autec328. The 
defendant used the plaintiff’s trademark in its toy car products marketed 
with the mark, ‘AUTEC’. In its reference to the ECJ, the German court 
hearing the dispute posed the following question:  
Does the use of a trade mark registered also for “toys” constitute use 																																																								
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as a trade mark for the purposes of Art. 5(1)(a) of the Trade Mark 
Directive if the manufacturer of a toy model car copies a real car in a 
reduced scale, including the trade mark of the proprietor of the trade 
mark as applied to the real car, and markets it?.329  
Guided by its ruling in Arsenal v. Reed, the ECJ noted that the exclusive 
right granted under Article 5 TMD applies only to instances where a third 
party’s use of a sign affects or is likely to affect the trademark’s functions, 
especially its essential function of affirming the origin of products to 
consumers.330 
 
Importantly, the Court pointed out that none of the Article 6 defences was 
applicable to the facts of that case.331 Consequently, the ‘use as a trademark’ 
requirement was confined to the determination of infringement, separate 
from the defences in Article 6 TMD.  
Impliedly, notwithstanding that ‘commercial communication’ and 
‘trademark use’ are both determinative conditions, they are not coextensive. 
This is because, whereas a trademark may sometimes be used by a third 
party, both as a trademark and in its own commercial communication, in 
other cases, such use may be only as a commercial communication, but not 
as a trademark. As a result, it seems inconceivable that the ‘commercial 
communication’ requirement is the same thing as the ‘use as a trademark’ 																																																								
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requirement stated in a different way.  
That takes the discussion back to the question as to what the ECJ 
actually meant in Interflora, where it concluded that Google did not use the 
plaintiff’s’ marks in its own ‘commercial communication’? Was the Court 
saying that there was no clear use of a trademark, since Google’s use was 
strictly ‘internal, functional and invisible’ to the Internet end user? In respect 
of the ‘use as a trademark’ requirement, it has similarly been suggested that, 
“... an internal use of the sign, which is not discernible by consumers, cannot 
be a use as a trademark.”332 
That interpretation has, nonetheless, not met the ECJ’s approval, as 
evident from its ruling in Google v. Louis Vuitton. There, the Court grappled 
with two distinct sets of facts. One related to where a third party, in making 
the advertisement presented as a sponsored result on Google’s search engine, 
clearly used the plaintiff’s trademark in the text of its advertisement.333 The 
other concerned where the third party’s advertisement did not contain a sign 
identical to a trademark 334 that is, both Google and its advertisers did not 
make any visible use of any trademarks.  
The invisibility of the trademarks resulted from their internal use. 
Logically then, if the ECJ found acceptable the earlier proposition that 
internal uses of trademarks do not constitute ‘commercial communication’, 
it should similarly have found, in the latter of the two scenarios above, that 																																																								
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there was no infringing use of any trademarks. Yet, the Court took the view 
that the mere fact that the sign a third party used for its advertisement was 
not shown in the advertisement itself did not necessarily mean that the use 
was not covered by the notion of “[use] ... in relation to goods or services” 
under Article 5 TMD.335 
5.9. The Flexibility of the Infringement Eligibility Criteria: the 
Fundamental Basis of the Problem  	
It could be said that the ECJ has narrowed down the tests for infringement. 
Although it seems that under Article 5 TMD, infringement would be proven, 
if the use of a trademark was in the “course of trade”, the Court would only 
hold that there is consumer confusion, or the likelihood of same, if the third 
party’s use of the mark is shown to have been in pursuance of a commercial 
activity, and that use undermines the ability of the mark to discharge a 
protected function.336  
The condition of ‘use in the course of trade’ in the TMD strictly has 
no purpose, except to circumscribe the degree of the exclusive rights 
enjoyed by trademark owners with the objective of striking a balance 
between them and the interests of consumers and competing third parties. 
All the same, since the emergence of the Internet, simply the ‘use’ of a 
trademark has proven to be potentially sufficient to incur liability for ISPs 
and keyword advertisers, who benefit from the sale and use of trademarks as 
keywords. Nevertheless, the Court has been parsimonious in its 																																																								
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interpretation of that requirement. It has clarified that not just “any use” of a 
trademark is forbidden, but only those uses, which harm the `specific 
interests` of its owner and prevent the mark from discharging its protected 
“functions”.337 In effect, mere ‘use’ is not enough to establish infringement.  
As said, in contrast with other categories of intellectual property 
rights, trademarks have a potential to vest their owners with the exclusive 
right to use them in perpetuity.  To illustrate the point, under Article 63(1) of 
the European Patent Convention, even patents, widely seen as the most 
valuable form of intellectual property rights, confer exclusive rights on their 
owners for a limited period of only twenty years from the date a patent 
application was filed.  
The Advocate General insightfully observed in Phillips Electronics that 
trademark owners seek protection even for shapes that hinge on 
functionality, and in doing so, not only acquire the ostensibly perpetual 
exclusive rights that trademarks confer, but also indirectly prolong the tenure 
of other rights like patent and design rights far beyond the maximum limited 
allowed by law.338  
Chronopolous describes that as the construction of a “language 
monopoly” on a foundation constituted by only the few words known to 
humanity. 339  Given the demonstrated potential for unfair monopoly, it 
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becomes vital to adopt a restrictive view of the exclusive rights that 
trademarks confer on their owners. Attempts to interpret trademark rights are 
usually enmeshed in a complex interplay of conflicting interests, which 
requires a delicate balancing of the necessity to, on the one hand, protect the 
rights of trademark owners to encourage them to continually strive for the 
development of commercial goodwill and the use of appropriate symbols to 
bring this about340, and on the other, preserve the broader interest of the 
public in free competition. 
The way out of that dilemma is the creation of a “safety zone” that 
insulates free competition from the apparently perpetual monopoly rights 
trademarks tend to confer on their owners; infringement claims should be 
entertained only in circumstances where the action of a third party prevents a 
mark from serving consumers as a reliable source of information.341 
While it is arguable that the ECJ has narrowed down the ‘use in the 
course of trade’ requirement, it does not follow that the rights of mark 
owners are necessarily “defensive” or “gross” in terms of degree since the 
objective of preventing consumer confusion is met, and further, the main 
concern of trademark law is not, after all, to help owners exploit the value of 
their marks.342  
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For example, according to Recital 11 of the Preamble to the TMD, the 
fundamental objective of trademark protection is to ensure that marks 
function as indications of origin. This intertwines with the economic 
rationale of trademark protection, which is to minimise search cost for 
consumers.343 
The European attitude to trademark protection had been circumspect, 
with unwillingness to extend protection outside the objective of preventing 
consumer confusion, quite unlike the more permissive position that 
demonstrated readiness to protect other economic functions marks have a 
potential to perform.  
The true purport of “in the course of trade” as used in the TMD has 
remained an evolving issue in trademark law, with the emphasis being 
placed on ever-changing considerations that tend to impact two of the factors 
upon which the ECJ usually determines infringement on the basis of that 
requirement namely:  
(i) what “in the course of trade” actually means, and  
(ii) whether the purported “use’ must be “use as a trademark” capable 
of undermining a mark’s ability to perform a protected function. 
 In its literal sense, “in the course of trade” suggests circumstances of a 
commercial nature, and which inevitably produce an economic effect or 
advantage. The Court has also adopted this meaning, which implies that a 
private use not directed at a commercial gain is not covered by that 
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requirement.344  
The Court’s construction of the ‘use’ requirement is narrower than the 
position taken in Arsenal. This deviation is contentious in that it has allowed 
ISPs space to circumvent liability, even when they sell trademarks owned by 
other parties as keywords, since they typically do not use the reserved marks 
commercially, that is, to market their advertising services; although they 
profit from it.345 
The fact that ISPs profit from selling marks as keywords raises the 
question whether they should be deemed to ‘use’ the marks “in the course of 
trade”. Examination of this issue may make it possible to tell whether it 
would augur well for E-commerce, and properly integrate the competing 
interests of trademark owners, ISPs, and free competition. Attention will 
turn later to this issue.  
Equally debatable is the interpretation of “use as a trade mark” by a 
third party, which is capable of adversely affecting one of the protected 
functions of the mark. Originally, the protection of trademarks from 
unauthorised use by third parties was only in respect of the mark’s ability to 
perform the primary function of affirming origin; however, a 
“multifunctional interpretation” 346  has meant that the ECJ now also 
acknowledges that marks are valuable not only for the purposes of indicating 																																																								
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origin, but also for the performance of other economic functions like 
advertisement and investment. To be sure, under Article 5(1)(a), all the 
functions performed by trademarks are entitled to protection, irrespective of 
the presence or absence of consumer confusion or adverse effect on the 
essential function. As the ECJ clarified in L’Oreal, marks perform other 
functions including those relating to quality and communication, although it 
concentrated only on the advertising and investment functions as those 
potentially impacted in that case.347 
The case law tends to lean favorably towards the protection of the 
interests of trademark owners in preserving the essential function. 
Nevertheless, overreaching protection as demonstrated by national courts in 
the EU, endangers the e-commerce sector of the economy. 348 
The ECJ has, however, exhibited a different attitude, which is 
approved in some quarters, especially those who espouse free competition. 
At the same time, others may frown at the Court’s position. Variability in the 
tests for infringement, the liability of keyword advertisers and the likely 
impact of their actions on the functions performed by trademarks, deserve 
greater examination. 
 
5.10. Overview of Current Situation Regarding Keywords 
Advertising  																																																									
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Imagine that you have entered a big shopping mall with the intention of 
purchasing an Adidas sports product. As the mall is a huge area, you become 
confused and unsure where to find an Adidas sports shop. You then walk to 
the mall‘s Information Center to ask for directions. The information officer 
understands right away that you are looking for sports products. So, as a paid 
Nike agent, he shows you a Nike sports shop instead. If we consider the 
Information Center as a search engine, the information officer may be 
considered to have clearly misled you, and infringed the Adidas trademark.  
The truth, however, is that keyword advertising is a different story 
altogether. When you ask for an Adidas sports shop, the information officer 
(search engine) actually directs you accordingly. But being convinced from 
your enquiry that you are in need of a sports product, he also offers you a 
Nike shop flyer, for which he receives a commission. In keyword 
advertising, a search engine is able to guess what you are looking for 
through your search term. Therefore, it does not only present you with the 
natural result of your search, but also shows you links, which are exactly like 
the Nike shop flyer mentioned above. The key issue that arises is whether 
there could still be a trademark infringement if the customer can easily 
differentiate between the natural results of his search, and the sponsored 
links.  
In the minds of most members of the public, an advertisement is a 
commercial service. Businesses pay fees in order to have their products 
promoted by professional advertising companies. Search engine owners earn 
huge sums in revenue from selling keywords. Therefore, users are unlikely 
to trust advertisements in the same way as they trust the natural results of 
their search. Logically, search engine owners are always seeking for ways to 
downplay the trademark issues implicated in keyword advertising, and to 
shirk liability for infringement, as was explained earlier in this chapter with 
respect to Google‘s policy. Google adopted its existing policy following the 
CJEU‘s rulings, not for the purposes of preventing trademark infringement, 
but for transferring liability for such infringement to advertisers. Thus, the 
prospects for trademark infringement still exist, but liability has been 
transferred to other parties. Search engine owners will, assuredly, continue 
to exploit legal loopholes that enable them to profit massively from keyword 
advertising. They will always consult with law firms for advice on the 
opportunities available for the sale of keywords in particular countries.  
So far, the CJEU has attempted, through a harmonious interpretation 
of EU trademark law, to protect trademark proprietors against the 
infringement of their marks, and customers from confusion. Yet, a possible 
option that may be considered for resolving the problem raised by keyword 
advertising is compelling search owners to clearly differentiate natural 
results from sponsored links. For the example, a red line on the left side of 
the natural search results could be used to indicate sponsored advertisement 
links. This is exactly like the Nike shop flyer given to the Adidas customer 
by the information officer at the shopping mall who is able to guess what 
that customer is looking for through his enquiry.  
Such an approach would help Internet users to discern the actual 
results of their search from sponsored advertisements. In this way, customer 
confusion will be prevented. In addition, customers will enjoy a greater 
variety of products offered by the sponsored advertisements. They will be 
able to find competing products, compare their qualities and prices, and 
arrive at informed purchasing decisions. After all, the general aim of 
keyword advertising is to offer Internet users alternatives to whatever they 
had initially searched for; and this practice has impliedly been well received 
by the CJEU. 
Unfortunately, the situation at the present moment is that Google 
sponsored links appear quite similar to natural search results. They appear in 
a pale highlighted area, often exactly above the natural search results, which 
does not make it easy for Internet users to distinguish one from the other. 
There is, therefore, a likelihood of confusion.  
The main purpose of trademark law is to protect against customer 
confusion, and it will be in tune with trademark law, while also preventing 
trademark proprietors from enjoying excessive protection over their marks. 
In the above connection, it is argued that where there is a clear 
differentiation between natural search results and sponsored links, the 
relevant use cannot be said to have adverse effect on the functions of the 
trademark concerned. Where a sponsored link makes it clear that there is no 
connection between the advertiser, and the proprietor of the mark, there is 
arguably no dilution, and, therefore, no trademark infringement. Strictly 
viewed, the search engine owner does not, in such a case, sell the 
trademarked keyword. Rather, that keyword is only being used as a 
“Keyword” or “code” that would enable the search engine to guess what the 
Internet user actually intends to purchase. Once this is made possible, the 
search engine can then display advertisements that are related to that product 
in a specified area known to Internet users to be reserved especially for 
sponsored advertisements.  
The CJEU in a series of cases ruled that even where a mark was used 
in keyword advertising, which mark was identical with a trademark, and 
covered identical goods, or services (and therefore, caught by Articles 
5(1)(a), and 9(1)(a) TMD, such a use will only be considered to amount to 
an infringement if it was likely to produce an adverse effect on any of the 
functions of that mark. As would be recalled, while the essentialǁ function of 
a mark is widely believed to be the guarantee of origin. In Interflora, for 
example, apart from the essential function, the Court also considered two 
other functions, the investment function, as well as the advertising function, 
and only one of these functions needs to be adversely affected in order to 
constitute an infringement. 
Regarding essential function and keyword advertising as the CJEU 
ruled in Google France, keyword advertising would run afoul of Articles 
5(1)(a) and 9(1)(a) TMD, where the generated advertisement would make it 
difficult for costumers to know whether that advertisement actually came 
from the trademark proprietor, a person economically associated with him, 
or from an entirely unrelated party. Where this happens, the essential 
function of that mark as a guarantee of origin would be considered to have 
been adversely affected.  
In respect to advertising function it costs each individual advertiser 
more to bid on a keyword as the number of advertisers bidding on that 
keyword increases. As was seen in Interflora, it became more expensive for 
Interflora to bid on the Interflora keyword when M&S bid for the same 
keyword. The increased cost of bidding meant that Interflora was compelled 
to either spend more on advertising, or scale down its advertising program. 
That it was compelled to adapt in this way was a potentially good ground for 
Interflora to contend that the advertising function of its mark had been 
adversely affected. Yet, the CJEU, in the earlier case of Google France, did 
not accept such a contention. It maintained the same position again in 
Interflora, even though its additional remark that keyword advertising may 
not adversely affect the advertising function of a mark in every caseǁ tended 
to suggest that, in certain cases, keyword advertising may have such an 
effect. 
Furthermore, it is arguable that a trademark proprietor‘s investment in 
advertising would be undermined if third parties used his mark as a 
keyword. As trademark proprietors maintain, search engine owners and 
advertisers profit from their marks at no cost since no compensation is paid 
to them. By contrast, trademark proprietors often have to pay significant fees 
in order to have their own advertisements appear on a priority position. A 
possible suggestion in this regard is for search engine owners to accord 
trademark proprietors some form of preferential treatment so that in the 
competition between them and third party bidders for keywords, they would 
be entitled to pay less per click.  
In respect to investment function according to the CJEU, trademarks 
could help their proprietors to attain, or maintain a reputation that wins over 
customers and retains their patronage. This seems to mean that a mark may 
attract goodwill. The Court expressed the view that proprietors could invest 
in a mark through advertising, as well as other commercial means not 
identified by the Court. And any use that results in a ̳substantial interference‘ 
with the ability of a mark to help its proprietor attain, or maintain a 
reputation, will constitute an adverse effect on the investment function of 
that mark. Therefore, the trademark proprietor will be entitled to prevent that 
use. Moreover, according to the CJEU, in the case of marks that are already 
reputable, the investment function will be harmed where a use affects that 
reputation and threatens its preservation. Also, for reputable marks, 
proprietors are not required to prove substantial adverse effect. Nevertheless, 
the extension of protection to the advertising and the investment functions of 
a mark, has received sharp criticism. Additionally, as was pointed out 
earlier, where there is a clear differentiation between natural search results, 
and sponsored links, which makes it easy for Internet users to know that the 
sponsored links are advertisements, which  are not economically related to 
the trademark used as a triggering keyword, then the use cannot reasonably 
be said to adversely affect the functions of that mark.  
 
 
6. APPLICATION OF KEYWORD ADVERTISING IN NATIONAL 
COURTS OF EUROPEAN MEMBER STATES  
6.1. Introduction 	
Apart from evaluation of keyword advertising disputes under European level 
and specially addressing ECJ case law, it is equally important to address this 
hot issue by reviewing case law of national member courts as, lacking of 
appropriate legal premise for trademark owners to pursue pecuniary reliefs 
against Internet intermediaries and wrongdoers is nor present. There is an 
urgent need to fill this gap in the law.  Therefore, A thorough and coherent 
analysis of current case law of national member states is desirable towards 
the creation of a sound legal framework that would allow Internet 
intermediaries to be held liable for infringing online material, and permit 
trademark owners to bring pecuniary claims against them in deserving cases. 
Only through an orderly, doctrinal assessment of currents laws related to 
Internet intermediaries would it be possible to bring about suitable legal 
reforms.349  
Despite the emphasis on UK law due to evaluation of Interflora Case 
in last part, this part also draws useful insights from other European 
jurisdictions to enrich prospective transformation of the UK legal 
framework, and the equivalent EU regime. A comparative approach to case 
law has its merits.350  
In contrast with the UK jurisdiction, which is rooted in the common 
law tradition, some other national jurisdictions in the EU that are founded on 
civil law, as well as the US, which has considerably turned from its common 
law roots,351  have proven to be more favorable to trademark owners in their 
quest to hold Internet intermediaries liable for the infringement of their 
rights. Consideration of cases from those other jurisdictions and the legal 
principles upon which they were decided is, therefore, bound to be helpful to 
guide the reformation of EU law.352  
6.2. United Kingdom 
In  Reed 353 case  at the suit of the plaintiff, Reed Executive Plc., registered 
owner of the trademark, “Reed,” the defendant, Reed Business Information 
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Ltd. (RBI), was found liable for trademark infringement because of its use of 
the terms, “Reed Elsevier” and “Reed Business Information”. In this appeal 
brought by RBI against that decision, the Court of Appeal had to decide 
whether the use of a search keyword that triggered RBI’s website whenever 
an Internet user entered “Reed” on a search engine, as well as RBI’s use of a 
metatag for “Reed” on its website, amounted to trademark infringement.   
The Court held, having regard to the circumstances of the case, that 
such uses of the plaintiff’s trademark were not infringing, neither did they 
amount to passing-off. The Court clarified that both parties did not carry on 
identical businesses; whereas Reed Executive provided employment agency 
services, RBI was engaged in the advertisement of job vacancies, apparently 
suggesting that there was no likelihood of consumer confusion.  Moreover, 
RBI did not use “Reed” as a stand-alone on its website, but only as a 
component of a copyright notice. The Court added, however, that RBI’s 
conduct would have amounted to trademark infringement, if there had been 
significant consumer confusion, even though it was only using its own 
business name. 
The next important case is famous to Victoria Plum case 354  which 
centered on the defense of honest concurrent use in keyword advertising 
disputes. Both the plaintiff, Victoria Plum Ltd. and the 1st defendant, 
Victorian Plumbing Ltd., were competitors in the sale of bathrooms, mainly 
online.  They had carried on their businesses using similar names for about 
one and a half decades. Having initially traded under “Victoria Plumb”, 
which it registered as a trademark, the plaintiff changed its name to 																																																								
354 Victoria Plum Ltd. v. Victorian Plumbing Ltd & Others [2016] EWHC 2911 (Ch.). 
 
“Victoria Plum” in 2015. Three years earlier in 2012, the 1st defendant had 
increased its bid for “Victoria Plumb” and its variants as keywords, creating 
serious tension between both parties.  
The plaintiff finally brought this trademark infringement action 
because of the 1st defendant’s advertisements that (i) were generated 
whenever users entered the purchased keyword on Google’s search engine, 
as well as (ii) advertisements that contained the signs, “Victoria Plumbing” 
and/or “Victorian Plumb” and/or “Victorian Plumbing”. Nonetheless, the 
plaintiff did not oppose the 1st defendant’s use of “Victorian Plumbing”. The 
1st defendant admitted that the first set of advertisements constituted 
trademark infringement, and the second confusingly similar to the plaintiff’s 
trademark. In respect of the latter, however, it pleaded the defence of honest 
concurrent use. The court, per Carr J., held that the signs, which the 1st 
defendant bid for as keywords were identical to, or at least, not significantly 
different from the plaintiff’s Victoria Plum marks.  
Following Louis Vuitton, the court concluded that the 1st defendant’s 
bid for those signs amounted to the use of the plaintiff’s trademark in the 
course of trade. The court then proceeded to examine whether that use was 
one capable of adversely affecting the mark’s origin function. Applying the 
test set by the ECJ in Louis Vuitton, it considered whether the latter set of 
advertisements made it possible for normally informed and reasonably 
attentive Internet users, or allowed them only with difficulty to determine 
whether the advertised goods or services actually originated from Victoria 
Plum(b) or its economic affiliate, or altogether from a third party. The court 
found in the negative, holding that the 1st defendant’s bid, which resulted in 
the generation of the latter set of advertisements, amounted to trademark 
infringement. 
Having held so, the court next turned to the defence of honest 
concurrent use. In this connection, it referred to Budweiser case. 355  In 
Budweiser, the ECJ held that where two trademarks had been used honestly 
and concurrently for a long period of time, and that use had neither 
adversely affected, nor was likely to adversely affect the essential origin 
function of the earlier trademark, the owner of the earlier mark cannot forbid 
the continued use of the other identical mark, despite being later in time. 
Referring to the Court of Appeal’s decision in the case, Carr J. stressed that 
potential consumer confusion from the honest, concurrent and prolonged use 
of identical or similar trademarks by two businesses, is a cost that society 
must forbear.  
Notwithstanding, the court came to the conclusion that the defence of 
honest concurrent use was not applicable to the 1st defendant’s bid for the 
plaintiff’s trademarks or variants of same as keywords. It noted that this 
defence could only allow the 1st defendant to use that which was its own 
name or trademark, and not the trademark of another party. The court 
stressed that the 1st defendant had, at no time, used Victoria Plum(b), except 
in its bidding activity, which sought to use the marks as keywords. It could 
not claim that this was an honest concurrent use of the marks, and which 
had, in no way, become an exclusive guarantee of origin for both parties.    
The court further considered whether the 1st defendant’s conduct was 
“honest”, and found that it was not since it was incompatible with the “duty 
to act fairly in relation to the legitimate interests of the trade mark 
proprietor”. This was so because by escalating its bidding price for the 
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Victoria Plum(b) keywords, the 1st defendant increased consumer confusion, 
and undermined the plaintiff’s  goodwill. Thus, overall, the 1st defendant 
was liable for the infringement of the “Victoria Plum(b)” trademarks. 
Finally, the court had to address the 1st defendant’s counterclaim of 
passing-off based on the plaintiff’s bid for “Victorian Plumbing” as a 
keyword, which resulted in the display of advertisements containing 
“Victoria Plum(b)”. It agreed that the 1st defendant had sufficient goodwill 
in “Victorian Plumbing” as to justify an action of passing-off against the 
plaintiff’s use of that name. The court observed that, compared to the 1st 
defendant’s bidding activity, that of the plaintiff was of a lesser scale, and 
equally, that the likelihood of confusion among Internet users searching for 
“Victorian Plumbing” was lower than that among those looking for ‘Victoria 
Plum(b)”.  
Still, according to the court, there remained the possibility of confusion 
when Internet users searching for “Victorian Plumbing” were shown 
advertisements from the plaintiff, an undertaking that had no economic 
relation to the 1st defendant. The court considered this to be a 
misrepresentation by the plaintiff because a large majority of concerned 
consumers were likely to nurse the misleading impression that the plaintiff is 
the same as the 1st defendant, or at, least, related to it, creating the likelihood 
of harm. 
The Victoria Plum decision is a landmark, being the first UK case to 
uphold a claim of passing-off in disputes arising from keyword advertising. 
It illuminates the applicability of the honest concurrent use defence to 
keyword advertising disputes, and provides guidance to businesses that have 
used identical or similar names for long periods of time on how to conduct 
their activities so as not to harm each other’s goodwill and increase 
consumer confusion. In the context of keyword advertising in particular, 
businesses should strive for clarity in their advertisements so that normal 
Internet users do not find it difficult to know the origin of the goods or 
services being advertised. 
Another case, worth to address is Amazon case 356 . In this case the 
Google AdWords allowed Amazon’s advertisements to be displayed on 
Google’s search engine results list whenever Internet users entered the 
search term, “Lush”.  The question was whether Amazon’s action 
constituted a trademark infringement. It was held that it did, because a 
normal consumer searching for Lush soap on Amazon’s website would not 
be able to determine that the products displayed on Amazon’s advertisement 
did not originate from Lush, or have any relation with it. 
One of the early cases on trademark infringement against ISP is 
Wilson v. Yahoo!.357The plaintiff was the owner of the trademark, ‘Mr 
Spicy’, which covered poultry and meat products, sauces and restaurant, as 
well as bar services.  The crux of the plaintiff ‘s case was that Yahoo!, 
without the plaintiff’s permission, used a ‘sign’ in the course of trade, 
accidentally, negligently and/or intentionally, which was identical to the 
plaintiff’s trademark, and for goods or services that were identical or similar 
to those of the plaintiff.358  
The genesis of that dispute was that, an Internet user, who, in the 
course of a search, had entered the term, “Mr Spicy’, on the Yahoo! search 
engine, was directed to results that included the websites of Sainsbury’s and 																																																								
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Pricegrabber, whose products clearly completed with those of the plaintiff.  
On its part, Yahoo! countered that the use of ‘Mr Spicy’ as a keyword to 
generate the sponsored advertisements was not by Sainsbury’s, Pricegrabber, 
or indeed, any other advertiser. Yahoo!’s contention, in other words, was 
that it did not, at any time, and neither did its advertisers, use the plaintiff’s 
trademark to present the advertisements in question. It maintained that its 
advertisers. 
 
 
6.3. Italy 
The first decision regarding keyword advertising in Italy is Win Rent S.p.a. 
359. and Avis Autonoleggio S.p.a which date back to 2009 360 where trademark 
infringement action instituted by two Italian car rental companies, Win Rent 
SpA and AVIS Autonoleggio SpA, licensees of the trademarks, “Sixt” and 
“Avis”. They alleged that the defendants, Zanox de AG and Zanox Srl, also 
licensees of the “Sixt” mark, Google Italy Srl, Google Inc. and Google UK 
Ltd. violated their trademark rights.  Zanox had concluded an AdWords 
contract with Google Ireland, allowing it to purchase the trademark “Avis”, 
among other keywords. Whenever Internet users entered “Avis” on Google’s 
search engine, a link was displayed to Zanox’s website under the heading of 
“sponsored links.” This, the plaintiffs alleged, enabled Zanox to steal 
customers, who would otherwise have visited the Avis website, by directing 																																																								
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them to the Sixt website to which Zanox was affiliated. The plaintiffs 
maintained that, by misleading consumers on car rental services, the 
defendants caused them to lose customers and profits. Eventually, the 
plaintiffs reached a settlement with Zanox de AG and Zanox Srl, but the 
case continued against Google.  
Two main issues arose for determination. The first was whether the 
defendants had violated Article 2598 of the Italian Civil Code on unfair 
completion, Article 21(2) of the Italian Code of Industrial Property 
prohibiting trademark infringement, and Legislative Decree 74/1992, as 
replaced by Legislative Decree 206/2005, dealing with false advertising. The 
second was whether Google could be held jointly liable for not exercising 
adequate control over its activities by failing to ensure that its services did 
not result in trademark infringement. 
The Milan court held that the unauthorised use of the keywords, 
which reproduced the trademark of a third party, amounted to unfair 
competition under Article 2598, Paragraph 3, of the Italian Civil Code 
because it was an act targeted at “linking the website with the trade mark of 
a third party and exploiting the undoubted notoriety of the latter sign. This is 
clearly a confusing activity, which misappropriates the merits of a third-
party and, overall, is professionally unfair and able to confuse and poach 
customers and to damage the competitor,” especially as the keyword was 
being unlawfully used to distinguish Sixt’s services, which were similar to 
those of the plaintiffs.361 
Further, the court held that the use amounted to trade mark 
infringement under Article 21 of the Italian Industrial Property Code 																																																								
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“…since it is used with a distinctive function... as a matter of fact, it is 
undisputed that if one clicks on the Avis sign of the sponsored link he is 
readdressed to the website [of Avis’ competitors] thereby making the risk of 
confusion between the signs real, at least due to the risk of association”. The 
court emphasised that the use of the “Avis” trademark as a keyword to 
trigger the Sixt sponsored link led to Sixt’s website being linked to an 
existing protected trademark, which fame was thereby exploited. This 
conduct did not only confuse customers about the two undertakings 
whenever they searched for the word “Avis”, but also violated the plaintiffs’ 
trademark rights. 
Having found that the claims of unfair competition and trademark 
infringement had been established, the court thought it unnecessary to 
consider the issue of false advertising. With regard to Google’s liability, the 
court did not rule on the matter because they lacked locus standi, although it 
observed that Google’s AdWords program was, per se, not unlawful. 
The decision of the Milan court was subsequently affirmed in March 23, 
2010 decision, where it was stated that:  
 
The proprietor of a trade mark is entitled to prohibit an advertiser 
from advertising, on the basis of a keyword identical with that trade 
mark which that advertiser has, without the consent of the proprietor, 
selected in connection with an internet referencing service, goods or 
services identical with those for which that mark is registered, in the 
case where that advertisement does not enable an average internet 
user, or enables that user only with difficulty, to ascertain whether the 
goods or services referred to therein originate from the proprietor of 
the trade mark or an undertaking economically connected to it or, on 
the contrary, originate from a third party. 
 
The Milan court decision is noteworthy. That court had, in a similar case 
decided on 15 October, 2007, turned down a trademark infringement claim 
on the basis that using a sign as a keyword did not amount to “the distinctive 
use provided by the Italian Legislator in the IP Code: as a matter of fact, the 
defendant clearly does not distinguish – neither for economical nor 
promotional purposes - its services with the mark at issue and the keyword 
does not appear in its company name and in its domain name”.362 
Another importance of the Milan decision lies in the fact that it 
enunciated a formula for the determination of damages in similar cases that 
may arise in the future. The court stated that: 
The damages suffered by the legitimate owner as a result of 
infringement and unfair competition acts, caused by using a keyword 
identical to its trade mark has to be calculated by considering the number of 
visitors during the period at issue, the ratio between the number of visitors 
and the number of actual customers, the average profit, the damages caused 
by the unlawful link to the competitor’s activity and the duration of poaching 
of customers. 
Another case related to Italian case law was issued by Palermo 
court.363The plaintiffs, Maggiore Rent S.p.A., a car rental company, and 
Maggiore Finanziaria di Partecipazioni S.r.l., were the owner and licensee 
respectively of the trademark “Maggiore”. They brought this infringement 
action against another car rental company, Sicily by Car (SBC), for using 																																																								
362  In the case Multiutility S.p.A./Key 21 Italia Trading Company S.p.A. – Judge Rosa 
(unpublished decision 
363 Joined Cases Nos. 11626/08 and 11627/08, Court of Palermo Italy [7 June, 2013]. 
 
“Maggiore” as a keyword in its Google Adwords advertisements. They 
further claimed contributory liability against Google for facilitating the 
choice of keywords that infringed their trademark rights. On its part, SBC 
sued Google Inc., Google Ireland Ltd. and Google Italy S.r.l. (Google), 
arguing that Google, and not SBC, should be held liable should the court 
find that there had been a trademark infringement. In effect, the case raised 
the issues of trademark infringement through keyword advertising and the 
potential liability of ISPs offering such services. 
In its determination, the Palermo court examined ECJ’s jurisprudence on 
trademark infringement in similar cases, such as Bergspechte, and 
Interflora. It would be recalled that, on the basis of the ECJ’s ruling in 
Interflora, a UK court had held Marks & Spencer liable for trademark 
infringement because of its use of the “Interflora” trademark in its AdWords 
advertisements. Against this background, the Palermo court sought to 
determine whether SBC’s use of “Maggiore” was infringing in that it 
adversely affected one or more of the trademark’s origin, advertising and 
investment functions. 
The court found that the use of "Maggiore" per se, that is, the mere 
use of the trademark as a keyword, did not have an adverse effect on the 
mark’s advertising function. It held, however, that there was an adverse 
effect on the mark’s function as an indication of origin, whenever SBC used 
it with the “dynamic keyword insertion” function provided by the AdWords 
program. This was because such use enabled the “Maggiore” trademark to 
be displayed in SBC’s advertisements whenever users searched for that term, 
leading to the likelihood of confusion among consumers, who might 
wrongly think that there was a connection between the services of both 
companies. Thus, the use of the “dynamic keyword insertion” function 
resulted in unfair competition and misleading advertisement.  
On the same reckoning, the court found that the trademark’s 
investment function; the function “to acquire or preserve a reputation 
capable of attracting consumers and retaining their loyalty“, was also 
adversely affected. On the contrary, whenever the dynamic keyword 
insertion function was not used, there was no unfair competition, dilution of 
trademark, or damage to its investment function. This was because users 
were clearly able to detect that SBC was different from Maggiore, the 
trademark owner, since “Sicily Car” was mentioned in the advertisement. 
Overall, the court awarded damages against SBC only for the harm caused 
by its advertisements that utilised the “dynamic keyword insertion” function. 
The company was accordingly ordered to refund a sum equivalent to the 
rental fees unlawfully received during the period when the “dynamic 
keyword insertion” function was used.   
Turning to the issue of ISPs’ liability, the court held that Google could 
not be held liable because, consistent with Section 16 of Legislative Decree 
No. 70/03, the Italian legislation implementing EC E-Commerce Directive 
No. 2000/31/EC,  it only provided hosting services to users, who were 
themselves responsible for choosing the keywords used. The court stressed 
that under Section 17 of that Decree, Google had no obligation to monitor 
the AdWords keywords chosen by users, and, in fact, was exempted from 
liability as a hosting service provider. Moreover, in the present case, Google 
acted quickly to block any connection between SBC’s advertisements and 
the “Maggiore” trademark, even without a court order, which was otherwise 
required by Italian law in such situations.   
 
6.4. Netherlands 
 
I. Portakabin Ltd. and Portakabin B.V. v. Primakabin  
This case, which was the first of its kind to be litigated at the Dutch Supreme 
Court, also concerned the use of trademarks in keyword advertising. 
Portakabin Ltd., an online seller of new portable buildings (cabins), owned 
the trademark “Portakabin”, of which Portakabin B.V. was a licensee. 
Primakabin was also engaged in online sales of cabins. In addition to the 
sale of both new and old cabins under its own brand name, “Primakabin”, it 
also sold new and used Portakabin products. It contracted with Google for 
the AdWord, “portakabin”, and other variants such as “portacabin”, 
“portocabin” and “portokabin”.  
When any of those terms was entered on Google’s search engine, a 
sponsored link would be triggered to Primakabin’s website, which read, 
“new and second hand units“; words that were subsequently changed to 
“used portakabins”. Portakabin instituted this action against Primakabin, 
claiming trademark infringement. The question arose as to whether the use 
of AdWords on Internet search engines constituted use of a trademark under 
Article 2(20) Paragragh 1(a)(b)(c) of the Benelux Convention on Intellectual 
Property , or “other use” under Article 2(20) Paragraph 1(d) of that 
Convention (i.e. Article 5 Paragraph 5 HD). 
The lower court, as well as the Court of Appeal held that such use 
amounted to “other use”, although they did not think that Primakabin had 
taken an unfair advantage of the “Portakabin” trademark. The Court of 
Appeal clarified that Primakabin could utilise the terms, “used portakabins” 
but only for the purposes of establishing a link directly to its webpage that 
advertised used Portakabin products. On further appeal, the Dutch Supreme 
Court made a reference to the ECJ seeking the following clarifications, all of 
which bothered on the construction of Articles 5(1), 5(5), 6 and 7 HD. 
I. Whether the use of a third party’s trademark as an AdWord amounts to 
"use for goods and services" under the HD.  In particular, whether it is of 
any material consequence that the link to an advertiser’s website, which is 
generated through the use of the trademark as an AdWord, is shown together 
with the normal results of the search engine, or as a sponsored link next to 
the natural results list. Also, whether it matters anything that the offer for 
sale by an advertiser dealing in products identical to marked ones, was 
displayed on the webpage of the ISP, that is, along with the link, or on the 
advertiser’s own website shown when the link is clicked.  
II. Even if the above question were answered in the affirmative, whether the 
trademark owner would still be unable to forbid the use of its mark as an 
AdWord, having regard to the restrictions on trademark rights contained in 
Article 6 HD, especially paragraphs (b) and (c) thereof namely, the use of 
the trademark merely to describe the attributes of the products at issue. 
III. Further, in the event of an affirmative answer to the question in (I) 
above, whether the trademark owner would still not be entitled to prevent the 
use of its mark as an AdWord, in light of the principle of exhaustion 
contained in Article 7 HD, which permits the use of a mark where an 
advertiser is offering genuine and even used products made by the trademark 
owner. 
IV. Whether the ECJ's answers to questions (I), (II) and (III) above would be 
applicable to variants of the “Portakabin” trademark used by Primakabin as 
AdWords, which enabled it to provide consumers more search options, 
assuming that the mark is mentioned in its correct spelling on Primakabin’s 
website. 
V. Finally, should the answer to question (I) above be in the negative, that is 
to say, use of a third party’s trademark as an AdWord does not amount to 
"use for goods and services" under HD, whether EU Member States could, 
nevertheless, under Article 5(5) thereof adopt provisions in their national 
trademark laws forbidding such use, where it lacks good cause and unfairly 
takes advantage of, or harms the distinctiveness or fame of the mark at issue.  
 
 
For the avoidance of doubt, Portakabin is similar to other cases earlier 
referred to the ECJ by the national courts of other EU Member States, such 
as France and Austria, in that they all concerned trademark infringement 
disputes arising from the use of protected trademarks as keywords. 
Nevertheless, Portakabin is different in an important aspect. Regarding this 
case , reaction of ECJ was addressed in this chapter earlier. 
 
II. Endless Webdesign v. Google Netherlands B.V. (Amsterdam District 
Court, August 24, 2006).  
The plaintiff, owner of the trademark, “Farm Date”, discovered that 
whenever users entered the search words, “farm date” or “farm-date on 
Google’s search engine, sponsored links were generated. As a result, it 
requested Google to stop the display of those links whenever the AdWords 
were used on its search engine. Google ignored that request, insisting that 
most of the advertisements complained about were generated by the use of 
the search term, “date” through its broad-matching program. In this suit filed 
by the plaintiff against Google, the Amsterdam District Court held that 
Google’s broad-matching service, which generated the advertisements, 
raised no trademark issues. It agreed with Google that the advertisements in 
question were actually generated by the non-trademarked term, “date”, even 
though the search term contained the trademark, “farm date”.   
III. Fleurop /Topblamen, Case No. C / 09/483170, HA ZA 15-217 (District 
Court of the Hague, July 20, 2016) [NL: RBDHA: 2016:8293]. 
 
This case decided fairly recently by the Hague District Court was yet 
another demonstration of the application of the ECJ’s ruling in Interflora364 
to the effect that the essential origin function of a trademark is adversely 
affected when an advertisement triggered through a trademarked keyword 
search prevents normally informed and reasonably attentive Internet users 
from determining or allows them only with difficulty to determine whether 
the advertised goods or services originate from the owner of that trademark 
or its economic affiliate, or from a completely different rival third party.  
 
The plaintiff in the present case, Fleurop, is a member of the Inteflora 
group (Fleurop-Interflora), and maintains a global flower delivery network 
under several “Fleurop” trademarks. It brought this trademark infringement 
action against the defendant, Topbloemen, similarly engaged in flower 
delivery in the Netherlands and the other parts of Europe, for using the 
AdWord, “fleurop” in keyword advertising through Google’s search engine. 
The court considered whether the use of a trademark in keyword advertising 
by a party exploiting a flower delivery network amounted to trademark 
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infringement particularly where, inter alia, that party is unknown to most of 
the relevant consuming public. 
In its determination, the court agreed that the defendant’s action did 
amount to trademark infringement. In reaching this conclusion, the court 
noted that the defendant was not known to most of the consumers concerned. 
Therefore, whenever they entered the term, “Fleurop”, they would not know 
that the defendant’s flower delivery service was different from that of the 
trademark owner. In fact, the court found that the defendant’s 
advertisements did not expressly indicate that it was a rival with no 
connection to the Fleurop network. As a result, according to the court, it 
would be difficult for consumers to know whether the flowers displayed in 
the defendant’s advertisements originated from Fleurop, or altogether from a 
rival party. This adversely affected the origin function of the “Fleurop” 
trademark, and the defendant was accordingly liable for trademark 
infringement. 
 
V. Eis.de GmbH v. BBY Vertriebsgesellschaft mbH (case C- 91/09, Order 
dated March 26, 2010)  
This case was similarly decided on the basis of the Inteflora line of cases. 
The court  held that Article 5(1)(a) of the First Council Directive 
89/104/EEC of 21 December 1988 relating to the harmonisation of EU 
Member States trademark laws must be construed to mean that the owner of 
a trademark is entitled to forbid a third party from using in its advertisement 
a keyword identical to that mark, which the third party advertiser has, 
without permission from the trademark owner, chosen through an ISP in 
respect of goods or services identical to the marked ones, where that 
advertisement does not allow average Internet users, or allows them only 
with difficulty to determine whether the advertised goods or services 
actually originate from the trademark owner or its economic affiliate, or, on 
the contrary, from a third party. 365 
6.5. France 
I. Voyageur Du Monde, Terres D'Aventures v. Google France, Google Inc., 
Google Ireland (Paris District Court, January 7, 2009). 
In this case, Google was found not liable for trademark infringement. 
However, it was held liable for misleading advertising and failure to exercise 
control over infringing acts on its website. 
II. Viaticum v. Google France (Versailles Court of Appeals, 2005).  
In affirming the decision of the lower court, the Versailles Court of Appeals 
held that Google was liable for trademark infringement by selling the 
plaintiff’s trademark  According to the court, Google failed to ensure that 
selected keywords did not infringe third party trademark rights, and to 
promptly desist from further selling the plaintiff’s trademarks as keywords 
upon being informed of their illegitimate use.  
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III. Hotels Meridien v. Google France (Nanterre Court (TGI), December 16, 
2004). 
 In this case, the Nanterre Court pointed out that the use of trademarks as 
keywords is capable of causing consumer confusion as to the origin of goods 
and services. Therefore, the ISP was liable for trademark infringement since 
it contributed principally to the choices made by advertisers through its 
suggestion of keywords to them. 
IV. Syndicat Français de la Literie v. Google France (Paris Civil Court, 12 
December, 2007) (Paris Civil Court of Second Instance, November 19, 
2011).  
In this case, it was held that an ISP has no control over advertisers’ choice of 
keywords, and therefore, the use of trademarks as keywords did not 
constitute a direct case of trademark infringement, although advertisers may 
be liable for misleading advertising. An ISP may become liable where it is 
proven that it directly influenced advertisers’ choice of keywords, or where 
it is shown that it failed to act upon being informed by a trademark owner of 
an infringement.  
V. Amen v. Google, et al., Court of Paris (June 24, 2005).  
Here, it was held that an ISP, which suggests keywords to advertisers, plays 
an active role in their choice of those keywords, and would, therefore, be 
considered liable for trademark infringement. Further, where an advertiser is 
a rival to the owner of a trademark, its choice of that trademark as a keyword 
would be considered to have been made with intent to divert customers from 
the trademark owner. Consequently, the advertiser would be held liable for 
trademark infringement and unfair competition.  
VI. Kertel v. Google, Court of Paris (December 8, 2005). 
 In this case, it was held that there was no trademark infringement because 
the ISP did not use the relevant trademark for identical or similar goods or 
services and in a commercial manner. An ISP may be liable under the civil 
law principle of fault pursuant to Section 1382 of the French Civil Code, 
where it fails to verify, as a matter of diligence, that a chosen keyword was 
not trademark infringing.   
VII. Atrya v. Google, et al., Court of Strasbourg (July 20, 2007).  
Here, it was held that where a trademark is used as a keyword, but the actual 
name of that mark is not reproduced, such a use will not be considered to 
cause consumer confusion as to the origin of the relevant products. Further, 
an ISP would be exempted from liability where it has taken technical steps 
to ensure that third party trademark rights are not affected by the use of a 
keyword. It has also been held that where trademarks are used in such a 
manner that they are invisible to Internet users, such use would not be 
considered to cause or likely to cause consumer confusion as to the origin of 
the relevant products or services  
6.6. Germany 
I. Metaspinner Media GmbH v. Google Deutschland GmbH, District Court 
of Hamburg, Court No. 312 O 324/04 (2004).   
The District Court of Hamburg held that the choice of a protected trademark 
as an AdWord did not amount to a trademark use. Moreover, a third party’s 
advertisements based on that AdWord were not trademark infringing 
because the term was not shown in those advertisements, and no consumer 
confusion was caused.  
II. Nemetschek AG v. Google, Inc., District Court of Munich, Case No.: 33 O 
21461/03 (2003). 
 The Munich District Court found that Google was not liable, whether 
directly or indirectly, for the infringement of a third party’s trademark. The 
court observed that an ISP could not be expected to expend its own 
resources in resolving trademark claims between rival third parties, and to 
prevent infringing entries from being made on its engine.  
III. BaNaNaBay 
This case was the subject of a reference to the ECJ by the German Federal 
Court of Justice, widely noted for its pro-technology decisions, particularly 
in the context of keyword advertising, starting in 2009 with pcb (I ZR 
139/07), Beta-Layout (I ZR 30/07) and subsequently the Bananabay/eis.de. 
BaNaNaBay is seen as the most seminal of the German cases on keyword 
advertising. The Court typically nurses the view that consumers are not so 
naive in matters of technology. In fact, in Beta-Layout, the Court noted, as 
incorrect, the idea that Internet users would readily believe that there is a 
relation between a term entered on a search engine and the sponsored link 
thereby generated, particularly where the sponsored link is clearly separated 
from and placed next to the natural search results in a specific advertising 
corner. It also maintained that Internet users would not necessarily consider 
such advertisement as affirming the origin of the advertised products or 
services.  
The Court would later expatiate on the above position in Bananabay 
II (I ZR 125/07). Consistent with the ECJ’s rulings in Google France and 
Eis.de, the Court held that the purchase of a sign that is identical to a 
trademark for the purposes of using it as a keyword to generate 
advertisements for products or services similar to those covered by that mark 
does not constitute trademark infringement insofar as the advertisement is 
separated from the natural search results in a way that can be clearly seen, 
and does not contain the relevant trademark, as well as  a “display URL” 
linking to the website of the trademark owner. 
 
Again in MOST-Pralinen (I ZR 217/10), the Court decided that the 
purchase of a rival party’s trademark as a keyword does not constitute 
trademark infringement, where the triggered advertisement is separated from 
the natural search results in a visual manner, does not mention the owner of 
that mark or its products, and the “display URL” points to a website that is 
different from that of the trademark owner, regardless of whether or not the 
advertisement explicitly clarifies that there is no economic association 
between the advertiser and the trademark owner. 
 
However, in Fleurop (I ZR 53/12), the same Court, like the UK court 
in Interflora, clarified that in rare circumstances, to avoid trademark 
infringement, it may be necessary for an advertisement made by a third party 
to contain information clearly informing consumers that there is no 
economic connection between the advertiser and the owner of the trademark 
used as keyword. The plaintiff in this case is the owner of the German 
trademark “Fleurop”, which it uses in its country-wide flower distribution 
network. Customers could order flowers from the shop of any member 
florist and have them delivered elsewhere by another member florist. The 
defendant, which ran a rival flower delivery service under the trademark, 
“Blumenbutler”, purchased the “Fleurop” trademark through Google’s 
AdWord service, leading to the display of advertisements about the 
defendant’s flower delivery service each time that term is entered on 
Google’s search engine.  
As a result, the plaintiff sued for trademark infringement. Reiterating its 
previous rulings, especially in MOST-Pralinen and Bananabay II, the Court, 
held that the use of a third party’s trademark in keyword advertising would 
not amount to an infringement of the origin function of that mark, if the 
relevant advertisement is separated from the natural search results in a visual 
manner, and does not mention the trademark owner or its products traded 
under that mark.  
On this occasion, however, the Court did not stop there. Rather, it 
proceeded to apply the two-legged test set forth by the ECJ in Interflora 
firstly, whether a normally informed and reasonably attentive Internet user 
would, based on general awareness about the market, be able to ascertain 
that the defendant’s flower delivery service was not a member of the Fleurop 
network, but a rival one, and secondly, whether the defendant’s 
advertisement allowed Internet users to know that the advertised service was 
not owned by the Fleurop network.  The Court found that no such 
knowledge existed, and which necessarily resolved the latter question in the 
negative. 
Thus, in conclusion, the Court, while maintaining its previous 
jurisprudence that the use of a trademark in keyword advertising does not 
generally constitute a trademark infringement, it held that in the instant case, 
given the nature of the plaintiff’s flower delivery system, relevant members 
of the consuming public might be misled into thinking that the defendant 
was a member of the Fleurop network. Since the defendant’s advertisement 
did not contain any caveat that it had no economic connection with the 
plaintiff, it was liable for trademark infringement.   
The Fleurop decision is the latest of the cases in which the German 
Federal Supreme Court had to determine the liability of parties, who 
purchase and use trademarked keywords in advertising their businesses. 
Upon first consideration, Fleurop would seem to be a shift in the Court’s 
previous approach to the issue, which is that the use of a trademark in 
keyword advertising does not constitute an infringement of the mark’s origin 
function, if the relevant advertisement is separated from the natural search 
results in a visual manner and does not mention the trademark owner or its 
products traded under that mark.   
The Fleurop case is factually identical to Interflora, and the German 
Court’s latest decision dovetails with the earlier decision of the UK High 
Court in Interflora v. Marks and Spencer, where the test set by the ECJ in its 
Interflora preliminary ruling was similarly followed. Seen in this way, 
Fleurop does not mark a real change, after all. As observed above, the Court 
still reiterated its general position that generally, keyword advertising does 
not amount to trademark infringement. However, by considering the special 
circumstances of the present case and then applying relevant precedent, it 
arrived at the conclusion that there had, indeed, been trademark 
infringement. 
It can be said that, despite initial discrepancies in national courts 
application of the ECJ’s rulings, there seems now to be some convergence, 
as clearly demonstrated by Fleurop and Interflora, which both reached the 
same conclusion. Disparities in judicial interpretations may still be observed 
in future cases since keyword advertising disputes may centre on aspects of 
national laws that are yet to be harmonised, such as those concerning unfair 
competition.  
Nevertheless, national courts have proven capable of adapting and 
applying ECJ’s rulings to cases having facts that are demonstrably different 
from those of relevant ECJ precedents. As already seen, in Cosmetic 
Warriors v. Amazon.Co.UK Ltd., the UK High Court successfully applied 
the ECJ’s ruling in Google France, holding that the defendant’s use of the 
“Lush” trademark, as a keyword, amounted to use in the course of 
commerce, and therefore, adversely affected the trademark’s origin, 
advertising and investment functions. 
 
6.7. Spain 
 
Spanish position on the intersection of keyword advertising and trademark 
infringement is not dissimilar to that of other EU jurisdictions. Generally, 
ISPs such as Google and Bing are not liable for trademark infringement as a 
result of keyword advertising. In respect of advertisers, the choice and use of 
a rival party’s trademark as a keyword per se does not constitute trademark 
infringement. In other words, advertisers cannot generally be forbidden from 
using their rivals’ trademarks as keywords.  They should, nonetheless, take 
care to ensure that their advertisements do not create the misleading belief 
among consumers that there is a commercial connection between them and 
the owners of relevant trademarks.  
 Specifically, Spanish courts have held that advertisers would be liable 
for trademark infringement due to the use of a protected trademark as a 
keyword, if the resulting advertisement fails to allow average Internet users 
or allow them only. With difficulty to determine whether the advertised 
products or services actually originate from the owner of that mark or its 
economic affiliate, or, on the contrary, from a rival. In Fotoprix v. 
Vistaprint, Decision 114/2014, which concerned the use of the “FotoLibro” 
trademark, the Barcelona Commercial Court, following the ECJ’s ruling in 
Louis Vuitton v. Google, held that a trademark’s origin function would be 
harmed where an advertisement creates the false impression of a commercial 
relation between the advertiser and the owner of the trademark used in the 
keyword advertising.   
In 2016, the Spanish Supreme Court delivered its judgment in 
Masaltos II, Judgment 105/2016 (February 26, 2016), which also bordered 
on keyword advertising. The plaintiff, Maherlo Iberica S.L., is the owner of 
the trademark, “Masaltos”. The defendant, Charlet S.A.M., was alleged to 
have used several terms similar to the “Masaltos” trademark as keywords in 
an AdWords program for the purposes of advertising products that were 
identical to those covered by the trademark. Although not materially 
different from the ECJ’s rulings in Interflora and Google France, the Court 
reached some notable conclusions. First, the Court reaffirmed the now much 
familiar principle that the use of a third party’s trademark as a keyword in 
AdWords programs such as Google’s is generally not unlawful, unless that 
use adversely affects any of the mark’s functions relating, for example, to 
origin or investment, or with regard to famous marks, if that use takes 
advantage of the fame or distinctiveness of the mark, or undermines any of 
these characteristics. As noted, this is not a novel determination. Still, it is 
notable because, in an earlier Spanish case, the Commercial Court No. 2 of 
Alicante had, in Judgment Number 165/2012 of 3 July (AC 2013\2176), 
held that the mere use of the trademark, “Bornay”  as a keyword amounted 
to trademark infringement. The Alicante court did not concern itself with 
whether the sponsored advertisement adversely affected the functions of that 
trademark. 
 
In that case, the plaintiff, Bornay Aerogeneradores, S.L. claimed that the 
defendant, Sonkyio, S.L., infringed its trademark rights by using “Bornay” 
or variants of same as keywords through an AdWords program. Dissatisfied 
with the lower court’s judgment, the defendant lodged an appeal. The 
Community Trademark Court in its judgment recalled the ECJ’s preliminary 
ruling of 2010  to the effect that the use of signs that are identical to 
protected trademarks as keywords amount to use “in relation to goods or 
services” pursuant to Article 5(1)(a) of Directive 89/104, and further, that a 
trademark owner may forbid its trademark from being used as a keyword to 
advertise products or services that are identical to those covered by that 
mark, if the advertisement does not allow the average Internet user to 
determine whether the advertised products or services actually originate 
from the owner of the mark or its economic affiliate, or, on the contrary, 
from a third party. 
 
In light of the ECJ’s jurisprudence, as recounted, the Court concluded 
that none of the essential functions of the trademark had been harmed. This 
was because, in consonance with ECJ’s jurisprudence, the use of a 
trademark as a keyword does not adversely affect a mark’s advertising 
function. Also, the mark’s origin function was not harmed because in the 
present case, the average Internet user would be able to tell that the relevant 
advertisement belonged to the defendant, and was not part of the natural 
search results. Further, the advertisement was shown in a way that did not 
suggest that there was any economic link between both parties. As a result, 
the Court concluded that the plaintiff’s trademark had not been infringed, 
and the appeal was allowed. As a whole, this decision followed the ECJ’s 
jurisprudence on keyword advertising and trademark infringement, and 
reaffirmed the rule that the mere use of a trademark as a keyword in 
AdWords programs does not constitute trademark infringement. For there to 
be infringement, it must be shown that the purported use created confusion 
among average consumers as to the origin of the advertised products or 
services.   
Returning to the Masaltos II decision, the Spanish Supreme Court 
held that, secondly, in assessing whether a mark’s origin function has been 
adversely affected, it is relevant to consider whether reference was made to 
the mark in text of the sponsored advertisement. In the present case, the 
advertisement did not refer to the plaintiff’s mark, a fact that led the Court to 
conclude that there was no infringement. The Court further observed that the 
defendant’s domain name and website did not refer to the plaintiff’s mark. 
These last two considerations are, however, not necessary under ECJ’s 
jurisprudence, which requires the likelihood of consumer confusion to be 
determined only on the basis of the text of the advertisement, and not 
whether the mark was used in any other place. 366  This highlights the 
importance of the text of a sponsored advertisement to the determination of 
the presence or absence of trademark infringement. 																																																								
366  
Thirdly, according the Court, in determining a trademark owner’s 
right to forbid the use of its mark, the visual composition of that mark must 
be taken into account. In a suit instituted by Maherlo Iberica S.L at the 
Grenada Commercial Court No. 1 for trademark infringement, the relevant 
“Masaltos” marks were of a mixed combination, comprising both text and 
graphics. The defendant in that case, which was engaged in the sale of shoe 
lifts, maintained a website, www.crecefacil.com, on which it used keywords 
such as  "MAS", "ALTOS", "MASALTOS", "MASALTOS.COM" and 
"BERTULLI". Both “MASALTOS” and “BERTULLI” were protected 
trademarks owned by the plaintiff. In its decision, the court prohibited the 
defendant from further using, as keywords, the marks, B BERTULLI, 
MARIO BERTULLI, MASALTOS, MASALTOS.COM, and the domain 
name, MASALTOS. The plaintiff’s right to forbid third parties from using 
its marks thus rested on the fact that they combined both textual and graphic 
components.  
 A related case under Spanish jurisprudence is Orona. The plaintiff, 
Orona S Coop, instituted this action against CityLift AS for trademark 
infringement before the Alicante Community Trademark Court. The court 
held that the defendant’s use of the “Orona” trademark as a keyword in 
advertising through Google’s AdWords program, did not constitute 
infringement of that mark. This, according to the court, was because the 
advertisement did not suggest any commercial connection between both 
parties as it made it expressly clear that CityLift was different from Orona. 
Therefore, the use of the “Orona” trademark as a keyword could not be 
trademark infringement.   
The court also had to determine whether the said use infringed the 
mark’s advertising function, and came to the conclusion that it did not, since 
it was not an advertising use; the use was only in the stream of commerce, 
and the mark was not even shown in the advertisement. Lastly, the court 
considered whether there was use without reasonable cause and the 
attainment of unfair advantage from the mark’s fame, but held that there was 
none. Instead, the court found that the defendant provided consumers with 
alternative products and services, thereby enhancing fair competition.  
 
 
6.8. Austria 
 
In Decisions 4 Ob 194/05s and 4 Ob 195/05p ("Google"), (December 19, 
2005), the Austrian Supreme Court addressed the issue of ISP liability for 
trademark infringement arising from keyword advertising. Applying already 
established principles in this regard, the Court held that an ISP is generally 
under no obligation to monitor whether search terms used by its customers 
are trademark infringing or inimical to fair competition. It pointed out that 
an ISP would be liable for trademark infringement perpetrated by advertisers 
patronising its services, only in situations where such infringement would 
have been clear to both lay and legally trained persons, or where the ISP was 
already notified in writing about the infringement. In such circumstances, an 
ISP may come under a duty to stop the infringement, failing which, it would 
be deemed to have intentionally abetted it. In the case at hand, the Court 
determined that the alleged infringement was not obvious to Google, which 
consequently, was not liable.   
 
The Court did not, however, specifically address the issue whether the 
act of keyword advertising per se is lawful. It finally confronted that 
question in “Wein & Co" in Decision 17 Ob 1/07g (March 20, 2007). The 
plaintiff, a food vendor, used the words, "Wein & Co" as both a trademark 
and an acronym. The defendant, a rival food vendor, purchased hundreds of 
keywords, including “Wein & Co", "Wein" and "Rotwein", the last two 
being of a generic nature. Whenever the words, “Wein & Co" were entered 
on a search engine, an advertisement bearing the caption, “Wein & Co", was 
shown right on top of the search results.  
 
The advertisement also contained the web address, "weinwelt.at", written in 
small letters, as well as the term, "Anzeige", meaning advertisement, which 
was positioned at the far right of the website. An Internet user, who clicked 
on the caption, "Wein & Co", was directed to the defendant’s website. The 
advertisement was later modified such that it contained only the term, 
"Anzeige", with "Wein & Co" removed. A vertical dark line separated the 
advertisement from the search results. The Court held that the words, "Wein 
& Co" were not merely a descriptive sign, but a protected mark. The 
defendant’s initial advertisement infringed this mark since that 
advertisement was captioned with the mark, leading to the likelihood of 
consumer confusion.  
The Court noted that the finding of infringement was further 
strengthened by the fact that the "Wein & Co" caption appeared above the 
plaintiff’s own website on the search results list. The Court also observed 
that the subsequent modification of the advertisement did not abate potential 
continuation of the infringement. Once again, the Court did not address the 
issue as to whether there would be trademark infringement, if a mark were 
simply used as a keyword, and were not shown in an advertisement, as 
exemplified by the defendant’s modified advertisement.  Austrian courts 
have yet to clarify whether the mere use of a protected trademark in keyword 
advertising is unlawful, or situations in which such use may be unlawful. 
In "Kieser Training", Decision 30 R 4/06p (June 7, 2006), the Upper 
District Court of Vienna indicated that the use of trademarks as metatags 
constitutes use as understood in trademark law. The plaintiff was the owner 
of the trademark, "Kieser Training", which the defendant, operator of a 
physiotherapy centre, used as a metatag in the source code of its website. 
The website, itself, did not mention that mark or make any reference to the 
plaintiff’s business.  
The court decided that the defendant’s use of the mark as a metatag in 
the source code of its website amounted to trademark infringement. This was 
because the defendant did not use the mark for any reasonable cause, neither 
was the use consistent with honest practices in commercial affairs. A 
reasonable cause may exist, where a defendant uses a trademark to describe 
its product as an accessory to the marked one.  A use would not be 
compatible with honest practices in commercial affairs, where the mark is 
only used as a Metatag, and not where it could be visible on the website, 
since Metatags are meant to serve as a description of what a website 
contains.  
It remains unsettled whether similar principles would apply to the use 
of trademarks in keyword advertising explicitly presented as such. In that 
case, the vexed issue would be whether the mark was used to distinguish the 
particular products or services in a way that led relevant members of the 
public to consider it as an affirmation of their economic origin. The current 
literature demonstrates a polarity of views on this matter. 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 		
 
CHAPTER FIVE: PRINCIPLES OF LIABILITY AND 
THEIR APPLICATION TO KEYWORD 
ADVERTISING 
 
1. BACKGROUND 
 
During the 1990s when the Internet and its transformative effects were just 
unfolding, the U.S. Supreme Court defined the Internet as “an international 
network of interconnected computers.” 367 Subsequently, its Australian 
equivalent, the High Court of Australia, observed that the Internet is 
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“ubiquitous, borderless, global and ambient in its nature.”368 
While not obvious to most users, the Internet is built on a complicated 
physical and organisational structure comprising a multiplicity of actors that 
facilitate connectivity among computers, and between computers and other 
appliances, ultimately allowing users to access online material. Those actors 
are called ‘Internet intermediaries’. They generally serve as a repository of 
online data, which they also link and make accessible to users. It is true that 
humans and machines also generate online material, but in view of the roles 
they play, Internet intermediaries are the main providers of online material 
to users. It is hardly controvertible that parties, who generate infringing 
online material, should be liable for their unlawful actions.  
 
2. DEFINING INTERNET INTERMEDIARIES 
  
One special class of Internet intermediaries that has been identified, and 
which makes online material available to users, relates to ISPs. 369 They 
function “as the gateway through which material is uploaded or downloaded 
by the end-users.” 370  They are chiefly responsible for establishing 
connectivity between computers and other contrivances, and therefore, serve 
as vital intermediaries that make it possible for Internet users to get 																																																								
368 Dow Jones v. Gutnick [2002] HCA 56, [80] (Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ)  
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connected to providers of online material. 
They function as digital receptacles for online data that are accessible 
through the Internet. 371  Assessment of the potential liability of Internet 
intermediaries requires an appreciation of this complicated, multilayered 
architecture of the Internet. 372  As Smith explains, search engines and 
directories index material available all over the Internet such that a “user can 
either perform a keyword search for relevant sites, or consult a structured 
directory for sites of interest.”373  
3. WHY HOLD INTERNET INTERMEDIARIES 
ACCOUNTABLE?  
Law and economics exponents argue that responsibility for an unlawful act 
should be borne by the party, who is best positioned to prevent that unlawful 
act at the least possible cost.374  
Along that line, it has been suggested that, “it is economically more 
efficient to require intermediaries to take action to prevent infringement 
occurring via their services than it is to require right holders to take action 
directly against infringers.”375 Several justifications can be advanced for this 
argument. One of them is that the secrecy provided by the Internet makes it a 																																																								
371 GHJ Smith, Internet Law and Regulation ,4th ed, , Sweet & Maxwell,  2007, p. 9.  
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challenging task for rights holders to track every possible infringing online 
material, and to determine those responsible for them.376 On the other hand, it 
is much easier to identify the Internet intermediaries that are usually 
responsible for hosting, connecting and making online material available to 
users. 377 
Another reason why rights holders are not in the best position to take 
action against infringers is that, given the structure of the Internet, as 
explained already, Internet intermediaries are better able to spot infringing 
material and prevent them at comparatively lower costs.378 
Relatedly, considering the nature of the roles they play, Internet 
intermediaries can be said to have some level of control over online material 
hosted, linked or circulated on their platforms. “Service providers control the 
gateway through which Internet pests enter and reenter the system. As such, 
service providers can help to stop these pests before they spread and to 
identify the individuals who originate them in the first place”379 Viewed, at 
least, from the angle of rights holders, controlling the actions of those 
Internet intermediaries would be a lot more effective than seeking to go after 
the potentially innumerable number of individual infringers. 380 
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There are further explanations why, at least, on a practical level, 
responsibility should attach to Internet intermediaries, despite the fact that 
“[a]dvances in technology are making it increasingly possible to locate and 
identify bad actors online, such that online anonymity is difficult to 
maintain.”381  
 
In some jurisdictions, there are no regulations governing behaviour on the 
Internet, and even where they exist, they may not be comprehensive.382  
Therefore, to sue perceived infringers may not be a satisfactory remedy.  
Even if infringers were successfully sued, enforcement of judgment 
against them would present problems, if they are located in foreign 
jurisdictions, given the absence of an international legal framework to 
govern disputes arising from the Internet.383 
Those arguments have, however, been contested by those who believe 
that one should be liable only for acts he has perpetrated.384 The presence of 
a nexus between a person’s unlawful act, and damage suffered by an 
aggrieved party, demands that liability should attach to the former for his 
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unlawful behaviour.385 This is the basis for the assignment of liability.  
Others, like Burrell and Weatherall, have also opposed the law and 
economics basis for the attachment of liability because of the likely impact 
that may have on otherwise legitimate activities. They maintain that “even 
under the conventional economic model it may not be desirable to impose 
liability on a cheapest cost avoider where to do so would cause substantial 
interference with legitimate activity.386  
That observation resonates quite well with Internet intermediaries, 
who operate in the private sphere with hardly any legal checks and public 
scrutiny.387 
4. “USE” AS OBSTACLE FOR ISP LIABILITY  	
The ‘use’ of trademarks as a condition for infringement does not include 
their sale as keywords by ISPs, without authority from their owners, 
irrespective of the fact that the results generated by the search may lead to 
consumer confusion. Janis and Dinwoodie believe that this may cause 
trademark law to lose control over activities occurring in the e-commerce 
world.388  
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There remain divergences of academic opinions on the true meaning 
of the term, “use” in the course of trade. According to one strand of opinion, 
the sale of a mark as a keyword does not amount to “use” in the course of 
trade, meaning that it is not intended to function as an indication of origin, 
and hence should not incur liability for ISPs.389 
By contrast, others believe that whenever marks are used in relation to 
the “sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising” of products, such an 
act should be viewed as “use” in the course of trade, rendering ISPs liable 
for infringement.390 
Both factions to the argument interestingly anchor their position on an 
economic view of trademark law namely, the “economics of information”.  
When consumers conduct “targeted” or “navigational” searches by 
typing the name of a trademark as a keyword on a search engine, their aim is 
usually to locate the website of the owner of that mark or to retrieve 
information about specific products. Consumers suffer comparatively higher 
costs when  they are presented with advertisements from rivals, or products 
or services that are strictly of no use to them. Nonetheless, it is also true that 
consumers often use trademarks simply to commence their search  for 
information that would eventually also include information about competing 
products, quality reviews and price comparisons, all of which make for more 
efficient online shopping, such that they are willing to tolerate the extra 
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search costs they may incur in the process.391  
Reconciling the interests of diverse Internet searchers may require 
more than a mere focus on the “search cost theory” in that, the justification 
of keyword advertising services that do not cause consumer confusion based 
on that theory, is only possible, if the real aim of the consumer conducting 
the search is to access the website of the trademark owner, or if otherwise, 
the use adversely affects the mark’s ability to function as a guarantee of 
quality.392 Yet, as the notion of “objective opaqueness” suggests, determining 
the true intent of the consumer, who enters a keyword on a search engine is a 
difficult task.393  
When a search is conducted by entering a trademark as a keyword, the 
search engine is not able to determine the actual destination intended by the 
consumer, and this makes it impossible to tell whether the use of that 
trademark as a keyword was meant to direct the consumer to the website of 
the trademark owner, or as an entry point to competing products.394 Goldman 
has, therefore, argued that “objective opaqueness” renders it impossible to 
arrive at any “legally-supportable inferences about searcher objectives based 
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on the keywords used”.395 
Nevertheless, others, like Dinwoodie and Janis, maintain that the sale 
of trademarks as keywords raises search costs for consumers as they are 
confronted with a deluge of information, which defeats the economic 
justification for trademark protection.396 The real purpose of the law is not to 
facilitate unrestrained flow of information to consumers, but rather, to assure 
correct and relevant information and avoid the adverse effect on consumer 
welfare that may accompany excessive information.397  
On the other hand, consumers may also find information generated 
through keyword advertising useful and timely, meeting the common 
interest of consumers, advertisers and ISPs.398 In the final analysis, keyword 
advertising offers the prospect of correct and useful messages, considerably 
reducing search costs for consumers.  
An important factor that has contributed to the rapid growth of the 
Internet is the fact that it is not subject to any central authority, and the 
information it contains is the product of free contributions from its many 
users.399 Unfortunately, this freedom also means an unusually high traffic of 
information, which increases the potential for messages generated from 
natural searches to be less accurate and useful, while also exposing 																																																								
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consumers to higher costs in choosing the relevant from the irrelevant.  
The results generated by ISPs for natural searches are made even 
more inaccurate by the unscrupulous use of metatags, a process through 
which owners of websites cleverly program trademarks belonging to their 
rivals onto their own websites so as to gain priority ranking whenever 
consumers enter that trademark in their keyword search.400  
Nonetheless, keyword services remain a method of information 
management, even though it is clear that service providers like Google may 
also have their interest to serve by tampering with their own search results 
through trademark sales, rather than allowing website owners to freely do so 
by incorporating trademarks in metatags .401 
It is almost impossible to navigate the Internet, without encountering 
online advertisements, whether visual images on websites or text messages 
on search engine sites.402 Revenues earned through advertisements using 
keywords normally sold to the highest bidders, are critical to the sustenance 
of ISPs and the free services they provide, such that there would be no 
incentive for them to strive for a more efficient search experience, if they are 
not assured of some profit.403 
For example, in 2016, Google earned more than US$55 million in 																																																								
400 R.Nelson Eng, 'A Likelihood of Infringement the Purchase and Sale of Trademarks as 
Adwords', Albanian Law Journal Science & Technology, 18(2) , 2009, p. 497.  
401 ibid 
402 . Ratliff, and D. Rubinfeld, Online Advertising: Defining Relevant Markets: Journal of 
Competition Law and Economics, 6(3), 2010, p. 653.  
403 Edward Wildman, Keyword advertising trademark infringement litigation: an uphill battle, 
World Trademark Review,  2013,  p. 94.  
advertising, largely through its AdWords program, which has turned out to 
be one of the most flourishing business initiatives in the world of e-
commerce; indeed a “goldmine” for entities engaged in search engine 
advertising. 404 It should be remembered that the primary objective of the 
TFEU is the promotion of free competition, particularly the free movement 
of goods and services within the European common market, including e-
commerce, and ISPs perform functions that are vital to the realisation of this 
goal by enhancing trading opportunities and directing consumers to needed 
products and services with greater efficiency. They hold a prospect for free 
competition far more than was possible several decades ago within EU 
Member States, and both consumers and businesses would be deprived of 
these benefits, if undue restriction were to be imposed on their activities.405  
It seems, therefore, at least, on policy grounds, that the exemption of 
ISPs from liability under trademark law is justified. It would be recalled that 
before the decision in Google France, the ECJ had taken the view that it was 
enough to establish trademark infringement on account of unauthorised use 
simply by showing that the alleged infringer was engaged in activity of some 
commercial nature. Were that still the case today, ISPs would be exposed to 
liability whenever trademark was used as a keyword, and the onus would fall 
on them to demonstrate that the ‘use’ did not harm any of the functions 
performed by the trademark. With the interpretation given in Google 
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France, the Court apparently sets ISPs free from direct liability for third 
parties’ use of trademarked keywords, bringing “certainty” into the law, at 
least, as far as search engine operators are concerned, and for whom it is 
now largely unnecessary to carry out a ‘confusion assessment’.406  
For all those reasons marshaled, it is proper to immune ISPs from 
liability for trademark infringement because all they are doing is to afford 
businesses a resource to attain their advertising objectives, and not ‘using’ 
trademarks ‘in the course of trade.’407  
The ECJ’s stance is policy-oriented; it recognises that, while significant 
profits accrue to ISPs from the sale of trademarks as keywords, they, at the 
same time, offer consumers a means to freely access useful information, and 
also enable businesses to reach far bigger markets, all of which are 
conducive to free competition. Although there may result a deluge of 
information that could cause consumer confusion, it is untenable to lay the 
blame on ISPs.  
Consumers usually may begin their searches for products by entering 
a keyword on the search engine, and in return, the advertisers would 
generate the information. To restrain this service would rob consumers the 
possibility of a wider range of alternatives, undermining free trade. Thus, the 
principal concern of the law should be to prevent confusion about the source 
of products that could arise in regard to the search procedure employed by 
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the consumer or the aim of that search.  
That contention assumes greater salience with regard to keywords that 
directly use trademarks, the development of which their owners have made 
significant investments in terms of reputation and expenses. Some Scholars 
refers to Google’s use of trademarks to advance its own commercial interests 
by offering other parties’ trademarks for sale to those who are willing to pay 
the highest prices, and, in return, have their advertisements displayed 
whenever consumers enter those trademarks on the search engine.408  
Consumers should not necessarily be confused as a result of that 
practice, and ISPs are insulated from responsibility, with the onus falling on 
advertisers to justify their use of the trademark, 409 although it is equally true 
that by selling keywords to the highest bidders, ISPs gain profoundly more 
by encouraging advertisers to make higher bids.  
Surely, ISP services that allow rivals to use protected trademarks in 
keyword advertising pose concerns for trademark owners, who are eager not 
only to protect their interests in marked products or services, but also in the 
marks themselves as independent products. As a result, trademark owners 
exhibit a disposition towards litigation whenever they perceive infringement 
of their rights.  
5. OVERVIEW OF LIABILITY UNDER TRADEMARK LAW 
Trademark law has grown considerably over time, affording trademark 
owners the desired protection of their marks on the Internet. Yet, rather 																																																								
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astonishingly, trademark owners have been largely unable to successfully 
sue Internet intermediaries for making infringing online material accessible 
to Internet users. 
A key explanatory factor for that lack of success stems from the strict 
“use” test that must be met to render unauthorised uses of trademarks by 
third parties as trademark infringement. As shown later in this chapter, 
strictly speaking, Internet intermediaries do not use trademarks, at least, not 
as conceived under trademark law, so as to be entangled in legal disputes 
over trademark infringement.  
5.1. Use Requirements 
 
Article 16(1) of TRIPS, which delineates the extent of the rights conferred 
on trademark owners, and also guides the level of trademark protection 
under national and regional trademark laws, including the EU, provides that: 
The owner of a registered trademark shall have the exclusive 
right to prevent all third parties not having the owner’s consent 
from using in the course of trade identical or similar signs for 
goods or services which are identical or similar to those in 
respect of which the trademark is registered where such use 
would result in a likelihood of confusion. 410 
The phrase ‘using in the course of trade’ is vital to the delineation of 
trademark rights, and consequently, the determination of infringement. 
Despite this, TRIPS offers no guidance on how that phrase is to be 
understood. Neither has this issue received sufficient attention even in some 																																																								
410 Article 16(1) of TRIPS 
of the most authoritative interpretations of TRIPS.411 
Correa makes the self-evident remark that “The exclusive rights conferred 
are subject to several conditions and limitations. First, such rights only apply 
in relation to the use of a trademark ‘in the course of trade’, that is, in 
commercial activities.”412  
But the meaning of ‘use’, itself, is unclear. Some of the best attempts 
to address this issue have failed to delineate the type of use that would run 
afoul of TRIPS, suggesting only that it is for WTO Member States to decide 
this matter for themselves in their domestic intellectual property regimes.413  
Equally important, is that use of a trademark ‘in the course of trade’ 
alone is not enough to constitute a breach of TRIPS. That use must be ‘for 
goods or services which are identical or similar to those in respect of which 
the trademark is registered’. 
In relation to the EU, for there to be a trademark infringement under 
the TMD, the sign purported to be identical or similar to a registered mark, 
must be used “in the course of trade” and “in relation to goods or services 
which are identical with [or similar to] those for which it is registered.”414 
																																																								
411 D Gervais, The TRIPS Agreement – Drafting History and Analysis (3rd ed, Sweet & Maxwell 
2008), 274-79 no discussion on the meaning of ‘use in the course of trade’.  
412 CM Correa, Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights: A Commentary on the 
TRIPS Agreement, Oxford University Press 2007,p. 186.  
413 P. Stoll, J. Busche and K. Arend (eds), WTO—Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights , Martinus Nijhoff Publications, 2009,p. 318.  
414 Directive 2008/95/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2008 to 
 6. LACK OF SECONDARY LIABILITY UNDER TRADEMARK 
LAW  
 
As already seen, the stringent ‘use’ requirement of trademark law necessary 
to establish trademark infringement against Internet intermediaries is 
difficult to meet. To be able to hold those intermediaries liable for providing 
Internet users access to trademark infringing material, one may need to look 
beyond the confines of traditional trademark law. 415  There are equally 
suggestions that resort may be had to common law since trademarks are, 
themselves, emanations of the common law. 416Trademarks are, after all, not 
new, having existed along with trade right from ancient times.417 
According to one commentary, “the repression of trademark 
infringement came into the common law through an action of deceit and, 
although it is the public rather than the owner of the trademark who is 
actually deceived, the common law trademark action is still deceit.”418 
Clearly then, even though “the right to a trademark, after being more and 
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more assimilated to proprietary rights, has become a statutory franchise...”419  
trademarks actually have their roots in the common law tort of deceit.  
As a matter of fact, while the premise on which the courts of equity had 
intervened in trademark disputes was the claimant’s ‘title’ to a trademark, a 
rationale that bestowed a proprietary status on trademarks, the justification 
for trademark protection would later change to the original ground of 
deceit.420  
The potential liability of parties other than the direct users of 
trademarks is not addressed, specifically, or otherwise, both by TRIPS and 
the Paris Convention.421 
Indeed, the issue of secondary liability hardly features in most 
international intellectual property agreements. 422  A further point worth 
noting, is that this form of liability is described in different ways. While 
some refer to it as ‘secondary’ liability, 423  others call it ‘contributory’ 
liability.424 In some jurisdictions though, particularly the U.S., each of these 
terms has a different meaning. For the avoidance of doubt, therefore, this 
thesis has chosen the more neutral term of secondary liability to indicate the 																																																								
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liability of a party, who aids trademark infringement by others, even where 
the former does not use the relevant trademark in a manner that can be 
considered infringing.  
In terms of international intellectual property regimes relating to this 
type of liability, Article 23(4) of the ACTA, which concerns ‘criminal 
offences’, provides that, “with respect to the offences specified in this 
Article for which a Party provides criminal procedures and penalties, that 
Party shall ensure that criminal liability for aiding and abetting is available 
under its law”.  
The ACTA, if it ever becomes effective, would be the singular 
international instrument specifically catering for Secondary liability, but it is 
limited to criminal enforcement and to parties who ‘aid’ and ‘abet’ 
infringements.  
In effect, international intellectual property law does not provide a 
civil basis for secondary liability for trademark infringement. That probably 
explains why civil enforcement of secondary liability has been consigned to 
domestic legal regimes, with significant differences among jurisdictions.425 
Within the EU, national trademark laws have been considerably 
harmonised through the TMD, but the Directive does not address the issue of 
Secondary liability.426 As a very important point, however, the TMD does not 
forbid Member States from applying to trademark issues, provisions of their 																																																								
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domestic laws other than trademark law, for example, legal provisions 
concerning civil liability, unfair competition, or consumer protection.427  
Hence, it is permissible for them to apply the rules of secondary liability in 
matters relating to trademark protection.  
Even the courts have acknowledged that proposition. As the High 
Court of England has observed:  
...it is settled law that arts 5 to 7 of the Trade Marks Directive embody 
a complete harmonisation of the rules relating to infringement of the 
rights conferred by registration of a trade mark within the 
Community. Those rules do not, however, harmonise the law of 
accessory liability applicable to such infringements. Accordingly, the 
question of accessory liability is primarily a matter for national law.428  
Further, under TRIPS, WTO Member States are free to provide in their 
domestic intellectual property regimes, standards of protection that are 
higher than the TRIPS minimum standards.429 On this basis, some WTO 
Member States have gone ahead to make provisions in their domestic 
trademark laws, which are stricter than the requirements of Article 16 
TRIPS.  
A useful illustration is Section 10(5) of the  UK TMA 1994 which provides 																																																								
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that:  
A person who applies a registered trade mark to material intended to 
be used for labelling or packaging goods, as a business paper, or for 
advertising goods or services, shall be treated as a party to any use of 
the material which infringes the registered trade mark if when he 
applied the mark he knew or had reason to believe that the 
application of the mark was not duly authorised by the proprietor or a 
licensee.  
 
 
Some well-acknowledged commentators, including Cornish, have observed 
that the above provision allows for what they describe as ‘contributory 
infringement’, 430  or as Bently and Sherman put it, ‘secondary 
infringement’.431 This discrepancy in usage creates some uncertainty as to the 
exact form of liability created by the above provision. It seems though, from 
the descriptions given by the above commentators, that the provision 
entertains a type of indirect liability, which exceeds the scope of Article 16 
TRIPS.  
																																																								
430 W Cornish et al, Intellectual Property: Patents, Copyright, Trade Marks and Allied Rights, 
8th ed, Sweet & Maxwell , 2013, p. 757.   
431 L Bently and B Sherman, Intellectual Property Law (4th ed, Oxford University Press , 2009, 
p. 1058.   
7. EVALUATION OF APPLICATION OF LIABILITY FOR 
ASSISTING A TORT TO KEYWORD ADVERTISING 	
There is a push among some academics for civil law recognition, especially 
under tort law, of the liability of a party, who assists another in perpetrating 
a wrong.432 This proposition has received clear disapproval from the courts.433 
Despite that, others like Dietrich434 and Davies435 have pressed on with the 
idea of a civil law basis to hold a party liable for facilitating another’s 
wrongful act.  
In his critical response to the ‘common design’ requirement that has 
undergirded judicial reluctance on this issue, Davies observes that “...it 
seems as if joint tortfeasance may well not cover a person who throws a 
knife to another, knowing that it will be used to stab somebody else, since it 
could be insuperably difficult to prove either inducement or a “common 
design”.436 
In the illustration given above, whereas criminal liability will attach to 
the one, who made the knife available because he assisted the principal 
offender437  to perpetrate the crime, he would not face any civil liability. 																																																								
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This, according to Davies, highlights “a gap in the law”.438  An appropriate 
way to fill this gap, he argues, is to endorse the idea that every type of act 
that significantly aids the infringement of another person’s right should incur 
secondary liability.439 
Inevitably, such liability will apply to those who aid others to commit 
a tort. This thesis expresses the view that judicial endorsement of Davies’ 
proposition and the consequent enhancement of the common law would 
create room for attaching liability to those who aid civil wrongs committed 
by others. In this way, it may become possible, in appropriate cases, to hold 
Internet intermediaries like Google liable, when their activities enable 
Internet users to violate the trademark rights of other parties.  
Still, the argument for the civil law recognition of secondary liability 
has been challenged440 partly because of fears that it would breed uncertainty. 
McBride and Bagshaw have, for example, countered Davies’ argument. 
According to them:  
It seems that if the law were to open the door to defendants simply on 
the basis that they assisted someone to commit a tort, the law would 
soon become unacceptably uncertain and inhibit many perfectly 
legitimate activities. Not holding A liable in cases where he throws a 
knife to B, which is then used to stab C, is a price we have to pay in 
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the interests of legal certainty and public welfare.441  
McBride and Bagshaw have a point. If unchecked, indiscriminate 
enforcement of secondary liability may precipitate legal uncertainty. Even in 
the criminal sphere, secondary liability has caused anxiety due to its 
perceivably overreaching application. One reflection on the issue maintains 
that:  
“The law of accessorial liability is an area where the need for 
consistency needs to be considered and, if there is to be inconsistency 
in the development of legal doctrine, it should operate, as with the 
interpretation of self-defence, so that criminal liability is more 
restrictive than tortious liability. The criminal law of secondary 
liability in particular has much to learn from tort law, specifically as 
regards the need to recognise a common design as a way of 
restricting secondary liability. The introduction of such a requirement 
into the criminal law of secondary liability would serve to ensure that 
the defendant was sufficiently involved in the commission of the crime 
by the principal so that he can be considered to have combined with 
the principal to commit the crime”.442  
Understandable as it may seem, the target of that criticism is not civil 
secondary liability, but criminal Secondary liability.  Criminal law terms like 
‘aid’ and ‘abet’ already feature in tort cases, but it is unnecessary to bring 
criminal law secondary liability into civil law. “[i]t is not obvious that 
accessory liability should be the same in the criminal law and the civil law.” 																																																								
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443 All that said, the courts would finally have to decide whether secondary 
liability should be admitted into civil law, and, importantly, whether it 
should constitute a basis under civil law, and specifically torts law, for 
attaching liability to those who knowingly assist others to commit wrongful 
acts. What is clear for now, is that the UK courts have remained averse to 
the application of the criminal law concept of Secondary liability to tort 
cases, ostensibly with some justification. It seems, improbable, at least, for 
the foreseeable future, that they would embrace the idea of liability based on 
the intentional assistance of a civil wrong, especially, a tort.   
Yet, that should not obviate the desirability, under civil law, of a 
properly formulated type of liability for those who knowingly assist the 
commission of a tort. 
8. KEYWORD ADVERTISING , E-COMMERCE DIRECTIVE  AND 
ADVERTISER LIABILITY  
 
The potential liability of ISPs can equally be examined under E-Commerce 
Directive 2000 (ECD).444 Article 14 of the ECD covers situations where an 
ISP only provides a technical means for the storage of content, without 
control or knowledge of that content. In such cases, they cannot assume 
liability for the content stored by advertisers, unless it is shown that they 
knew about the unlawfulness of that content or the activities of the 
advertiser, but failed to timeously withdraw the content or deny access to it. 																																																								
443 D Cooper, Secondary Liability for Civil Wrongs , PhD thesis, Cambridge University, 1995, p. 
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For this reason, in responding to requests for information, ISPs normally 
rely on the past search behavior or the search words provided there is no 
illegality. This way of handling consumer ‘intelligence’ enables ISPs to 
escape liability under Article 14 ECD, but conceivably has no bearing on the 
broad nature of the searches that consumers may conduct in their quest for 
products. It may be said though that the online services that ISPs offer are 
comparable to those of real-world shops, where, in response to enquiries 
about trademarked products, consumers are also directed to other competing 
alternatives.  
8.1. The Liability of the Advertiser  	
Under existing case law, the use by advertisers of trademarked keywords 
purchased from ISPs to direct traffic to their websites where their own 
products are displayed for sale amounts to ‘use in the course of trade’. It 
amounts to use in a commercial, rather than a private activity, and an 
advertiser’s liability for the infringement of the relevant mark fits within the 
frame of Articles 5(1)(a) and 5(2) TMD; the harm likely to be done to one of 
the mark’s protected functions to with, origin, advertising, and investment, 
must be ascertained.  Although the practical damage that may arise from 
breaching a trademark function has already been examined, attention has yet 
to focus on the possible justification of the use in the event that such damage 
is found. 
In the aftermath of the decisions on AdWords, the ECJ has held that, 
with regard to the origin function of trademarks, causing confusion as to 
origin is the basic premise for finding infringement, but still, in considering 
how the emergent online advertising works, the Court apparently also 
protects the “legitimate interests” of trademark owners. The origin function 
would be considered to be adversely affected, if the relevant advertisement 
prevents reasonably well-informed and attentive users from determining, or 
renders it difficult for them to determine whether the products offered for 
sale in that advertisement actually emanated from the trademark owner or its 
affiliates, and not the third party advertiser.445 Under the test used by the 
Court, the implicated advertisement must be of such transparency as to make 
identifiable not just the identity of the advertiser, but the actual source of the 
products displayed, even without the consumer visiting its website.446 This 
“novel duty of transparency” as Cornwell describes it, has, however been 
condemned for shifting the burden onto advertisers to ensure that consumers 
are not confused as to the origin of products displayed in their 
advertisements, and hence guarantee transparency in the marketplace.447 On 
the other hand, it is clear that the act of using protected trademarks, while 
making payments to ISPs, instead of the owners of those marks, is 
reprehensible. In those cases where a mark enjoys absolute protection under 
Article 5(1)(a), use would lead to automatic liability, unless the user is 
related to the trademark owner.  
In reality, it would be challenging a task for advertisers to ensure the 
so-called market transparency, given that their advertisements are mostly 
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constituted by just a few words and last for a few moments.448 Considering 
the unrestrained flow of information on the Internet, consumers are bound to 
be bombarded with information whenever they do a search, even when the 
search terms used are not trademarked; there is, thus, no reason to expect 
that all the results of their search would relate to the same business or its 
affiliates.449The ECJ considers this in its interpretation of what is necessary 
for the protection of strictly the origin function, instead of the other 
economic functions.  
Ostensibly, this adds weight to the belief that, perhaps, those other 
functions are ancillary to the essential origin, and do not exist independently. 
When consumers conduct searches on the Internet using a trademark, it 
would not be reasonable for them to think that all or even any of the 
sponsored results generated have a commercial connection to the trademark 
owner, a point equally valid in respect of the natural search results. In most 
cases, they are bound to receive more information, including from sources 
not intended, for example, those providing information on close substitutes, 
and price comparisons. This would be more evident where the additional 
messages are identified as ‘sponsored results’ and demarcated from the 
section showing the natural results.450 The ECJ has, nevertheless, expressed 
the view that, generally, consumers may get confused in respect of the origin 
function, where an advertisement is prompted soon after a trademark is 
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searched, and which advertisement stays on as the consumer contemplates 
buying.451  
That ‘sponsored results’ are distanced from the natural results may, 
thus, not be enough to avert harm to the origin function; the third party 
advertisement is capable of influencing the consumer’s choice.452 But while 
consumer protection against confusion has the merit of facilitating 
competition and “economic efficiency” of the market, the protection of 
trademarks on that account must be done diligently so as to strike the right 
balance with the equally important values of free competition and flow of 
information, more so under Article 5(1)(a) that presumes confusion and 
grants ‘absolute’ protection. In this case, using the trademark as a keyword 
usefully facilitates free trade and the flow of information to consumers, 
without misleading them.  
Perhaps, defining the class of Internet users capable of being misled, 
whether ‘targeted’ or ‘contextual’, could help to establish a viable threshold 
for determining the liability of keyword advertisers. According to the ECJ’s 
guidance to the national courts of EU Member States, harm to the origin 
function should be found only if “reasonably well-informed and attentive 
users” are misled by the advertisement into thinking that the third party 
advertiser is affiliated to the owner of the trademark.453 That language seems 																																																								
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453 In Interflora V. Marks & Spencers Court referred to a similar test by stating “the average 
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covered. Landes and Posner have defined the former category of users as 
“consumers with low costs of acquiring and processing product information, 
(who) are not fooled”.454 
In Beta Layout, the German Federal Supreme Court held attentive 
users to be those, who appreciate the difference between results from the 
natural search and those from sponsored advertisements, and also take note 
of the advertiser’s website address.455 
Inattentive users are more prone to confusion as to the origin of a 
product, irrespective of whether or not results from the natural search are set 
apart from those from the sponsored advertisements.  
Still, this ‘standard’ of the Internet user is amoeboid so much so that national 
courts exhibit disparities in their interpretations, based on the subjective 
thinking of individual judges; consequently, there is an absence of a 
harmonised interpretive approach to the subject in the EU.456 
Considering their technical, computer orientation, it is difficult to 
expect programmers, who design keyword-derived advertisements to put 
themselves in the shoes of a particular category of prospective users; it is 
virtually impossible for them to evaluate the user standard for the purposes 
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of escaping liability, since their own standard is likely to vary from that of 
the court, and further, technical constraints render it challenging or even 
impossible to insert disclaimers.457  
Ultimately, application of the standard may require the naive strategy 
of determining what number or percentage of Internet users should get 
confused for a given advertisement to be deemed truly misleading and 
unacceptable. Without doubt, there would always be inattentive users, who 
would get confused as to the origin of a product, regardless of how an 
advertisement is shown, leaving the ECJ’s standard vague, non-instructive 
and without legal certainty.  
It is that weakness that has caused discrepancies in interpretations 
rendered by national courts. In BergSpechte, 458 for example, the Austrian 
Court apparently applying a low standard of attentiveness to find confusion, 
held that the defendant was liable for trademark infringement because of the 
absence of “appropriate clarifying indications” in the advertisement, even 
though the trademarks allegedly infringed were not shown in the 
advertisement, and further, the advertiser’s identity was provided in the 
URL.459 
Altogether, it appears that the ECJ tilts towards contextual searching 
as the basis for exemption from infringement liability, and regarding that 
classification of Internet users, the legitimate interests of consumers and 																																																								
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trademark owners may prove pertinent in determinations relating to the 
essential function. Therefore, Attentive users are considered to be alert, 
cautious and capable of assessing for themselves information furnished to 
them on the market. At any rate, as has been contended, excessive protection 
for consumer interests would, itself, be incongruous with other contending 
interests.  But the origin function is also affected by being given undue 
importance in terms of the protection considered necessary with regard to 
keyword advertising.  
Generally, the advertising function is a redeeming source of hope for 
trademark owners eager to protect their marks from being used as keywords 
by advertisers. 460 The ECJ first recognised this function in L’Oréal, 
inevitably conferring it with protection. The reality has, nevertheless, been 
different because decisions in AdWords disputes have tended to ignore the 
significance of the origin function, with demonstrated unwillingness to grant 
it any special protection.  
When several advertisers bid fiercely over a keyword, this is bound to 
push up the price of the underlying trademark. To strengthen its own 
marketing campaign, the actual owner of that trademark may end up paying 
more to buy what is, after all, its own property. This provides a cogent basis 
for finding an ‘adverse effect’ on the advertising function of that mark, thus 
justifying an agitation for protection.461 
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Such an argument appealed to the ECJ in Google France, where it 
found that the use of a trademark as a keyword would likely have some 
“repercussions” on the advertising function of that mark, more so, where, as 
a result thereof, the trademark owner is compelled to reinforce its own 
advertising drives.462 But those “repercussions” of the mark’s use, according 
to the Court, do not, per se, amount to an adverse effect on its advertising 
function. Thus, a trademark owner cannot forbid third parties from using 
signs identical to its mark in referencing services based on the grounds that 
such a use is likely to produce an adverse effect on the mark’s advertising 
function.463  
That is a judicially narrow view of what is considered to harm the 
advertising function, and the ECJ grounds this denial of protection on the 
function it performs. According to the Court, a third party’s ownership of a 
trademark should not prevent the keyword purchaser from exploiting that 
mark as a means of informing consumers or persuading them about its own 
products, provided the trademark owner’s Internet address is indicated in the 
search results. The actual owner of that mark can only allege damage to its 
advertising function, if it is prevented from promoting its own website. The 
contention would be made, though, that the Court ought not to have 
considered adverse effect on the advertising function independently, without 
regard to the issue of dilution. Protection of the economic functions is easily 
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covered by the protection guaranteed to the origin function.464 
Further, the ECJ’s position that there cannot be protection, if the 
trademark owner’s web address is indicated in the advertisement is 
unpersuasive because it cannot be doubted that the use of a trademarked 
keyword by competitors would harm the advertising function of that mark.465 
Advertising is a tool for business promotion in the fiercely contested 
marketplace, and when rival third parties use trademarked keywords bought 
from ISPs, they obviously benefit from the advertising value of that mark. 
The essence of the trademark owner’s advertisement is to create an enduring 
impression in the perception of consumers that suppresses information 
coming from rivals, and this objective is weakened when the trademark 
owner’s advertisement is beclouded by advertisements sponsored by rivals, 
even where the trademark owner’s website is shown; this is capable of 
adversely affecting the mark’s advertising function and accordingly, justifies 
protection. 
Even putting aside the likely “repercussions” on the mark’s 
advertising function, one would still arrive at the same result. The same 
effect would be produced on the mark’s uniqueness or its owner’s goodwill, 
bearing in mind the huge investments necessary for the mark to acquire that 
distinct recognition. It is legally misconceived to maintain that harm to the 
advertising function, outside unjust advantage and damage to a mark’s 
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distinctiveness, warrants protection. Extra protection is possible in this 
respect only under Article 5(2) TMD for the purposes of preserving the 
mark’s prestige and the overall objective of the Directive.466  
The Court has apparently noticed the problem associated with 
overreaching interpretations of European trademark law and the necessity of 
taking into account other competing interests, as demonstrated by its view 
that trademark law is not meant “to protect [trademark] proprietors against 
practices inherent in competition”.467 
The Court had previously held in L’Oréal that any sort of meddling 
with the advertising function is capable of adversely affecting it with 
potentially grave repercussions. Nevertheless, in L’Oreal, the Court was 
uncertain about the impact of the alleged infringer’s action on the 
advertising function. Although the implicated marks were shown in the 
advertisement, the advertiser would escape liability, if its advertisement was 
found to be in conformity with the MCAD. In this case, the ECJ concluded 
there was no compliance.  
Where a mark is shown in an advertisement and the latter fails to conform 
with the MCAD, there would probably be an adverse effect on the mark’s 
advertising function, amounting to an infringement of that mark. That would 
readily expose keyword advertisers to liability for infringement, potentially 
denying otherwise useful information derivable from advertisements. The 
capacity of the Internet as an engine for free trade will be constrained, 
whereas the interests of market monopolists would be perpetuated. Indeed, 																																																								
466 Ibid.  
467 Interflora Inc V Marks & Spencer Plc', at para 57  
free trade ideals would be jettisoned.  
As already mentioned, the additional functions of trademarks are more 
apparent than real, and without substance.468Nonetheless, in determining the 
consequence of damage to the investment function, the ECJ in Interflora 
gave serious focus to the possibility of extending protection to the 
investment function, by noting that its objective is “to acquire or preserve a 
reputation capable of attracting consumers and retaining their loyalty”.469  
Although that amounts to recognition of the possibility of causing 
harm to the investment function, by the ECJ’s reckoning, it is unlikely that 
trademark owner would be able to establish the necessary harm, even in the 
clearest of situations where such harm is possible; it is, indeed, difficult to 
contemplate other situations, where the investment function is undermined, 
requiring litigation to protect it. The Court indicates that both the advertising 
and investment functions are intertwined in that it requires the advertising 
function and the employment of “various commercial techniques” for a mark 
to attain a certain degree of fame. In Intel, the plaintiff was required to show 
‘dilution’, that is, demonstrate that there had been a change in consumer 
perception, attitude and decision making.470  
All that leaves one with a blurred imagery of the importance of 
protecting a useful principle, accompanied at the same time, by lack of 
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clarity as to how to do so. National courts in EU Member States are, 
therefore, left with hardly any direction on how to approach the issue in 
individual cases.  
8.2. Liability for Trademark infringement and Article 6(1) 
Defences  	
The level of parties’ exposure to liability for trademark infringement is 
determined by the type and scope of defences they can deploy to justify their 
use of a protected mark. One possible defence can be found in Article 6(1) 
TMD, which contains several qualifications to the trademark rights 
conferred pursuant to Article 5(1). As earlier observed, a trademark owner 
has the burden of establishing infringement under Article 5(1)(a), which 
would, in turn, necessitate the defence provided in Article 6(1) relating to 
other types of advertising and product comparison. It should be stressed that 
the defence in Article 6(1)(a) merely requires the advertiser’s identity and 
address to be revealed, and is not a prominent feature when comparing the 
descriptions. Article 6(1)(b), nevertheless, permits a third party to use a 
protected mark in a ‘descriptive’, or a ‘referential’ manner for the purposes 
of referring to the attributes of their products or the names of their 
geographical locations. It is necessary to allow third parties to make 
descriptive uses of otherwise protected marks so as to minimise potential 
negative economic consequences or limitations on free competition. As was 
pointed out in the analysis of the economic justifications for trademark 
protection, consumers would incur lower search costs, if third parties are 
allowed to make use of marks belonging to others, as no economic loss is 
inflicted on the trademark owners.  
As to referential use, this is allowed by Article (6)(1)(c) TMD “where 
it is necessary to indicate the intended purpose of a product or service, in 
particular as accessories or spare parts”. Such use is particularly vital for 
parties who make or deal in spare parts, for which it may be necessary to use 
a comparative advertising strategy that “explicitly or by implication 
identifies a competitor or goods or services offered by a competitor”.471 
  Comparative advertising is permitted by the MCAD, provided a party 
meets the conditions spelt out in Article 4, and this serves as a qualification 
to the rights granted under Article 5 TMD.472 
According to Article 4 MCAD, a comparative advertising must not 
confuse consumers, impugn the trademark used, or take undue advantage of 
its fame; it should not offer goods or services that are imitations or replicas 
of the marked ones, and should not mislead them. The ECJ interprets these 
requirements harmoniously with the tests for infringement under Article 5 
TMD.473 
Further, to avail of the defences in Article 6 TMD, use of the mark 
must conform with “honest practices in industrial or commercial matters”, 
albeit a requirement that is open to wide interpretations.474 The ECJ has 
clarified in several decisions that ‘honest practice’ is actually “The 
expression of a duty to act fairly in relation to the legitimate interests of the 																																																								
471 Misleading Advertising Directive (84/240) as Amended by the Comparative Advertising 
Directive (97/55)', at Art 2  
472 O2 V Hutchison 3g'; 'L’oréal Sa Et Al. V Bellure Nv Et Al.', at paras 53-54.  
473 Sakulin, Trademark Protection and Freedom of Expression: An Inquiry into the Conflict 
between Trademark Rights and Freedom of Expression under European Law , Kluwer Law International , 
2011, p. 34.  
474 Article 6 of TMD 
trade mark owner”.475 
The ECJ proceeded to adumbrate the extent of such a duty, and in 
Gillette, detailed out what should be taken into account when deciding 
whether use of a particular mark is in conformity with the ‘honest practice’ 
requirement contained in Article 6(1)(c).476 
 It may be contended that the defence in Article 6(1)(b) must also 
abide by that interpretation of ‘honest practice’, in view of the requirement 
that the advertiser be allowed opportunity to represent the characteristics of 
its products in a fair and proper manner. The ‘honest practice’ requirement 
would be breached, if use of a mark leads consumers to believe that the 
reseller is affiliated to the trademark owner, or if that use unfairly takes 
advantage of the mark’s uniqueness or fame. Similarly, there would be no 
honest practice, if the reseller’s mark impugns the original mark or if the 
former’s mark displays the products to which they are attached as imitations 
or replicas of the products bearing the original mark.477These conclusions 
seem though to merely repeat the TMD requirements.  
In subsequent disputes, the Court took into account other 
considerations, apart from those earlier outlined in Gillette. This was done to 
facilitate decisions about the honesty and fairness of competition practices. 
In Céline Sarl v Céline SA, the Court expressed the view that factors such as 
the degree to which the use of a mark could mislead consumers into 
																																																								
475 Bmw V Deenik', ((C- 63/97) [1999] ETMR 286) at para 61  
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believing that there exists a connection between the user and the trademark 
owner, and whether the trademark owner or a party it has permitted to use 
the mark should be taken into consideration in assessing the genuineness of 
a defence, may help in determining whether the alleged infringer could 
actually benefit from such a defence.478 
 The Court also considered the degree to which the third party knew 
that its use of the mark would likely cause consumers to assume a 
connection between that third party and the trademark owner, and further, 
directed national courts hearing any dispute to take into account any profit 
the third party may have reaped from trading on the basis of the original 
mark’s fame. The ECJ stressed that national courts should use their 
discretion in deciding the issue by engaging in a general evaluation of all the 
pertinent circumstances of each case so as to arrive at a conclusion on what 
amounts to honest practice in view of those factors.479 
  The honest practice test is arguably objective. It could be seen as 
giving broad interpretations to the defences provided in the TMD apparently 
in response to the extensive scope of trademark rights. 480  Such broad 
interpretations actually promote free competition and movement of products 
and services, the very aspirations of the TFEU. The Article 6(1)(c) defence 
“Seeks to reconcile the fundamental interests of trade-mark protection with 
those of free movement of goods and freedom to provide services” and can 
be seen to cover descriptions, in advertisements, of the attributes and quality 																																																								
478 Celine V Celine', at para 34  
479 Bmw V Deenik'; 'Gillette V La-Laboratories  
480 D. Bainbridge, Intellectual Property, 8th edn, Pearson Education Limited, 2010, p. 768. 
of the advertiser’s  products.481  
In Belgian Electronic Sorting v Peelaers, the defendant registered a 
domain name that was similar to the words used in the plaintiff’s 
advertisement, and with identical signs and products, although the issue of 
trademark infringement was not followed through. 482  Notwithstanding, 
viewed from the perspective of comparative advertising, it is clear that the 
defendant rode on the wings of the plaintiff’s fame and skill. The 
defendant’s act was considered to fall outside those the courts had 
accommodated in earlier decisions, and potentially opened novel ways of 
causing consumer confusion in violation of the essential function of marks. 
The use of identical marks must conform with MCAD requirements, and 
may render it unnecessary to proceed to the defences in Article 6.  
In the end, Article 5(2) offers a two-pronged defence to protection 
against dilution; it narrows the scope for trademark owners to allege 
infringement, and endeavours to reconcile that protection with other 
competing interests. Although the TMD fails to proffer a meaning for this 
defence, “the due cause criterion can be described as a need to use the mark 
so that it would be unreasonable to require the alleged infringer to stop the 
use”.483 
In Interflora, the ECJ modified and elaborated the view expressed 
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above.484Courts may be willing to grant respite from liability based on the 
balance of competing principles and interests, a task they are, in any case, 
expected to perform. The ‘due cause’ notion and necessity to abide by the 
statutory and Directive requirements seem to generally shield unauthorised 
third party use from liability, but this is still subject to the limitations 
imposed by trademark owners’ rights, the principles governing comparative 
advertising , as well as other competing interests, both individual and 
public.485 
8.3. Possibility of Using Art. 6(1) Defences for Advertisers  
 
As observed, the ECJ has addressed the extent of trademark protection 
granted in Article 6(1). In Portakabin v. Primakabin, the Court took the 
view that the use of a mark as a keyword was not meant to serve as a 
descriptive representation, and therefore, Article 6(1)(b) was inapplicable. 
Still, it remains for the national courts to use their discretion to determine the 
applicability of this defence in the particular circumstances of each case they 
are called upon to resolve.486 
Surely, the need to ensure free competition and movement of products 
in the European common market argues in favour of allowing third parties to 
enjoy the defence provided in Article 6(1), whenever they use or refer to a 
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mark owned by another party, so long as any of the exceptions contained in 
that article applies.487 
What is certain though, is that the defence does not avail just any use 
of trademarked keywords claiming to be ‘descriptive’. Genuinely descriptive 
uses of trademarked keywords could deserve insulation from liability as in 
Gillette v. LA-Laboratories. There, the ECJ held that the defendant’s use of 
the mark, ‘Gillette’, was descriptive as it was meant to inform consumers 
that the blades it offered were fit for Gillette Sensor handles; in that sense, 
the use of the plaintiff’s mark was necessary to clarify what the third party’s 
products were designed for, and consequently, came within the ambit of the 
defence provided by Article 6(1).488  
Even if the ‘Gillette’ mark had been used as an online keyword, the 
result would have been the same; the use would still have been descriptive, 
and, therefore, protected from liability for trademark infringement. In cases 
of comparative advertising, the third party advertiser could make use of a 
defence under Article 6(1)(b), if it is able to prove that its intention was to 
convey the “kind...or other attributes of the goods” and if that use also meets 
requirement of ‘honest practices’.489 
  The requirement that a use must be compatible with ‘honest practices’ 
demands that, to be able to rely on the exemption from liability contained in 
Article 6(1), the use of the keyword be clear in its meaning and purpose; 
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advertisements, which are vague as defined in Article 5(1)(a) and lead to 
consumer confusion are not protected by the Article 6(1) defence.490 It can be 
seen then that an advertiser’s ability to benefit from that defence is 
intertwined with the factors for establishing infringement, thus beclouding 
both cases. As Senftleben has rightly pointed out, defences “must have an 
independent meaning different from relevant infringement criteria. 
Otherwise, a finding of infringement inevitably precludes the invocation of 
limitations and renders them meaningless”.491 
Thus far, directions from the ECJ on the defences open to third party 
advertisers are not enough and leave scope for improvement. A more 
efficient approach for determining restrictions and possible defences to 
infringement claims is required. Before delving into possible ways of 
achieving this solution, some attention should be given to impending 
reformulation of the TMD by the European Commission.  
8.4. Evaluation of Comparative Advertising Defence in 
Keyword Advertising Case  	
The law, like a living system, has tendency to continually metamorphose, 
although this equally brings with it legal instability and uncertainty. 
Senftleben maintains that there is no reason to think that the ECJ would ever 
revert to a low standard for proving dilution or relinquish the trademark 
functions analysis; the rights enjoyed by trademark owners would likely 
continue to be almost as strong as those conferred on patent or copyright 																																																								
490 'Portakabin V Primakabin', at para 76-72.  
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owners. 492   Thus, as the extent of trademark protection increases, with 
correspondingly growing uncertainty as to where to draw the line, the law 
would be required to step in and work out acceptable defences for third 
parties and shield them from the liability likely from the use of protected 
trademarks.493 
The 1989 TMD and its provisions predate the emergence of the 
Internet, coming at a time when the recent information and communications 
technologies, as well as their implications were hardly in view. A Max-
Planck study has rightly identified this challenge and, in response, proposed 
a general “fair use” clause allowing some flexibility to cope with 
circumstances not previously contemplated by lawmakers, especially with 
regard to the novel methods of doing business made possible by the 
Internet.494 
The primary objective on which trademark protection under Article 6(1) was 
founded, was to prevent confusion among consumers and users. That was 
the premise for defences that enable third parties to use their own names or 
addresses to advertise rival products. It permitted messages about the 
characteristics and quality of competing products or services, as well as the 
purposes for which they were meant. The law extended protection to free 
competition and flow of information on the condition that consumers should 
be able to trust what is described to them as fair and honest: as reiterated in 																																																								
492 Ibid, p. 22.  
493 G. Dinwoodie,, ‘Developing Defenses in Trademark Law', Lewis & Clark Law Review No. 1-
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several ECJ decisions, this protection is undermined when confusion is 
created in the minds of consumers.  
In BMW, the Court exculpated the defendant on the grounds that its 
use of the plaintiff’s mark to describe the services it provided for the marked 
vehicle did not breach the restrictions on the use of that mark; consumers 
were not confused, and there was no suggestion that the defendant was a 
commercial affiliate of the plaintiff. 495   As would be considered later, 
although the BMW decision was, strictly speaking, not concerned with 
comparative advertising, the principles on which the defence was sustained 
are just as applicable; the source of the rival products or services must not 
give any indication of a commercial connection with the owner of the 
original mark, or cause consumer confusion.  
Trademarks used for referencing purposes in keyword advertising call 
for greater vigilance in  their protection and restrictive  effects on other 
freedoms; the 1989 TMD in its current form does not offer effective 
defences to cope with the variability of the  infringement tests.496 
  The potential liability facing third parties who use trademarks for 
referencing purposes remains open to the functional analysis of the purpose 
and effect of that use by the ECJ or Member State courts, whenever there is 
an alleged damage to one of its functions. A “due cause” defence is assured 
only against dilution under Article 5(2), which is restricted to famous marks. 
The recent recognition and extension of protection to other functions under 																																																								
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Article 5(1)(a) does not reconcile the contending interests of trademark 
owners and those of their rivals on the same market. This goes to show the 
limitations of the TMD.497  
Clearly, in respect of keyword advertising, the ECJ fails to properly 
enforce the restrictions on trademark protection under Article 6(1). The 
Court has conditioned the enjoyment of that defence on proof that the 
relevant advertisement was clear and did not cause confusion in the minds of 
Internet users. This means that the advertisement or connected website must 
be clear, failing which the third party advertiser’s use of an identical 
trademark as a keyword is bound to undermine the mark’s essential function. 
In effect, this requirement amounts to proving infringement, instead of the 
use of a defence.  
That leaves hardly any latitude in the enforcement of the current 
restrictions on the apparently more malleable and ever increasing rights of 
trademark owners, and to ensure the right balance with the interest of free 
competition. The Court has yet to endorse the ‘descriptive use’ of keywords 
and the ‘honest practices’ requirement in the application of the infringement 
tests. With regard to keywords, although it is possible to achieve an 
appropriate balancing of rights by way of the defences in Article 6(1) that 
may be relied upon in comparative advertising cases following L’Oreal, the 
ECJ has yet to follow this path.  
There is no reason to consider L’Oreal as a final pronouncement on 																																																								
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the interpretation of the defences in Article 6, particularly since the courts 
tend to adopt a flexible stance on the interplay of the diverse laws 
applicable. The ECJ noted this point, although it was rather as a general 
observation on the law as it pertained to the facts of the case, than the actual 
basis of the decision. In respect of comparative advertising, it would be 
necessary for advertisements of products that are the same as those of the 
original trademark owner to conform with the terms and restrictions of the 
MCAD. In L’Oreal, the ECJ suggested that the MCAD sets the borderline 
for use, the transcendence of which would trigger liability under Article 
5(1)(a). The national court that made the reference in that case had assumed 
that conformity with Article 4 of the MACD was capable of grounding a 
defence under Article 6, but the ECJ did not actually say so.498  
Therefore, it may well be appropriate to examine keyword advertising 
in relation to its‘ comparative’ equivalent, but neither the ECJ nor its 
Advocates General have really pondered this issue. The Court has not seen 
any need to consider whether keyword advertising could amount to 
comparative advertising, but has, instead, only casually and non-
instructively reflected that that could be the case. As a promotional device, 
keyword advertising has a special impact on comparative advertising, and as 
the ECJ has already decided, its use would only be justified, if it conforms 
with the principles of the MCAD and not on the basis of the defences in 
Article 6(1). 
Nonetheless, where there is such compliance, third parties would be 
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able to enjoy further exemptions that apply to referential uses and conflate 
with Article 6(1) of the TMD, without any adverse effect on the law. Still, 
the extent to which keyword advertising and comparative advertising are 
comparable must initially be clearly analysed, before any particular solution 
is endorsed.  
One should also be mindful that keyword advertising is multifaceted, 
comprising not only the webpages that are prompted for consumers to click 
on when they enter a search term on the search engine, but also the order in 
which the products or services are presented in the generated results. 
Consequently, it is possible for the third party’s competing advertisement 
prompted through the use of a trademark as keyword to be positioned over 
and above that of the trademark owner, with a greater likelihood of being 
clicked by consumers.  
So, with reference to above the main question is whether the use of 
trademarks in keyword advertising could be seen as a form of comparative 
advertising. Article 2(c) DMCA defines this concept as “any advertising 
which explicitly or by implication identifies a competitor or goods or 
services offered by a competitor”. Following the decision in Belgian 
Electronic Sorting Technology (BEST) 499 the view has been expressed that 
the use of trademarks in domain names, as well as the use of metatags in 
websites’ metadata fit within the meaning of “advertising” under Directive 
2006/114/EC (Comparative Advertising Directive) 500 , which deals with 
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misleading and comparative advertising.501    
Based on the ECJ’s established jurisprudence, to strike a balance 
between trademark protection and the use of comparative advertising, 
trademark owners are not allowed to prohibit third parties from using signs 
that are identical with or similar to their marks in comparative 
advertisements where such advertisements meet all the requirements 
necessary for comparative advertising to be allowed502. The BEST decision 
fails to resolve the issue as to whether the use of Metatags to market 
substitute products amounts, in a way, to comparative advertising. An 
affirmative answer from the ECJ would probably mean that where uses of 
trademarked keywords conform with the conditions set by the Comparative 
Advertising Directive, then such uses may be uplifted from the ambit of 
TMD and transferred into the domain of comparative advertising law. 
 
Typically, the purpose of referring to other parties’ trademarks 
through comparative advertising is primarily to help the advertiser’s 
products to gain greater appeal by alerting consumers to certain facts about 
them, including differences in price, quality or other attributes. In that way, 
consumers are better informed about products, enabling them to make only 
those purchases they believe would be most beneficial to them. Therefore, 
comparative advertising is intended to guide consumers in the complex web 
of information available on the Internet and help them make better informed 																																																								
501 Directive 2006/114/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 
concerning misleading and comparative advertising, OJ L 376, 27.12.2006, pp. 21–27. 
502  CJEU,O2 Holdings Limited and O2 (UK) Limited v. Hutchison 3G UK Limited (2008) Case 
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buying decisions.503 Even the ECJ has acknowledged that the advertising 
links that prop up from keyword advertising services, which display 
products that compete with those of the trademark owner are seen by 
consumers as the offering of alternatives, and therefore, enrich the 
information accessible to them about the online market and the different 
choices it provides.504  
However, referential uses of keywords attract consumers’ attention to 
competing products, their qualities, prices and other features, and, to that 
extent, keyword advertising may be seen as a variant of comparative 
advertising, even though not specifically presented in that way. According to 
Mills’ classification, advertisements generally manifest in three forms: (i) 
those that make exclusive reference to a single product brand, and not to any 
other rival ones, whether expressly or implicitly; (ii) those that refer 
exclusively to the attributes of a single product brand, but in doing so, make 
tacit references to the attributes of rival products; a form of indirect 
comparative advertisement; and (iii) those that directly compare the 
attributes of the products originating from one business with those of rivals, 
that is, direct comparative advertisements.505 
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Keyword advertising may be considered as a ‘semi’ or ‘in- direct’ 
comparative advertising, although it works in a manner that is identical to 
direct comparative advertising; in that sense, it qualifies as a veritable and 
lawful use of keyword, serving as a useful source of  information that 
facilitates better decision making by consumers.  
If keyword advertising services are deemed to be a type of 
‘comparative advertising’, it would imply that the reservation of keywords 
owned by other parties is legitimate; it is hardly possible for advertisers to 
refer to the products of their competitors, without using or indirectly hinting 
at their trademarks. The MCAD in its Recital 14 recognises that the need for 
effective comparative advertisements may make it “indispensable” for 
advertisers to refer to competitors’ marks, either directly or indirectly. In this 
connection, the actions of consumers or users of the Internet may have an 
effect on liability for the use of keywords. This is because it is they, who 
usually use trademarked keywords to conduct Internet searches and then 
decide which link to click on.  
In effect, it is consumers, who trigger disputes between advertisers 
and trademark owners on the likelihood of confusion and liability. Every 
click that consumers make has the potential to trigger the MCAD and the 
provisions of Article 6(1). In the contemporary business environment and in 
the genuine spirit of competition, the use of keywords would similarly be 
“indispensable” to traders with respect to online advertising. Even if 
keyword advertising is considered to be ‘indirect’ or ‘semi-comparative’ 
marketing, the use of trademarks as keywords would still amount to ‘use’ as 
defined in Article 5(1)(a) for the purposes of advertisers’ competing 
products.506 Under Article 5(3)(d), it is also possible for trademark owners to 
prevent third parties from using their marks in advertisements, although the 
ECJ, in Google France, acknowledged that it may be necessary to see things 
in a more pragmatic light to accommodate recent technological advances 
that were not foreseen during the adoption of the TMD.507  Hence, the 
provision of Article 5(3)(d) should be another good candidate to be included 
in the proposed reforms of European trademark law. 
Still, the vexed question is how the acceptance of keyword advertising 
as a type of comparative advertising would make it possible for advertisers 
to enjoy flexible defences that cope with increasing trademark rights, as well 
as overlaps in the MCAD requirements and the defences in Article 6(1). It 
seems that MCAD’s Recital 15 and Article 4, as well as TMD’s Article 
6(1)(b) offer an answer, even if only partial, but as not noted, the 
relationship between the MCAD requirements and the defences in Article 
6(1) has to be clarified before attention can shift to the issue of a solution.508  
It should be recalled that with regard to advertising, Article 4 MCAD 
demands inter alia, that the comparison should be objective (c), there should 
be no aspersion (d) and advantage should not be taken of the original 
trademark, which essential function should also be protected to prevent 
consumer confusion. These conditions certainly impose some restraint on 																																																								
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the use of keyword advertising.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER SIX: OVERVIEW OF MAIN FINDINGS, 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
 
 
1. MAIN FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION 		
The Internet poses new challenges to the legal world. In the recent years, the 
issue of using trademarks as keywords in referencing services has become a 
much-litigated issue, both in the EU and other countries and continent.  
It has provoked a discussion concerning the core concepts of 
trademark law. In the early stages of the debate, the issue most vehemently 
discussed centered around the question whether the use of a trade mark as a 
keyword in search advertising constituted a  “use”, “trademark use” or “use 
as a trade mark” thereby falling within the scope of harmonized trade mark 
law. Many Member States‘ national courts have struggled with the question 
of whether or not an unauthorized use of someone else‘s trademark as a 
keyword in an advertisement on the Internet constitutes trademark 
infringement. This entirely new way of using trademarks was not anticipated 
in the European Trade Mark Directive , nor in the Community Trade Mark 
Regulation . 
To establish trademark infringement in keyword advertising cases 
within the EU, Article 5(1) of the Trademark Directive and Article 9(1) of 
the CTM Regulation requires a “use in the course of trade” combined with 
either the condition “in relation to goods or services which are identical with 
those for which the trade mark is registered” or the condition of a 
“likelihood of confusion” for trademark infringement to be established.  
Given that the Member States’ courts have reached different conclusions on 
the issue, national courts have referred questions to the Court of Justice of 
the European Union for the Court to interpret the Trademark Directive and 
the Community Trademark Regulation. In a series of judgments, the Court 
of Justice has explained how the old laws apply to an entirely new form of 
advertising which has arrived to both the delight and the despair of brand 
owners. 
In response to this need CJEU came to a decision in the issue for the 
first time in March 2010. The Court made a distinction between advertiser’s 
liability on one hand and referencing service provider’s liability on the other. 
According to case law, the referencing service provider does not use the 
trademark in the way required by the Trademark Directive. However, 
advertisers that use someone else’s trademark, as a keyword in a referencing 
service, are liable to use that trademark in the course of trade.  
Furthermore, after examining the condition of “in relation to goods or 
services which are identical with those for which the trade mark is 
registered” the Court came to the conclusion that the trademark owner is 
entitled to prohibit an advertiser from advertising when the advertiser uses 
keywords that are identical to another’s trademark. In the case C-278/08, the 
Court clarified that the owners also are entitled to prohibit an advertiser from 
using the trademark owner’s trademark when the advertiser uses keywords 
similar to someone else’s trademark.  
So, basically we can say the ECJ did most of the hard work on 
keyword advertising in a set of judgments.509These cases have broadly 
given the practice a green light, so long as the advertising does not cause 
consumer confusion and trademark infringement. Arguably, this body of 
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jurisprudence as it was discussed in fourth chapter rendered a proportion of 
the reference in Interflora redundant by the time the ECJ came to consider it 
.in Interflora Inc v Marks & Spencer510, Court of Justice of the European 
Union, have come to a conclusion. So, with this decision, the ECJ has now 
covered almost all the bases so far as trade mark law and keyword 
advertising are concerned. Having already largely approved the practice, the 
Court of Justice has now, in the interests of fair competition, declined to give 
famous marks any additional rights to prevent it. But uncertainties remain, 
particularly as regards the application and effect of some of the newly 
emerging functions of a trademark.  
Also it was observed that, the emerging jurisprudence of the CJEU 
has continued to enhance the protection of EU trademarks, especially 
reputable marks. Its expansive interpretation of trademark use often ropes in 
uses that would ordinarily be seen as fair trademark use. For example, a 
party who uses a trademark simply for the purposes of referring to the 
product covered by that mark, or to compare that product with his own, may 
be implicated in trademark infringement.  
This is more so in cases involving reputable marks. Combined with 
the relatively easy test set by the Court for establishing reputation, such 
marks inevitably enjoy more stringent protection against dilution. As evident 
from this discourse, the Court has readily ruled that simply riding on the 
coattails of a reputable mark amounts to a trademark infringement pursuant 
to Article 5(2) TMD. In the same vein, use of a mark that adversely affects 
its advertising, investment, or communication function may lead to liability 
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for infringement under Article 5(1)(a) TMD.  
In reference to above, it is worthy to mention that keyword advertising 
disputes rarely involve reputable marks, such as Interflora, and L‘Ore ́al. 
Moreover, the CJEU has generally endorsed keyword advertising, which 
does not involve the use of a reputable mark. Therefore, Some challenges 
remain, however. Even though the Court has outlined several functions 
served by a trademark, those functions, for example, the investment 
function, remain clouded in ambiguity.  
So, with reference to above case law on this issue, within the EU, is 
still evolving and lack of clarity is likely to cause future disputes in keyword 
advertising, or other areas. Equally troubling, is that, if the transformation of 
the Internet continues with the rapidity seen in the last several years, much 
of the unfolding jurisprudence, and, indeed, EU trademark law, will be 
negated, thus taking everyone back to the starting line.  
This study also demonstrated that the stringent ‘use’ requirement of 
trademark law presents difficulty to infringement actions instituted against 
Internet intermediaries for making trademark infringing material available to 
Internet users. In doing so, reference was made, among others, to Google v. 
Louis Vuitton, a reference from a French court to the ECJ involving a 
challenge to keyword advertising and Interflora v. Marks & Spencers. 
Arguably, in relation to keyword advertising, an Internet intermediary 
clearly makes use of trademarks by selling to advertisers, keywords that are 
identical or similar to trademarks, thereby reaping some profit through the 
use of trademarks owned by others. Still, the ECJ ruled that Google did use 
any trademark in its own commercial communication, a notion first 
enunciated by the Court in that case. This means that the commercial 
communication requirement is now a hurdle that must be crossed, along with 
the other requirements for establishing trademark infringement.  
Therefore, as the EU trademark law presently stands, Internet 
intermediaries can hardly be held liable for trademark infringement for 
storing, linking or granting Internet users access to third party material, even 
where they make available, whether intentionally or not, material that 
infringes the trademark rights of others. The reason is that, in light of 
existing judicial interpretations, Internet intermediaries generally cannot be 
said to use trademarks in their own commercial communications.  
Also, It was observed that the main justifications for trademark 
protection have been examined by considering the key functions they 
perform, as elaborated in theoretical expositions that provide different 
premises for protection. Among the primary functions identified, are those 
relating to origin, quality and advertising, each of which contributes to 
sustain the trademark in the economic sphere. Regrettably absent, however, 
is unanimity on the ideal function that trademarks should perform to justify 
legal protection. Therefore, protection of additional trademark functions, 
especially the economic functions, should be consigned to unfair 
competition regimes, which equally require harmonisation in the interest of 
free competition, and, therefore, invite attention from EU lawmakers.  
For now, it would not be out of order to suggest that the economic 
functions that have been accorded independent existence, should actually be 
viewed as part and parcel of the essential origin function as has evolved in 
the contemporary marketplace. The quality function can be seen as cognate 
to the origin function, which reliability is reinforced by means of the 
advertising and promotion functions. In this way, the interest of consumers 
is served in that they are assured as to product origin.  
Regarding the origin of product , it is interesting that even the 
meaning of ‘origin’, itself, has somewhat been transformed because under 
the new manufacturing models that have emerged, as exemplified by 
licensed manufacturing and manufacturing spread across several locations, 
the exact physical location where a product was produced is no longer what 
matters as such; instead, it is the dominant control of the trademark owner 
that actually attracts protection. This is demonstrated through the economic 
functions which themselves have a bearing on the origin.  
 With reference to above, currently, two main lines of thinking seem 
to be at play. The first, which is of a parsimonious nature, advocates the 
restriction of protection to the origin function for the purposes of shielding 
consumers from confusion, and simultaneously allowing space for free 
competition. The second, more flexible position tolerates the extension of 
protection to other functions that trademarks may also be capable of 
performing, particularly those relating to quality and reputation.  
Therefore, clarification of the meaning of trademark function, and the 
commercial situations it is meant to cater for, is crucial to the delineation of 
the rights of owners and the circumstances under which consumers and 
businesses can use or refer to a trademark. Traditionally, the essential origin 
function has been, and continues to be the primary function a mark is meant 
to perform; if a mark fails to serve as a true indication of the source of the 
marked product, it would not be considered deserving of legal protection. 
However, in the contemporary world of manufacturing with different 
production models in existence like licensed manufacture, the meaning of 
‘origin’ becomes blurred. Origin must, nevertheless, still retain the dominant 
understanding among consumers as the ‘parent’ business undertaking or 
brand generating particular products or services. This complicates the 
development of marketing strategies for new entrants to markets already 
dominated by popular brands enjoying worldwide recognition, and the 
financial might to protect their business interests and trademarks, based on 
an ever growing list of justifications.  
In the environment of global trade, and especially in respect of 
trademarks, legal protection has economic ramifications. Not surprisingly, 
observers have propounded a series of economic theories to rationalise 
trademark protection. Equally, however, economic considerations of ‘cost 
and benefit’ provide an empirically convincing premise for the protection of 
the competing interests of consumers and third parties. The protection of 
trademarks based on economic rationales and the resulting restriction on free 
competition compelled the courts to conclude that protection should only be 
available for the origin function to shield consumers from confusion about 
the origin of products.  
Regarding essential function As the CJEU ruled in Google France, 
keyword advertising would run afoul of Articles 5(1)(a) and 9(1)(a) TMD, 
where the generated advertisement would make it difficult for costumers to 
know whether that advertisement actually came from the trademark 
proprietor, a person economically associated with him, or from an entirely 
unrelated party. Where this happens, the essential function of that mark as a 
guarantee of origin would be considered to have been adversely affected.  
Based on the objective of this study and the foregoing analysis, it is 
proposed here that this justification for the protection of the quality function 
should be subsumed under the protection of the origin function, instead of 
enjoying an independent existence. Also in Interflora as it was seen ,  for 
example, apart from the essential function, the court also considered two 
other functions, the investment function, as well as the advertising function, 
and only one of these functions needs to be adversely affected in order to 
constitute an infringement. 
As has been seen, among all the recent justifications advanced for 
protection, the advertising function has proven to be the most problematic 
for the courts to justify. This is understandable since the rapid growth in this 
model of marketing is crucial to free competition. In respect of keyword 
advertising, selling and E-commerce generally, advertising has turned out to 
be controversial, particularly in aspects concerning association and 
comparison. Advertising has, indeed, been seen to be an independent 
product that satisfies the interests of trademark owners and consumers. 
Regardless, it would be argued that such an intangible benefit does not, 
having regard to the tenets of free competition, have any economic rationale 
that makes it deserving of protection. In itself, advertising may be seen as a 
psychological product of the trademark, but its impact in the marketplace 
favors not consumers, but its owner through increased growth in sales and 
revenue. This returns attention back to the question regarding the purpose of 
the origin function. As discussed, the overriding premise for protection is the 
prevention of consumer confusion, and in doing so, secure other competing 
interests that may be affected under the advertising rationale.  
In respect to advertising function, It costs each individual advertiser 
more to bid on a keyword as the number of advertisers bidding on that 
keyword increases. As was seen in Interflora, it became more expensive for 
Interflora to bid on the interflora keyword when M&S bid for the same 
keyword. The increased cost of bidding meant that Interflora was compelled 
to either spend more on advertising, or scale down its advertising program. 
So, it was potentially good ground for Interflora to contend that the 
advertising function of its mark had been adversely affected. Yet, the CJEU, 
in the earlier case of Google France, did not accept such a contention. It 
maintained the same position again in Interflora, even though it’s additional 
remark that keyword advertising may not adversely affect the advertising 
function of a mark, tended to suggest that, in certain cases, keyword 
advertising may have such an effect.  
Furthermore, it is arguable that a trademark proprietor‘s investment in 
advertising would be undermined if third parties used his mark as a 
keyword. As trademark proprietors maintain, search engine owners and 
advertisers profit from their marks at no cost since no compensation is paid 
to them. By contrast, trademark proprietors often have to pay significant fees 
in order to have their own advertisements appear on a priority position. A 
possible suggestion in this regard is for search engine owners to accord 
trademark proprietors form preferential treatment so that in the competition 
between them and third party bidders for keywords, they would be entitled 
to pay less per click.  
Today, however, things have changed dramatically; trademarks now 
enjoy an enhanced position in the contemporary marketplace, and play a key 
role in the development of competition policy. The ECJ has incontrovertibly 
agreed that trademarks perform an “essential function” by helping to 
differentiate the products or services of a business from those of its 
competitors, and has, equally, through its construction of TMD, proceeded 
to acknowledge the need to extend protection to the useful advertising and 
investment functions that trademarks are also considered to perform. This 
marks a radical shift in the treatment of trademarks as a linchpin for 
commerce. 
Regarding investment function, according to the CJEU, trademarks 
could help their proprietors to attain, or maintain a reputation that wins over 
customers and retains their patronage. This seems to mean that a mark may 
attract goodwill. The Court expressed the view that proprietors could invest 
in a mark through advertising, as well as other commercial means not 
identified by the Court. And any use that results in a substantial interference, 
with the ability of a mark to help its proprietor attain, or maintain a 
reputation, will constitute an adverse effect on the investment function of 
that mark.  
Therefore, the trademark proprietor will be entitled to prevent that 
use. Moreover, according to the CJEU, in the case of marks that are already 
reputable, the investment function will be harmed where a use affects that 
reputation and threatens its preservation. Also, for reputable marks, 
proprietors are not required to prove substantial adverse effect. 
  Nevertheless, the extension of protection to the advertising and the 
investment functions of a mark, has received sharp criticism. Additionally, 
as was pointed out earlier, where there is a clear differentiation between 
natural search results, and sponsored links, which makes it easy for Internet 
users to know that the sponsored links are advertisements, which are not 
economically related to the trademark used as a triggering keyword, then the 
use cannot reasonably be said to adversely affect the functions of that mark.  
 
2. RECCOMENDATIONS 
 
(A). Since 2013, the EU has been preoccupied with dialogues and potential 
transformation of the TMD and the Community Trade Regulations to better 
harmonise the law and its implementation across Member States.511 
  As the result of those efforts are awaited, it is suggested that, in light 
of the significance of contending interests and principles, trademark 
protection ought not, and would presumably not be extended over and above 
the function it is traditionally intended to perform, which is to shield 
consumers from fake products and prevent them from being confused about 
the origin of such products. The consultative nature of the ongoing review 
efforts creates the expectation, and this is only an expectation, that the law 
would be updated to cater more specifically for e-commerce and new forms 
of advertising like keywords. Therefore, to ensure harmony between 
trademark protection and free competition, the answer lies in the hands of 
EU lawmakers. They should provide for clear and effective directions to 
national courts in the Member States so as to harmonise judicial practices 
across the common market.  
Also , notwithstanding, the important point remains that, for there to 																																																								
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be true and effective competition in the European common market, the law 
must ensure clarity, consistency, and certainty.  The conflation of the 
protections under Articles 5(1)(a) and 5(2) TMD, for example, does not offer 
that assurance; instead, it only serves as a source of confusion among 
businesses about what they can and cannot do, thereby weakening the 
effectiveness of the market. As earlier observed, the TMD was adopted 
before the emergence of the Internet and e-commerce so that its likely 
consequences for the new business environment could not have crossed the 
minds of its makers.  
(B). Imagine that you have entered a big shopping mall with the intention of 
purchasing an Adidas sports product. As the mall is a huge area, you become 
confused and unsure where to find an Adidas sports shop. You then walk to 
the mall‘s Information center to ask for directions. The information officer 
understands right away that you are looking for sports products. So, as a paid 
Nike agent, he shows you a Nike sports shop instead. If we consider the 
Information Center as a search engine, the information officer may be 
considered to have clearly misled you, and infringed the Adidas trademark.  
The truth, however, is that keyword advertising is a different story 
altogether. When you ask for an Adidas sports shop, the information officer 
(search engine) actually directs you accordingly. But being convinced from 
you enquiry that you are in need of a sports product, he also offers you a 
Nike shop flyer, for which he receives a commission. In keyword 
advertising, a search engine is able to guess what you are looking for 
through your search term. Therefore, it does not only present you with the 
natural result of your search, but also shows you links, which are exactly like 
the Nike shop flyer mentioned above. The key issue that arises is whether 
there could still be a trademark infringement if the customer can easily 
differentiate between the natural results of his search, and the sponsored 
links.  
In the minds of most members of the public, an advertisement is a 
commercial service. Businesses pay fees in order to have their products 
promoted by professional advertising companies.  
Search engine owners earn huge sums in revenue from selling 
keywords. Therefore, users are unlikely to trust advertisements in the same 
way as they trust the natural results of their search. Logically, search engine 
owners are always seeking for ways to downplay the trademark issues 
implicated in keyword advertising, and to shirk liability for infringement, as 
was explained in chapter III with respect to Google‘s policy. Google adopted 
its existing policy following the CJEU‘s rulings, not for the purposes of 
preventing trademark infringement, but for transferring liability for such 
infringement to advertisers. Thus, the prospects for trademark infringement 
still exist, but liability has been transferred to other parties. Search engine 
owners will, assuredly, continue to exploit legal loopholes that enable them 
to profit massively from keyword advertising. They will always consult with 
law firms for advice on the opportunities available for the sale of keywords 
in particular countries.  
So far, the CJEU has attempted, through a harmonious interpretation 
of EU trademark law, to protect trademark proprietors against the 
infringement of their marks, and customers from confusion. Yet, a possible 
option that may be considered for resolving the problem raised by keyword 
advertising is compelling search owners to clearly differentiate natural 
results from sponsored links. For the example, a red line on the left side of 
the natural search results could be used to indicate sponsored advertisement 
links. This is exactly like the Nike shop flyer given to the Adidas customer 
by the information officer at the shopping mall who is able to guess what 
that customer is looking for through his enquiry.  
Such an approach would help Internet users to discern the actual 
results of their search from sponsored advertisements. In this way, customer 
confusion will be prevented. In addition, customers will enjoy a greater 
variety of products offered by the sponsored advertisements. They will be 
able to find competing products, compare their qualities and prices, and 
arrive at informed purchasing decisions. After all, the general aim of 
keyword advertising is to offer Internet users alternatives to whatever they 
had initially searched for; and this practice has impliedly been well received 
by the CJEU.  
Unfortunately, the situation at the present moment is that Google 
sponsored links appear quite similar to natural search results. They appear in 
a pale highlighted area, often exactly above the natural search results, which 
does not make it easy for Internet users to distinguish one from the other. 
There is, therefore, a likelihood of confusion. As the main purpose of 
trademark law is to protect against customer confusion, the suggested 
approach will be in tune with trademark law, while also preventing 
trademark proprietors from enjoying excessive protection over their marks.  
In the above connection, it is argued that where there is a clear 
differentiation between natural search results and sponsored links, the 
relevant use cannot be said to have adverse effect on the functions of the 
trademark concerned. Where a sponsored link makes it clear that there is no 
connection between the advertiser, and the proprietor of the mark, there is 
arguably no dilution, and, therefore, no trademark infringement. Strictly 
viewed, the search engine owner does not, in such a case, sell the 
trademarked keyword. Rather, that keyword is only being used as a CODE 
that would enable the search engine to guess what the Internet user actually 
intends to purchase. Once this is made possible, the search engine can then 
display advertisements that are related to that product in a specified area 
known to Internet users to be reserved specially for sponsored 
advertisements.  
(C). The Internet has developed rapidly, and become part of societal life, 
with its associated challenges. A key emerging questions is where the 
Internet belongs. Could it be considered to be a part of the jurisdiction 
whose laws are violated by an alleged infringing act? It may be said that the 
Internet belongs to nowhere. It is not part of the real world, as the name 
cyberspace implies. But real activities take place on the Internet. Products 
are sold and bought, and payments made. It is as wide as the world, yet not 
very distant – a global village – as it is often described.  
Within this Cyber area Keyword advertising is a relatively new 
phenomenon. However, courts, especially the CJEU and those in national 
member states, have, for several years, already grappled with the challenges 
it presents. It is difficult to know how the guidelines set up by the CJEU in 
the recently handed out cases will be interpreted by the Member States' 
national courts. The CJEU leave room for interpretation of their verdicts by 
the national courts. However, I do not think the national courts' end result 
will differ that much from each other. The main question was answered by 
the CJEU, namely who can be held liable for trademark infringement in 
online keyword advertising. Whether an advertiser should be held liable for 
using someone else's trademark is up to the national courts to determine, 
which I think is reasonable given that the national courts are aware of the 
actual terms of the case  
One particularly observable fact is that the world over, Internet 
activities follow the same pattern. This leads to another suggestion, which is 
that it would, perhaps, be better to design a unique, overarching law, 
applicable to all countries, to govern the online environment.  
It may well be necessary for the World Intellectual Property 
Organization (WIPO) to convene multilateral discussions on online 
controversies, particularly keyword advertising. The ultimate goal of such 
discussions should be the adoption of a treaty addressing problems posed by 
keyword advertising, and other online activities. Alternatively, an existing 
convention, such as the Paris Convention could be amended in order to 
harmonize international trademark law relating to online activities. 
Developing countries, would benefit from such efforts, and the ratification 
of any treaties agreed. Apart from having a uniform, internationally 
recognizable law that corresponds with the ubiquitous nature of the Internet, 
the suggested approach will help to save the considerable time spent on the 
strenuous interpretation of existing domestic laws, or the adaptation of such 
laws to online controversies.  
If we should have a specific trademark law that applies to situations 
on the Internet. I think it would be a good idea, especially since national 
boundaries on the Internet are more or less nonexistent from the Internet 
user’s perspective and advertising on referencing services in a different 
country can be done by merely changing a couple of letters in Google’s 
domain name.  
It would make sure that trademark owners enjoy the same protection 
for their trademark irrespectively of where the infringement occurs on the 
Internet. It is difficult to know how a uniform law for the Internet could be 
formed. A treaty is one option. Another is to create a law within your own 
jurisdiction that makes it more difficult for referencing services to continue 
to let advertisers violate the trademark owners exclusive right to their 
trademark.  
Google and other referencing service providers nowadays create their 
own policies for their service, and changes their policies in respect to court 
verdicts within different jurisdictions. How such a national law would look 
is difficult to predict as the Internet is challenging to a lot of areas of the law.  
 
(D). So, as we can conclude that ECJ exhibits a lack of uniformity in its 
interpretations of the theory of trademark functions, the existing perspective 
on the origin function demands reconsideration because it fails to take into 
account the nature of trademark uses on Internet search engines, especially 
Google’s AdWords program, as well as consumer awareness levels in the 
context of online searches and the likelihood of confusion. In determining 
the existence of trademark dilution or whether an unfair advantage is being 
taken of a trademark, the ability of Internet users to ascertain whether a 
particular rival is or is not economically connected to the trademark owner is 
an important factor. In dealing with online uses of trademarks, therefore, 
greater attention should be paid to the behavior of Internet users. This 
requires that rivals to trademark owners be given more latitude in designing 
their marketing schemes in the online environment. That does not mean, as 
the ECJ seems to do, that the adverse effects of keyword advertising on the 
advertising and investment functions of trademarks should be neglected. 
 
(E). Another important point to be made is that, the degree of protection 
presently afforded to famous marks within the EU, is overreaching. If online 
uses of trademarks are absolutely prohibited, given the difficulty of refuting 
the presumption that rivals are taking unfair advantage of the distinctiveness 
of popular marks, coupled with inconsistency in the rules for determining 
consumer confusion, the end result would be the monopolisation by owners 
of popular marks of the online use of what is, after all, natural language. It 
must be recognised that some popular marks used as keywords are simply 
existing words, or have no ready descriptive terms that can be used as 
substitutes in Internet searches. Undue restriction on their use as keywords 
would, therefore, gravely undermine the interest of consumers. 
 
Additionally, the ECJ’s tendency to consider any form of taking 
advantage of the trademarks of rivals as potentially unfair fails to mesh with 
the nature and essence of Internet search engines, prevents consumers from 
fully exploiting the benefit of the Internet and stifles free competition. If 
trademark owners are allowed to monopolise the use of their marks, that 
would significantly hamper the free dissemination of information, a 
fundamental role the Internet is supposed to serve. It would equally 
constrain the ability of Internet search engines to manage commercially vital 
information. Therefore, rivals can only avail themselves of the due cause 
defence, if their advertisements did not make it difficult for consumers to 
ascertain that they did not originate from a trademark owner’s own 
commercial network. Thus, if trademark law is allowed to remain in its 
presently largely limitless form, the immense benefits that the Internet holds 
for society would be eroded. 
 
(F). It seems that it may make sense to initiate a system within paid search 
engine services that would permit purchasers of other parties’ trademarks as 
keywords to use those marks, provided such use would also guarantee the 
flow of some revenue to their owners. Such a system may involve the 
possession of a license permitting trademarks belonging to rivals to be used 
as keywords in paid searches. This proposal is based on the fact that the 
owners of trademarks used as keywords are in a position comparable to that 
of the owners of copyright in public performance of digital sound 
recordings. 512  The adoption of a licensing requirement for the use of 
trademarks as keywords, needs, however, to take cognizance of the 
provision of Article 21 TRIPS, which forbids WTO Member States from 
exploiting trademarks through the use of compulsory licensing. To avoid 
obstacles, therefore, any licensing system adopted to generate royalty 
payments for the use of rival parties’ trademarks as keywords in paid online 
searches should necessarily involve the agreement of the owners of those 
marks. In this respect, it may be useful to set up special bodies charged with 
the administration of the licensing system between trademark owners and 
their licensees .513 																																																								
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 In establishing the proposed licensing system, an important issue that 
should be clarified is whether trademark owners should be allowed to decide 
the level of royalties licensees are eager to pay for using their trademarks in 
keyword advertising.514 Perhaps, the royalty structure could be based on the 
mode of revenue collection employed by search engine providers in their 
keyword advertising services. An ideal royalty structure could take the form 
below: 515 
I. percentage of the click cost of the trademarked keyword; 
II. flat fee per click, or; 
I. flat fee per thousand impressions; 
II. blanket licence.  
Where royalty is based on a percentage of the click cost of the trademarked 
keyword, the owner of the relevant mark would receive payment only when 
the sponsored link is clicked because of the trademarked keyword. In this 
case, the sum payable to the trademark owner will reflect the cost of the 
trademarked keyword. 516 
This means that should the price of the trademarked keyword 
increase, for example, there would also be an increase in the fee payable to 
the trademark owner, and vice versa.517As far as the flat fee per click system 
is concerned, the keyword advertiser will pay a flat rate whenever an 
Internet user clicks on its advertisement. In this case, the price paid for the 
keyword is irrelevant. It also means that the trademark owner is assured of a 																																																								
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steady flow of revenue. 
In cases where the flat fee per impressions is adopted, a keyword 
advertiser will pay a certain amount whenever its advertisement is triggered 
by entering the trademarked keyword into the web browser .This formula 
will enable the trademark owner to earn some income in situations where an 
Internet user searches for a particular keyword, but the trademark owner’s 
sponsored link turns up, even though the user may switch to another 
webpage. This means that the trademark owner is assured of some income 
whenever the advertisement is generated as a result of its trademark being 
entered on the search engine as a keyword 518. It will compensate the 
trademark owner for the extra loss suffered due to the advertiser’s breach of 
the advertising function of its mark. Lastly, the blanket licence royalty 
model will require payment of a modest yearly fee as an annual licence, 
which would permit the use of the trademark in keyword advertising. This 
model will be particularly helpful to the owners of less popular trademarks 
that may not have the resources to monitor their marks in the marketplace or 
detect that they are being used in keyword advertising.519 
The proposal made above takes nothing away from the possibility of 
devising other arrangements that can suitably cater for the interests of all 
classes of trademark owners. Ultimately, it may even be better to allow 
trademark owners and keyword advertisers to develop royal payment 
schemes they consider most suitable. 520 
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(G). But after all, Rome was not built in a day.521   
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